**Recent Topics in Formal Epistemology**

[ Home ] [ Syllabus ] |

Professor |
Time & Place |

Branden
Fitelson |
Seminary 3 – Seminar Room |

**Readings**

All readings for the course will be posted on this page. Scroll down for the reading schedule.

**Requirements**

I will expect enrolled students to write one term paper for the seminar.

**Website**

Current course information can be found on the course web site, at:

The home page of our website is reserved mainly for announcements. You should keep an eye on the course website, as it will be updated regularly with various content and announcements pertaining to the course. The only two computer applications you will need to view/print,

etc. the content on our website are: (i) your favorite web browser, and (ii) Adobe Reader (version 6 or later, or – if you prefer – another program that can read Acrobat PDF version 6 files).

**Tentative
Schedule ** (**subject
to change and evolution – so stay tuned**)

I will be presenting material for the first 6–7 weeks of class. Then, we will have the following guest seminar presenters:

- Matt Kotzen (11/2)
- Jim Joyce (11/9)
- Darren Bradley (11/16)
- Michael Titelbaum (11/30)
- Kenny Easwaran (12/7)
OK, here are the notes, readings,

etc.,for the seminar. This list will evolve as the semester unfolds…

09/07/11:No readings for this week. I'm just going over the syllabus (and a few other things), and then assigning background readings for our second meeting.09/14/11: No meeting today (Branden's in Munich). I recommend using this week to bone-up on some background technicalities that will be presupposed in the seminar. For the most part, the seminar will presuppose only (1) sentential logic, (2) simple algebra, (3) some fundamentals of the theory of binary relations (specifically, relations that imposeorderingson sets), and (4) some simple theories that are built-up from these basic ingredients (e.g., comparative and numerical probability calculus). Here are some background materials on these topics.

- Grandy & Osherson, Sentential Logic for Psychologists
- Roberts, Relations [Chapter 1 of his
Measurement Theory]- Fishburn, The Axioms of Subjective Probability
- Fitelson, Probability & Induction Lecture Notes (first nine sets of lecture notes only)
- Fitelson, A Decision Procedure for Probability Calculus with Applications (first few sections only)
- Paris, Belief as Probability [Chapter 2 of his
Uncertain Reasoner's Companion]- Halpern, Representing Uncertainty [Chapter 2 of his
Reasoning About Uncertainty]09/21/11: Full Belief, Partial Belief, and the Lottery Paradox

- Hawthorme & Bovens, The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief
- Douven & Williamson, Generalizing the Lottery Paradox
- Smith, A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces
- Chandler, The Lottery Paradox Generalized?
- Leitgeb, Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief
- Lin & Kelly, A Geo-logical Solution to the Lottery Paradox, with Applications to Nonmonotonic Logic
- Hawthorme, The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief
- Christensen, Two Models of Belief [Chapter 2 of his
Putting Logic in its Place]09/28/11: Full Belief, Partial Belief, and the Preface Paradox10/05/11: Whither Deductive Cogency?

- Christensen, Arguments for Deductive Cogency [Chapter 4 of his
Putting Logic in its Place]- Field, What is the normative role of logic?
- Milne, What is the normative role of logic?
- MacFarlane, In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for Thought?
- Bledin, The Myth of Logical Coherence
- Murzi, Harmony and Separability in Classical Logic
- Fitelson, Goodman's 'New Riddle'
- Fitelson, Pollock on Probability in Epistemology
- Hailperin, Probability Logic
- Harman, Chapters 1 & 2 of
Change in View- Kolodny, How Does Coherence Matter?
- Broome, Does rationality consist in responding correctly to reasons?
10/12/11 - 10/26/11: Accuracy, Coherence, Evidence, and Judgment (viz., full belief, comparative confidence, and numerical credence)

- Fitelson, Notes on Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence
- Ramsey, Truth & Probability
- Hájek, A Puzzle About Degree of Belief
- Hájek, Arguments for — Or Against — Probabilism?
- Joyce, A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
- Joyce, Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
- Keynes, The Measurement of Probabilities [Chapter 3 of his
A Treatise on Probability]- de Finetti, Foresight: Its logical laws, its subjective sources [first two pages of Chapter 1]
- Fishburn, The Axioms of Subjective Probability
- Fine, Excerpts from Chapters 2 and 3 of his
Theories of Probability- Krantz, Luce, Tversky, and Suppes, Chapters 5 & 6 of
Foundations of Measurement: Volume I- Paris, Justifying Belief as Probability [Chapter 3 of his
Uncertain Reasoner's Companion]11/02/11: Matt Kotzen11/09/11: Jim Joyce

- Some Remarks on Easwaran & Fitelson’s 'An Evidentialist Worry About Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism
- Scoring Rules, Updating and Coherence

- Joyce, A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
- Joyce, Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
- Easwaran & Fitelson, An "Evidentialist" Worry about Joyce's Argument for Probabilism
- Fitelson, Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce's Argument for Probabilism
- Maher, Joyce's Argument for Probabilism
11/16/11: Darren Bradley11/30/11: Michael Titelbaum

Memory Loss, Part II of hisQuitting Certainties: A Bayesian Modeling Framework(OUP, forthcoming)12/07/11: Kenny Easwaran