**Coherence [ILLC @ UvA, June 2014]**

Professor |
Time & Place |

ILLC Seminar Room F1.15 |

This seminar will present a general framework for grounding (formal, synchronic) epistemic coherence requirements. The framework will be applied to three types of judgment: full belief, comparative confidence, and numerical confidence (

**Lecture Notes & Readings
**

The lecture notes for the three introductory lectures will be self-contained. They will be based on a draft book manuscript written by the instructor. The manuscript will be the main required reading for the seminar. All readings for the course will be made available in electronic format on this page (see below). I don't expect people to study all the optional background readings (but I recommend them all highly).

Lecture Notes & Audio Recordings for the Three Introductory Lectures

- Lecture #1 (6/3/14): Credence & Evidential Probability [slides | audio]
- Lecture #2 (6/4/14): Full Belief [slides | audio]
- Lecture #3 (6/5/14): Comparative Confidence [slides | audio]
- Q&A Session: Bonus Material (6/10/14): [slides]

**Required Reading**

*Coherence*(draft book manuscript by the instructor — with Kenny Easwaran and David McCarthy)

**Optional Background Readings On** Numerical Credence**(Lecture #1)**

- Pettigrew, Epistemic Utility Arguments for Probabilism
- Joyce, Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
- Maher, Joyce's Argument for Probabilism
- Easwaran & Fitelson, An "Evidentialist" Worry about Joyce's Argument for Probabilism
- Fitelson, Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce's Argument for Probabilism
- Caie, Rational Probabilistic Incoherence
- Greaves, Epistemic Decision Theory
- Hájek, Arguments for — Or Against — Probabilism?
- Hájek, A Puzzle About Degree of Belief

- Predd
*et al*, Probabilistic coherence and proper scoring rules - Joyce, A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
- Ramsey, Truth and Probability
- Leitgeb & Pettigrew, An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I & An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II

**Optional Background Readings on Full Belief (Lecture #2)**

- Christensen, Two Models of Belief, Deductive Constraints: Problem Cases, Possible Solutions, Arguments for Deductive Cogency [Chapters 2, 3, 4 of
*Putting Logic in its Place*] - Easwaran, Dr. Truthlove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities
- Hempel, Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation (section 12)
- Hawthorme & Bovens, The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief
- Ryan, The Epistemic Virtues of Consistency
- Pollock, The Paradox of the Preface
- Douven & Williamson, Generalizing the Lottery Paradox
- Leitgeb, The Stability Theory of Belief
- Leitgeb, Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief
- Kolodny, How Does Coherence Matter?
- Broome, Normative Requirements
- Wedgwood, The Aim of Belief
- Miller, Thirty Years of Language Dependence [Chapter 11 of
*Out of Error*] - Duddy & Piggins, A measure of distance between judgment sets
- Briggs, Cariani, Easwaran and Fitelson, Individual Coherence and Group Coherence

**Optional Background Readings ** on Comparative Confidence (Lecture #3)

- Halpern, Representing Uncertainty [Chapter 2 of
*Reasoning About Uncertainty*] - Capotorti and Vantaggi, Axiomatic Characterization of Partial Ordinal Relations
- Wong, Axiomatization of Qualitative Belief Structure
- Fishburn, The Axioms of Subjective Probability
- Icard, Pragmatic Considerations on Comparative Confidence
- Fine, Axiomatic Comparative Probability [excerpts from Chapter II of
*Theories of Probability*] - Koopman, The Axioms and Algebra of Intuitive Probability
- Krantz, Luce, Tversky, and Suppes, Chapters 5 & 6 of
*Foundations of Measurement: Volume I* - Hawthorme, The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief
- Hawthorme, A Logic of Comparative Support
- Holliday & Icard, Measure semantics and qualitative semantics for epistemic modals