Scientific Explanation & Scientific Realism

TOC: [Synopsis] [ Texts ] [ Requirements ] [ Website ] [ Tentative Schedule ]

Synopsis
The seminar will break (roughly) into two parts. Part One of the seminar (about 7 weeks) will involve the careful examination of several contemporary accounts of scientific explanation. These will include:

• The deductive-nomological
• The inductive-statistical model
• The statistical-relevance model
• Causal models
• Pragmatic or Erotetic models
• Models of explanation as unification

Some of the key questions in Part One will be:

• What is a scientific explanation?
• What purposes do scientific explanations serve? Why do we seek explanations? What are explanations for?
• What are the differences between probabilistic and non-probabilistic explanations? Can there be such a thing as probabilistic explanation?
• What sort of model of scientific explanation should we seek? Should a single model apply to all of science or should different models apply to different sciences?
• What role should pragmatic features play in a model of scientific explanation? At what level of abstraction should a model of scientific explanation be cast?
• What is the connection between Explanation and Prediction in science?
• How central is scientific explanation to scientific progress? [also a key Part Two question – see below]

In Part Two, we will think about the relationship between scientific explanation and scientific realism in contemporary philosophy of science. We will be reading about various forms of scientific realism. And, we will focus our attention on the role that explanation plays in arguments for various forms of scientific realism. Some key questions arising here are:

• How central is scientific explanation to scientific progress?
• Is scientific explanation the primary aim of science (rationally reconstructed)?
• Is "explanatoriness" correlated with the empirical (or, for that matter, super-empirical) virtues of a theory?
• Can "explanation" (or "inference to the best explanation") be used to provide a compelling argument for some version of scientific realism?
  

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Texts
All texts for the course will be made available in electronic format on this page – either in HTML or Adobe PDF format. In order to read/print/search, etc. our PDF files (note: all the PDF files available here are fully searchable), you will need Adobe Reader 6 (or another reader that can read PDF version 6 files). I recommend that you download the latest version of Adobe Reader asap (it's free). See the tentative schedule, below, for all readings (both required and supplementary).

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Requirements

• Seminar Paper (70%)
  • The seminar paper is the main work required and counts toward 80% of your semester's grade.
  • Papers can be on virtually any subject that is relevant to this seminar. I encourage you to come up with your own topic, but I am happy to make recommendations if you get stuck.
  • Everyone should email me with a proposed topic by April 1. That email should (1) describe the problem your seminar paper will tackle, (2) suggest what sort of solution you hope to be able to defend, (3) list the most important texts that you think you will need to study, and (4) explain why you decided to tackle this problem. Obviously, it is hard to answer these questions before you have finished (or even begun) your papers. But it is important to take a stab at answering them, even if it turns out that your guesses as to where you are going turn out to be off the mark.
  • Seminar papers should be 12–15 double-spaced pages in length. Much shorter papers probably will not engage the issues with sufficient detail, depth, and care. Longer papers are fine, but not if they could have been shorter without loss. Seminar papers are due on Tuesday, May 11 (last seminar meeting). Incompletes are granted only for good reasons.
  • Further comments on writing seminar papers will be posted on the web.
    
    
• Seminar Presentation (20%)
  • Students who are enrolled in the seminar for credit are all required to give one seminar presentation during the semester, which will count for one-fifth of your semester's grade.
  • Seminar presentations will typically consist in articulating some specific issue that arises in the assigned reading for the particular meeting of the seminar, clarifying and relating the views on this issue that are defended in the readings, and offering a tentative conclusion concerning how the issue should be addressed.
  • Seminar presentations should be roughly 20 minutes in length. (If they were written out, they would be roughly six double-spaced pages.) The goal is to make a clear and useful presentation to the seminar that will help to focus the discussion that follows, not to write a second briefer paper. Seminar presentations may be interrupted with questions, and seminar presenters should lead the ensuing discussion.
  • In many cases seminar presentations will be on the same topic as the seminar paper. But this is not necessary, and those who give presentations early in the semester may well decide to focus on different questions in their seminar papers.
  • Students should have an outline of their presentations ready a week in advance and should discuss their outlines with me.
  • A list of possible topics and dates for presentations will be posted on the notes & handouts page and distributed during the first meeting of the seminar, and I shall ask you to let me know your first four choices by our third meeting.
    
    
• Seminar Participation (10%).
  • Participation in discussion in the seminar will count for 10% of your semester grade, though only in unusual circumstances will poor participation lower your grade.
  • Discussion is a crucial part of a seminar. Though I hope that I will have useful insights and perspectives to offer, every member of the seminar should have useful insights and perspectives to offer to the other members, too.
  • I will use the course notes & handouts page to post occasional questions and puzzles of my own, which I hope will further stimulate discussion.

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Website
Current course information can be found on the course web site, at:

http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~fitelson/290/

The home page of our website is reserved mainly for announcements. The purpose of the other pages on our website should be self–explanatory. You should keep an eye on the course website, as it will be updated regularly with various content and announcements pertaining to the course. The only two computer applications you will need to view/print, etc. the content on our website are: (i) your favorite web browser, and (ii) Adobe Reader (version 6 or later, or – if you prefer – another program that can read Acrobat PDF version 6 files).

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Tentative Schedule (subject to change – so stay tuned)

Week 1 : The Deductive–Nomological (D–N) Account of Scientific Explanation

• Required Readings
  • Hempel and Oppenheim, Studies in the Logic of Explanation (don't worry about the Postscript until next week), pp. 9–50 of Joseph Pitt, ed. Theories of Explanation. Oxford University Press, 1988. [JSTOR version of original journal article]
  • Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, Introduction & Chapter 1 [you can download the notes and bibliography of Salmon's book here]
• Further Reading
  • Woodward, The DN Model, Section 2 of his Scientific Explanation entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Week 2: Controversies Surrounding the D–N Account

• Required Readings
  • Scriven, Explanations, Predictions, and Laws, pp. 51–74 of Joseph Pitt, ed. Theories of Explanation. Oxford University Press, 1988.
  • Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, Chapter 2 [esp. sections 2.1–2.3] [you can download the notes and bibliography of Salmon's book here]
  • Hempel and Oppenheim, Studies in the Logic of Explanation (now worry about the Postscript!), pp. 9–50 of Joseph Pitt, ed. Theories of Explanation. Oxford University Press, 1988. [JSTOR version of original journal article]
• Further Reading
  • Scheffler, Explanation, Prediction, and Abstraction, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (1957): 293–309.
  • Eberle, R., Kaplan, D. & Montague, R., Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation, Philosophy of Science 28 (1961), pp. 418–28.
  • Woodward, The DN Model, Section 2 of his Scientific Explanation entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  • Bromberger, Why Questions, in R. Colodny, ed. Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966, pp. 86–111.

Week 3: Inductive-Statistical (I–S) and Statistical Relevance (S–R) Accounts

• Required Readings
  • Hempel, Two Basic Types of Explanation, Inductive–Statistical Explanation, and The Thesis of Structural Identity, pp. 685–719 (from Chapter 6) of Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, Curd, M. and Cover, J.A. eds., W.W. Norton, 1998.
  • Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, Chapter 2 [esp. sections 2.4–2.5], and Chapter 3 [sections 3.1–3.4] [you can download the notes and bibliography of Salmon's book here]
  • Woodward, The SR Model, Section 3 of his Scientific Explanation entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Further Readings
  • Coffa, Hempel's Ambiguity, pp. 57–77 of Explanation, Ruben, D.H. ed., Oxford University Press, 1993.
  • Coffa, Probabilities: Reasonable or True?, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No. 2. (Jun., 1977), pp. 186–198.
  • Fetzer, What's Wrong with Salmon's History: The Third Decade, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 59, No. 2. (Jun., 1992), pp. 246–262.
  • Strevens, Do Large Probabilities Explain Better?, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, No. 3. (Sep., 2000), pp. 366-390.
  • Malinas and Bigelow, Simpson's Paradox, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Week 4: Two Other (Broadly) Probabalistic Accounts of Explanation

• Required Readings
  • Railton, A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 45, No. 2. (Jun., 1978), pp. 206–226.
  • Railton, Probability, Explanation, and Information, Synthese 48 (1981): 233-256.
  • Harman, Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation, American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 5, Number 3, July 1968. [just the sections indicating Harman's account of "best explanation"]
• Further Readings
  • Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 [sections 3.3, and 4.6] [you can download the notes and bibliography of Salmon's book here]
  • van Fraassen, The Pragmatic Theory of Explanation, pp. 136–156 of Joseph Pitt, ed. Theories of Explanation. Oxford University Press, 1988. [just the "evaluative" section describing the probabilistic component of his theory]
  • Strevens, Do Large Probabilities Explain Better?, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, No. 3. (Sep., 2000), pp. 366-390.
  • Good, Explicativity: A mathematical theory of explanation with statistical applications. In his Good Thinking, UM Press, 1984. [the last two pages explain how to do radioactive decay with likelihood ratios]

Week 7: Causal Accounts of Explanation

• Required Readings
  • Lewis, Causal Explanation, pp. 214–240 (Chapter 22) of his Philosophical Papers: Volume II, Oxford University Press, 1986. [featured article for this week]
  • Salmon, Statistical Explanation and Causality, pp. 75-119 of Joseph Pitt, ed. Theories of Explanation. Oxford University Press, 1988.
  • Woodward, The Causal Mechanical Model, Section 4 of his Scientific Explanation entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Further Readings
  • Davidson, "Causal Relations", Journal of Philosophy, 64(21): 691–703 (JSTOR version)
  • Lewis, "Causation as Influence", Journal of Philosophy 97(4): 182–97
  • Schaffer, "The Metaphysics of Causation" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  • Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 [sections 3.7, 4.7, and 4.8] [you can download the notes and bibliography of Salmon's book here]
  • Strevens, The Causal and Unification Accounts of Explanation Unified – Causally, forthcoming in Nous. [esp. sections on causal accounts of explanation]

Week 8: Pragmatic and Erotetic Accounts of Explanation

• Required Readings
  • van Fraassen, The Pragmatic Theory of Explanation, pp. 51–74 of Joseph Pitt, ed. Theories of Explanation. Oxford University Press, 1988. [now, the entire article!]
  • Kitcher and Salmon, van Fraassen on Explanation, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 84, No. 6. (Jun., 1987), pp. 315–330
• Further Readings
  • Bromberger, Why Questions, in R. Colodny, ed. Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966, pp. 86–111.
  • Bromberger, An Approach to Explanation, Chapter 1 of his On What We Know and What We Don't Know: Explanation, Theory, Linguistics, and How Questions Shape Them, University of Chicago Press, 1992.
  • Achinstein, The Pragmatic Character of Explanation, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers. (1984), pp. 275–292.
  • Maher, Prediction, Accommodation, and the Logic of Discovery, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1988, Volume One: Contributed Papers. (1988), pp. 273-285.

Week 9: Explanation and Unification

• Required Readings
  • Friedman, Explanation and Scientific Understanding, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 71, No. 1. (Jan. 17, 1974), pp. 5–19.
  • Kitcher, Explanatory Unification, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 48, No. 4. (Dec., 1981), pp. 507–531.
  • Kitcher, Explanation, Conjunction, and Unification, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 8. (Apr. 22, 1976), pp. 207-212.
  • Woodward, A Unificationist Account of Explanation, Section 5 of his Scientific Explanation entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Further Readings
• Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, Chapter 3 [section 3.5]
• Strevens, The Causal and Unification Accounts of Explanation Unified – Causally, forthcoming in Nous. [esp. sections on unificationist accounts of explanation]
• Woodward and Hitchcock, Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account, Nous 37 (2003): 1–23.
• Hitchcock and Woodward, Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth, Nous 37 (2003): 181–199.

Week 10: Inference to the Best Explanation (a.k.a, Abduction) and its Critics

• Required Readings
  • Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 74, No. 1. (Jan., 1965), pp. 88–95.
  • Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, Chapter 4 of his Inference to the Best Explanation.
  • van Fraassen, Inference to the Best Explanation: Salvation by Laws?, pp. 130 –150 (Chapter 6) of Laws and Symmetry, Clarendon Press, 1989. [you can download the notes and bibliography for van Fraassen's book here]
• Further Readings
  • Niiniluoto, Defending Abduction, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 66, Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers. (Sep., 1999), pp. S436-S451.
  • Harman, Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation, American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 5, Number 3, July 1968.
  • Harman, Detachment, Probability, and Maximum Likelihood, Noûs, Vol. 1, No. 4. (Dec., 1967), pp. 401-411.
  • Psillos, On Van Fraassen's Critique of Abductive Reasoning, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 182. (Jan., 1996), pp. 31–47.
  • Ladyman, Douven, Horsten, van Fraassen, A Defence of Van Fraassen's Critique of Abductive Inference: Reply to Psillos, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 188. (Jul., 1997), pp. 305–321.

Week 11: Explanation & Scientific Realism 1: Overviews of "Explanationism" and Scientific Realism

• Required Readings
  • van Fraassen, Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism, pp. 6–40 (Chapter 2) of The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press, 1980. [focus on sections concerning IBE and explanationist realist strategies]
  • Boyd, Scientific Realism, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [focus mainly on "explanationism" – section 3]
• Further Readings
  • Teller, Whither Constructive Empiricism?, Philosophical Studies, 106 (2001): 123–150.
  • Monton and van Fraassen, Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism , forthcoming in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
  • van Fraassen, Constructive Empiricism Now, 2000 APA.
  • Psillos, Defending Scientific Realism, excerpt from his Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. [focus just on explanationism for now – we'll read this whole article for week 14]

Week 12: Explanation & Scientific Realism 2: Explanatoriness, Truth, and Scientific Realism

• Required Readings
  • Glymour, Explanation and Truth, in Scientific Realism.
  • Hitchcock, Causal Explanation and Scientific Realism, Erkenntnis 37(2), 1992, 151–172.
• Further Readings
  • Hempel, The Theoretician's Dilemma, from his Aspects of Scientific Explanation
  • McMullin, Explanatory Success and the Theory of Truth, in Scientific Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective.
  • Putnam, Explanation and Reference, in his Mind, Language, and Reality.

Week 13: Explanation & Scientific Realism 3: Scientific Realism, Empiricism, and Scientific Progess 1

• Required Readings
  • Brown, Explaining the Success of Science, in Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues
  • Lipton, Truth, Existence, and the Best Explanation, in The Scientific Realism of Rom Harré.
• Further Readings
  • Laudan, Explaining the Success of Science: Beyond Epistemc Realism and Epistemic Relativism, in Science and Reality: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science.
  • McMullin, A Case for Scientific Realism, in Scientific Realism.
  • Thagard, The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 2. (Feb., 1978), pp. 76-92
    

Week 14: Explanation & Scientific Realism 4: Scientific Realism, Empiricism, and Scientific Progess 2

• Required Readings
  • Psillos, Defending Scientific Realism, excerpt from his Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth
  • Laudan, A Confutation of Convergent Realism, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 48, No. 1. (Mar., 1981), pp. 19-49
• Further Readings
  • Hardin and Rosenberg, In Defense of Convergent Realism, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 49, No. 4. (Dec., 1982), pp. 604-615
  • Leplin, Truth and Scientific Progress, in Scientific Realism.
  • Turner, The past vs. the tiny: historical science and the abductive arguments for realism, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (A) (March 2004).
  • Musgrave, The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism, in Realism and Relativism in Science
  • Psillos, Thinking About the Ultimate Argument for Realism, PhilSci Archive
  • Stanford, An Antirealist Explanation of the Success of Science, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, No. 2. (Jun., 2000), pp. 266-284.
  • Lange, Baseball, pessimistic inductions and the turnover fallacy, Analysis (October 2002).
  • Stanford, No Refuge for Realism: Selective Confirmation and the History of Science, forthcoming in Philosophy of Science.
  • Psillos, The Present State of the Scientific Realism Debate, forthcoming in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • Psillos, Resisting the Pessimistic Induction, excerpt from his Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth
  • Horwich, Realism and Truth, Philosophical Perspectives, 30(10): 187–197.

Week 15: Explanation & Scientific Realism 5: "Closeness to Truth" (Verisimilitude, Truthlikeness)

• Required Readings
  • Oddie, Truthlikelness, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [especially, sections on Popper and Tichy]
  • Forster, Philosophy of the Quantitative Sciences: Unification, Curve Fitting, and Cross Validation, précis of book manuscript (2004).
• Further Readings
  • Teller, Twilight of the Perfect Model Model, Erkenntnis 55 (2001): 393–415 [especially, sections 4 and 5].
  • Niiniluoto, Verisimilitude: The Third Period, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 49 (1998): 1–29.
  • Miller, Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25 (1974): 166–177.
  • Fitelson, A Concise Analysis of Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude, manuscript (2000).
  • Forster, Notes on Verisimilitude [from his introductory philosophy of science course].
  • Forster, Chapters 2 and 3 of Philosophy of the Quantitative Sciences: Unification, Curve Fitting, and Cross Validation, book manuscript (2004).
  • Forster and Sober, How to Tell when Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories will Provide More Accurate Predictions, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45 (1994) : 1–35.

Week 16: Beer at a Local Pub (on Me)

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