

## 1 Knowledge as Justifying Belief

In this section, TW points out that while  $S$ 's justified beliefs need not be known by  $S$ , this doesn't imply that what justifies  $S$ 's beliefs (namely,  $S$ 's evidence) need not be known by  $S$ . He's right that it doesn't follow, but on many (internalist) evidentialist views (like Feldman's), the following is *not* assumed:

(1) If  $S$ 's belief that  $p$  on the basis of  $E$  is justified (by  $E$ ), then  $S$  knows that  $E$ .

What Williamson is pushing is a kind of evidentialism, but one according to which the evidential basis is itself known. TW's evidentialism is also a kind of *foundationalism*, since he equates  $S$ 's total evidence with the totality of  $S$ 's knowledge (this is his  $E = K$  thesis). One's evidence justifies one's beliefs, and there is no further (pressing) question of what justifies one's evidence, since it is *known*. This does block a potential regress for internalist conceptions of evidentialism. One can ask an internalist evidentialist questions like "Doesn't your evidence for  $p$  have to be supported by further evidence?". For TW, once something gets counted as evidence, it must be known, which makes such questioning otiose. That seems like an advantage.

But, is it really an advantage? This is not at all obvious to me. I often find myself saying things like "I believe  $p$  on the basis of my belief that  $q$ , and my belief that  $p$  is thereby a justified belief" without feeling committed to the claim that I *know*  $q$ . Williamson seems to be assuming that the basing relation ( $S$  believes that  $p$  on the basis of their belief that  $q$ , and said belief is thereby justified) must take knowledge for its second argument, but not necessarily for its first. It's not clear to me why we should have an asymmetric basing relation in which the second argument must be factive but the first need not be. To my mind, talk of justified (or epistemically rational) belief is sometimes entirely *non-factive*. As Sherri, Jim Joyce (online paper) and I have been suggesting, the internalist just seems to have a different conception of evidence and justification in mind. This is a crucial issue, since (*e.g.*) TW's discussion of scepticism trades essentially on the *factivity* of evidence. I already complained about that last week. I'll return to this issue again, below (in several places).

## 2 Bodies of Evidence

In this section, TW lays down his explication of " $E$  is evidence for  $H$  for  $S$ ", which is:

(EV)  $E$  is evidence for  $H$  for  $S$  iff  $S$ 's evidence includes  $E$  and  $\Pr(H | E) > \Pr(H)$ .

There are two components to (EV). The first component is the inclusion of  $E$  in  $S$ 's *body of evidence*. The second component is the "support" component. I'll take the second component first. Williamson explicates " $E$  supports  $H$ " as " $E$  and  $H$  are positively correlated, under a suitable probability function". This way of thinking about evidential support goes back to (at least W.E. Johnson). Modern Bayesian confirmation theory has adopted a similar account, but one that is *internalist* about "inclusion in  $S$ 's body of evidence" and *subjectivist* about the "suitable" probability function. Williamson, on the other hand, is an *externalist* on the "inclusion" question (more on that later) and an *objectivist* about the "suitable" probability function.

Carnap endorsed a similar account of "support". He thought there were "logical probabilities" out there (analogous to entailments), and that these were the "suitable" probability functions that undergird "support" relations. Williamson has a similar thing in mind here. His "evidential probabilities" (to be discussed next week in detail) are not subjective degrees of belief and they are also not "epistemically rational" degrees of belief (*viz.*, *credences*). They are quasi-logical in nature. We'll say more about that next week. There is an immediate problem that Williamson faces with the combination of his  $E = K$  thesis and the Carnapian-style conception of support or confirmation. Carnap endorsed a *requirement of total evidence*:

(RTE) In the application of inductive logic to a given knowledge situation, the total evidence available must be taken as a basis for determining the degree of confirmation.

What Carnap meant by (RTE) was that when we are assessing the degree to which  $E$  supports  $H$  for  $S$  in a context  $C$ , we must use a probability function  $\Pr(\cdot | K)$  that is *conditioned on*  $S$ 's total evidence  $K$  in  $C$  (for Carnap,  $K$  denotes the totality of  $S$ 's knowledge in  $C$ ). If  $E = K$ , then the combination of TW's (EV) and Carnap's (RTE) lead immediately to paradox. Assume that  $E$  is evidence for  $H$  for  $S$ . Then, following (RTE) and (EV), we must have  $\Pr(H | E \& K) > \Pr(H | K)$ , where  $K$  is  $S$ 's total evidence. However, if  $E$  is evidence for  $H$  for  $S$ , then — by  $E = K$  and (EV) —  $E$  is included in  $K$ . But, if  $E$  is included in  $K$ , then  $\Pr(H | E \& K) = \Pr(H | K)$ , and  $E$  is *not* evidence for  $H$  for  $S$ . This is absurd. Was Carnap just dumb, or what? What.

Carnap was, in fact, only endorsing (RTE) for a *different kind* of "support" relation. Carnap was only endorsing (RTE) for a probability threshold conception of confirmation, according to which  $E$  confirms  $H$  iff  $\Pr(H | E) > t$ . And, this relation is not undermined by conditioning on  $S$ 's total evidence  $K$ . If  $E$  is included in  $K$ , then  $\Pr(H | E) = \Pr(H | E \& K)$ , but these can both

be larger than any given fixed threshold value  $t$ . So, the paradox above only applies to the probabilistic relevance conception of “support” that TW is using. Carnap was not talking about that kind of support relation in his discussion of (RTE). As such, this is a problem faced by TW and not by Carnap. Of course, anyone who endorses a probabilistic relevance conception of confirmation can potentially run headlong into this problem. This problem is generated by a naive interpretation of (RTE), which reads “ $K$  must be taken as a basis for determining  $c(H, E)$ ” as “ $c(H, E)$  must be calculated using a probability function  $\Pr(\cdot | K)$  that has been *conditioned on*  $K$ ”. Carnap endorsed this reading, but only for the non-relevance (threshold) conception of confirmation. Ultimately, I agree with TW that this naive reading of (RTE) must be abandoned in favor of a more subtle reading, if one is going to assume (RTE) and a probabilistic relevance conception of support. However, I am not satisfied with TW’s approach, since he assumes the existence of quasi-logical “evidential probabilities” (more on that next week).

TW’s discussion here obscures an important difference between his RTE-paradox and the analogous problem faced by contemporary subjective Bayesian confirmation theory. Given the naive Carnapian reading of (RTE), TW’s  $E = K$  thesis forces him to *never* conditionalize  $\Pr$  on  $K$ . This is worse than the analogous problem faced by contemporary subjective Bayesian confirmation theory (infamously known as “the problem of old evidence”). For the subjective Bayesian, *if  $E$  is believed with certainty by  $S$ , then  $E$  cannot be correlated with any  $H$  on  $S$ ’s credence function*. This is not absurd (categorically), but it is problematic, since there will be *some* cases in which we want to say that  $E$  is evidence for  $H$  for  $S$  *even though*  $S$  believes  $E$  with certainty. TW, on the other hand, is forced *never* to conditionalize his “evidential probability function”  $\Pr$  on  $S$ ’s total evidence  $K$ , on pain of *thereby* making it false that  $E$  is evidence for  $H$  for  $S$ . In this sense, it is rather odd for someone with a probabilistic relevance conception of support to endorse  $E = K$ . The Bayesian will say that  $E \neq K$ , and this is why  $E$  can often have probability less than 1 (for  $S$ ), which is required for  $E$  to confirm any  $H$ ’s in the subjective Bayesian sense. So, while a subjective Bayesian *sometimes* faces an “old evidence” problem (when  $S$ ’s credence in  $E$  is 1), TW *always* faces an analogous problem, because he endorses  $E = K$ . I take this as a (*prima facie*) strike against TW’s  $E = K$  thesis.

Another crucial question you need to ask yourself here is: What is the relationship between “ $E$  is evidence for  $H$  for  $S$ ” and “ $S$ ’s belief in  $H$  on the basis of  $E$  is justified (by  $E$ )”? Clearly, the former is not a sufficient condition for the latter, since  $\Pr(H | E) > \Pr(H)$  is consistent with  $\Pr(H | E)$  being *very low*. Perhaps Williamson intends it only as a *necessary* condition? I don’t think he says anything about this in the chapter, but it is a very important issue. I wonder if even the conjunction of  $\Pr(H | E) > \Pr(H)$  and  $\Pr(H | E) > t$  can be sufficient (by Williamson’s own lights) for “ $S$ ’s belief in  $H$  on the basis of  $E$  is justified (by  $E$ )”. This is worth thinking about. If we can’t tell some story about the connection between the probabilistic and dichotomous epistemic concepts Williamson pushes around in these chapters, then I’m worried the probabilistic machinery will turn out to be just an idle technical dangle that floats free from much of the rest of the book. This is a long-standing and well-known problem faced by “probabilistic epistemologists”. [Joyce opts for a purely gradational and quantitative approach to epistemology. I suspect he does so, largely because of the deep problems of trying to connect the two domains.] Putting these traditional vs formal epistemology worries to one side, I have another worry about this section. It is rather unclear to me what TW could possibly mean by “ $S$ ’s total evidence  $K$  supports  $H$ ”. His account seems to say this amounts to the claim that  $\Pr(H | K) > \Pr(H)$ , but now what probability function are we supposed to use to evaluate *this* claim? Apparently, it must be an “evidential probability” that is conditioned on *none* of  $S$ ’s evidence. What is *that*, and why does it have any probative value for what  $S$  (whose knowledge is  $K$ ) should believe (or what  $S$ ’s degrees of belief should be)? This sounds like it might require *too strong* a rejection of (RTE). It also sounds like TW will need an “a priori” or “information-less” evidential probability function after all (just like Carnap did). I wish him luck with that (more on this issue next week). Michael will also tell us a lot more next week about the shortcomings of some of the formal models TW presents in these two chapters.

### 3 Access to Evidence

In this section, TW rehearses some of his old points about the lack of perfect access to one’s knowledge, and also to one’s evidence. I agree with all of that. But, none of this shows that  $S$  can have *no* access to the fact that  $E$  is evidence for  $S$  (*e.g.*, because  $S$  has no access to the fact that  $E$  is *true*, which TW requires of evidence) without thereby undermining  $E$ ’s status as evidence *for*  $S$ . And, it seems to me, this is what TW would need to establish in order to allay the deeper worries of internalists (especially, sceptical ones). The mere fallibility of  $S$  with respect to judgments of the form “ $E$  is evidence for  $H$  for  $S$ ” does not put to rest the sceptical worries or the more general worries about access that internalists have. There is an intuitive sense that  $S$ ’s belief that  $S$  has hands is equally justified for  $S$  in both the good and the bad cases. And, TW’s theory is unable to recover that intuition (because, according to TW,  $S$ ’s belief is justified in the good case and unjustified in the bad case). I take that as another (*prima facie*) strike against  $E = K$ . Nobody wants (or thinks we can have) *perfect* access to our evidence, but by assuming  $E = K$ , Williamson makes “ $S$ ’s evidence” *so* detached from  $S$  that it leads to unintuitive consequences about which of  $S$ ’s beliefs are justified (or epistemically rationally believed on the basis of  $S$ ’s evidence or supported by  $S$ ’s evidence). Foley does a good job of explaining this shortcoming of TW’s account in his review of KAIL.

In this section, TW says some things about the “standard of correctness” for belief, which says is:

(SCB) Proportion your belief in  $p$  to the support that  $p$  receives from your evidence.

For Williamson, this is equivalent to:

(SCB') Proportion your belief in  $p$  to the support that  $p$  receives from your knowledge.

As I explained above, TW must have something like high conditional evidential probability  $\Pr(H | K) > t$  in mind here, rather than merely  $\Pr(H | K) > \Pr(H)$ . Otherwise, this would be a rather silly rule, since  $K$  could be *strongly positively relevant* to  $H$  (relative, I suppose, to an “information-less” or “a priori” Williamsonian quasi-logical evidential probability function) even if it *confers a low evidential probability* on  $H$ . Watch for this ambiguity between “firmness” and “increase in firmness” senses of “support” (as Carnap called them) throughout chapters 9 and 10. Also, we’ll need to think hard about how TW understands “standards of correctness” and “norms” for belief. Beri will also be talking about that in our last meeting this semester. But, I already have serious worries about the probative or normative force of anything like the rules or norms TW seems to be presupposing here. First, it is unclear what the content of the norms is (because of the “firmness”/“increase in firmness” ambiguity). Second, even if we could get clear on that, TW’s norms seem much more stringent than our normal usage of words like “justified” or “rational” belief would support. [I guess he’ll make a distinction between “blameworthiness” and “objectively failing to follow a rule”. But, then, I’m not sure I see what normative force the norms are actually going to have.]

## 4 An Argument for $E = K$

Williamson gives a little argument for  $E = K$  here:

- (2) All evidence is propositional.
- (3) All propositional evidence is knowledge.
- (4) All knowledge is evidence.
- (5)  $\therefore$  All and only knowledge is evidence.

I have no major problems with (2) or (4), and I take it neither do most modern internalists (like Feldman and Conee, and Joyce). So, all of the controversy must be surrounding (3). My first worry about (3) is that it implies that evidence is factive, which I think is quite controversial (especially, in the context of the scepticism debate). Feldman, for instance, takes  $S$ 's evidence to consist of  $S$ 's occurrent beliefs and experiences. Joyce suggests a gradational notion of “inclusion”, rather than a categorical one. Neither Feldman nor Joyce has a requirement that  $E$  be true (or known by  $S$ ) in order to count as evidence (for  $S$ ). As I mentioned above, I am sympathetic to this. It seems perfectly natural to think that  $S$ 's belief that  $q$  can sometimes be evidence for  $p$  (for  $S$ ), even in cases where  $q$  happens to be false. That is inconsistent with (3). Moreover, even if we insist that  $E$  must be true in order to count as evidence for  $S$ , it seems a very strong requirement that evidence must be *known by S* in order to count as evidence for  $S$ . Why not allow some true beliefs that aren't known to count as evidence? I don't see an argument for this anywhere in the book. My second worry about (3) is that it is the source of the paradox discussed above in connection with (EV) and (RTE). Recall the argument: Assume  $E$  is evidence for  $H$  for  $S$ . Then, by (EV) and (RTE),  $\Pr(H | E \& K) > \Pr(H | K)$ . But, by (3), we also have that  $E$  is included in  $K$ , which implies  $\Pr(H | E \& K) = \Pr(H | K)$ . So, it is really just (3), (EV), and (RTE) that generate the paradox. I take this as a (*prima facie*) strike against (3). I think it is at (3) where the epistemic internalist is going to get off the boat. I'm inclined to get off the boat here too. [See Joyce for more.]

## 5 Evidence as Propositional

I have no problem with the claim (2) that evidence is propositional. I don't think modern epistemic internalists/evidentialists do either. [I also don't have any problem with  $E$  being evidence for itself.]

## 6 Propositional Evidence as Knowledge

As I explained above (and in my second handout from last week), I think this is quite an important and controversial section. He gives various arguments for (3) here. I don't find any of them convincing.

- The *inference to the best explanation* argument. “Why would  $H$ 's being a better explanation of  $E$  than  $H'$  count in favor of  $H$  over  $H'$  unless  $E$  were known?” I don't accept inference to the best explanation as a way to ground favoring claims in the first place, so this argument is not compelling to me. This is beyond the scope of the seminar, but I recommend reading van Fraassen on IBE and confirmation. *E.g.*, you might want to read chapter 6 of his book *Laws and Symmetry*.

- The *incompatibility/ruling-out* arguments. “Why should the probability of  $H$  on  $E$  regulate our degree of belief in  $H$  unless we know  $E$ ?” Well, it depends on whether you think there is such a thing as the “inductive” or “evidential” probability of  $H$  on  $E$  in the first place. If you don’t (like me and Joyce), then you’ll probably want to revert to an explicitly epistemic notion of conditional probability from the outset. Then, it will just be *constitutive* of “ $\Pr(H|E\&K) = r$ ” that it would be epistemically rational for  $S$  (an agent with total evidence  $K$ ) to have degree of belief  $r$  in  $H$  on the supposition that  $E$ . And, if it is also the case that  $\Pr(E|K) = 1$ , then it will follow from the probability axioms that  $\Pr(H|K) = r$ . There may still be a residual question as to why epistemically rational degrees of belief (credences) should be probabilities *at all*. But, Williamson doesn’t seem to be questioning the relevance of probabilistic quantities *per se* in the assessment of evidential relationships. He never argues for probabilism.

“An incompatibility between  $H$  and  $E$  does not rule out  $H$  unless  $E$  is known.” So? Why does “ruling-out” have any special place in an otherwise gradational/probabilistic approach to evidential relationships? What matters are “evidential” probabilities (or, Joyce and I would say, *credences*). Joyce suggests adopting have a *gradational* notion of “possessing” evidence, not a categorical one. He also describes some other differences between  $H$  and  $H^*$  in TW’s urn example (gradational differences that do not trade on only one of them being “not ruled-out by”  $S$ ’s evidence).

- The *chain reaction* argument. I just didn’t get this one (page 201).
- The *evidence must be true* argument. “One’s evidence may make some truths improbable, but it should not exclude any outright.” Why not? An internalist (especially a sceptic) will need more convincing. As Sherri and Jim Joyce point out, this is not making contact with an important (albeit internalist) sense of “evidence” (which, as I have tried to explain already, I suspect is the one at work in the sceptical argument). As Joyce explains:

Often when we speak of a person’s evidence our aim is to make sense of (or criticise) her beliefs by presenting her subjective reasons for believing what she does. We try to give a rationalising explanation (or critique) of some things she believes, usually by citing other things she believes. Here the standard of truth is inappropriate.

## 7 Knowledge as Evidence

This is where TW defends (4). Since I’m not so worried about (4), I won’t bother too much with this section. It does contain some interesting stuff about Bayesianism and various kinds of conditionalization. I also think what TW says here about allowing some knowledge to be less than certain makes sense.<sup>1</sup>

## 8 Non-Pragmatic Justification

I’m happy to distinguish epistemic vs non-epistemic justification. And, I’m happy to focus on the question of epistemic justification. TW suggests here that belief “aims at knowledge”. And, he says,  $E = K$  implies that “the more a belief is justified by evidence, the closer it comes to its aim”. Does he mean to suggest that the *evidential* probability  $\Pr(H|K)$  measures “the degree to which a belief in  $H$  is justified by knowledge  $K$ ”? [This can’t be quite right (can it?), because  $K$  might not be *positively relevant* to  $H$  — assuming we can make sense of the relevance of the totality of  $S$ ’s evidence to  $H$  in probabilistic terms.] Even bracketing this issue, I still would be hesitant to use  $\Pr(H|K)$  for this purpose in cases where either (a)  $S$  apportion their degree of belief to  $\Pr(H|K^*)$ , where  $K^* \neq K$  is what  $S$  reasonably takes to be their total evidence (which could include some falsehoods, etc.), or (b)  $S$  apportion their degree of belief to  $\Pr'(H|K)$ , where  $\Pr'$  is not identical to  $\Pr$ , but is (intuitively) a reasonable estimate of  $\Pr$  made by  $S$ . Here, again, we face the “two faces of evidence” problem, and the challenge of making contact with internalist (even sceptical) conceptions of justification and evidential support.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Bayesians sometimes assume that what is known is known *with certainty*. TW is right to reject this (especially, given his  $E = K$  view). Also, he’s right that having a more flexible Bayesian model of learning (which allows propositions to change from having extreme to having non-extreme subjective probabilities) would be useful. Michael is working on this problem, and I think he’s got a much richer and more subtle picture of probabilistic models of learning than TW does. I encourage you to read Michael’s stuff on learning context sensitive propositions, forgetting, and other problems for naive Bayesian conditionalization. I hope Michael will give us a little tutorial next week on his stuff and how it connects with/improves upon TW’s stuff.

<sup>2</sup>I highly recommend Joyce’s paper for a terrific discussion of these and other issues. Joyce offers a context-dependent and gradational conception of “evidence possession”, which sounds much less question-begging against the sceptic and internalist, but which of course rejects  $E = K$ . [The Foley review also makes some of the same points.] We’ll discuss these issues further when we talk about evidential probability (chapter 10) next week.

Framing Backdrop: Recall that TW is engaged in a project, overall, of reinstating *knowledge* as an interesting concept, indeed, *the* interesting concept of epistemology. This must go through some argument against those who have concluded that the interesting concept is *truth-directed justification* as, for example, internalists and those obsessed with and frustrated by skepticism have. The argument overall is:  $E=K$ , and this supports the equation of justification by evidence (justification by E) with truth-directed justification (argument for this at top of page 208). Therefore, “if truth-directed justification is central to epistemology, so too is knowledge.” (208) Weren’t there easier ways to get this? Perhaps he didn’t use them so as not to incur assumptions he didn’t want.

Note that TW’s explanations (bottom 187) for why the implication that e is evidence for itself is okay, are unnecessary. All you need is to realize that the notion of evidence in question is *increase in firmness* not *firmness*.

### Some problems for $E = K$

The  $E \rightarrow K$  direction.

1) On page 191 TW draws distinctions between when beliefs are implicitly and explicitly evidence-based. S’s belief in p is *implicitly evidence-based* if it is appropriately causally sensitive to the evidence for p (but possibly lacking influence by prior *beliefs* of the subject *concerning* that evidence). TW surely needs it to be the case that that evidence on which a belief is implicitly based counts as part of the subject’s evidence; otherwise the subject’s belief is based on a fact that isn’t part of her evidence. But nothing so far says that the subject has to believe that evidence, though what has been said is consistent with it. Thus, nothing in the picture given by this distinction says that S’s evidence has to be knowledge. Of course, TW has other arguments for that. The point here is that he’s offering a picture of a possibility—having as part of one’s evidence something one is (merely) causally sensitive to—and that should make us think that this sensitivity may be thoroughly sufficient for something to be part of the subject’s evidence.<sup>1</sup> Admitting that would be admitting that not all our evidence is knowledge. (Not all evidence for S is knowledge for S because not all evidence for S is believed.)

Note also that Williamson’s view that this subject whose belief is causally sensitive to evidence has the evidence appears inconsistent with his (to my mind strange) insistence (pp. 196-97, for example) that the subject must “grasp” the evidence in order to use it. See below under “Explaining” for more issues on that.

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<sup>1</sup> This is my own view, by the way, although I make a distinction between evidence one *has*, which requires that one believes it (which is not nec. conscious) and what is evidence for one, which includes those things one is causally influenced by in one’s belief but one does not recognize as such. Either way, to be evidence a thing has to track to some degree what it is evidence for, and this makes no reference to the subject.  
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2) This comes from the section explicitly on  $E \rightarrow K$  (9.6). TW says:

[I]f we do not know  $e$ , why should  $h$ 's capacity to explain  $e$  confirm  $h$  for us? It is likewise hard to see why the probability of  $h$  on  $e$  should regulate our degree of belief in  $h$  unless we know  $e$ . (p. 200)

If we know  $e$ , then  $P(e)$  is 1 or very high. The probability of  $e$  is independent of whether  $e$  confirms  $h$  in the sense of increase in firmness. Increase in firmness occurs when  $P(h/e) > P(h)$ , which is equivalent to when  $P(e/h) > P(e)$ . For firmness,  $h$  may have a high probability given an  $e$  which itself has a low probability. Now if  $e$  has a low probability then we don't know it, so the probability of  $h$  on  $e$  would regulate our belief in  $h$  without our knowing  $e$  provided there was a reason to regulate our beliefs in accord with increase-of-firmness relations, which it is an understatement to say there is.

There are conditionalization issues here, though. Perhaps Williamson is expressing the thought behind strict conditionalization: when you learn something you should take it as true and update your other beliefs accordingly. But this doesn't say you *have* to do that in order to have your beliefs regulated by the probability axioms and in particular by the fact that  $e$  is evidence for  $h$ , i.e.  $P(e/h) > P(e)$ . TW must be aware of Jeffrey conditionalization, for example, where we could say you partially learn  $e$  and partially update other beliefs in accord with the relevance that has to  $h$ .

Even for evidence as firmness (even assuming  $h$  got that high probability partly from  $e$ , that is, that  $e$  was not irrelevant to  $h$ ) an  $e$  with a low probability can confirm an  $h$  that it's relevant to.

### Applying a Rule (p. 192)

TW is trying to respond to the objection, How can you be proportioning your belief to the evidence, as we are called to do, if you don't know what your evidence is? ("Ought" implies "can", after all.) His reply is essentially that "ought" does not imply "actually succeed". (We try, but fail, to know our evidence.) But this is surely beside the point, since the objector knew that. What should be said rather is that knowing your evidence is not *required* for following rules concerning it. In this TW is still ironically internalistic and intellectualistic. (He rejects KK and KE but doesn't seem to see the obvious reason to do so.) To follow a Bayesian rule of rationality, for example, is simply to have your degrees of belief in accord with it. This does not require having consciously set out to do this, or having consciously sorted one's beliefs as to their rational relationships. (If it did, the vast majority of people wouldn't even come close to being rational.) Indeed it places no constraints at all on how you got to your degrees of belief or how you manage to maintain their rational coherence. (TW is persistently misrepresenting Bayesians on this issue, by the way.)

**Explaining** (pp. 195-197)

I'm happy to grant that evidence is propositional (in the sense that all evidence, whether we have it or we don't, is appropriately expressed by "that" clauses, but his argument that evidence must be grasped (propositionally) in order to be used in explanation is not probative at all. Once again, TW is ironically presuming conscious access to things there's no reason to suppose we have or need to have. So, he says:

One can use an hypothesis to explain why A only if one grasps the proposition that A. Thus only propositions which one grasps can function as evidence in one's inferences to the best explanation. By this standard, only propositions which one grasps count as part of one's evidence. (p. 195)

(He tries a similar thing with probability, but though if you use probability then, yes, the evidence will be propositions, once again he presumes too much need for access when he concludes that one has to *grasp* a proposition in order for it to be effective as evidence. See Bayesianism above.)

One of the problems with this paragraph is the ambiguity about type of explanation or inference. One can 1) infer unconsciously, without making anything explicit of that, and one can do so without even being *able* to make the corresponding conscious argument, or 2) one can engage in a performance for oneself or others, an argument, a deliberate and explicit drawing of conclusions. (Or, explanation could be a logical relation between propositions, and the act of explaining would then be drawing attention to that for given propositions.) Now if he's only talking about the latter two possibilities then he's not scoring a point in favor of *all* evidence needing to be grasped in order to be used, which was what he suggested he was doing. In the former case his claim just isn't true. Evidence doesn't need to be grasped in order to be used, as when a subject is causally sensitive to evidence that she does not understand and wouldn't be able to articulate. Example: in judging people's testimony for trustworthiness we use tons of cues that we could never name. We also would probably be very bad at recognizing them if they were discovered and presented to us. Similar things hold for beliefs about attractiveness. One is influenced by subtle cues that one would not necessarily even recognize if they were presented to you by an experimental psychologist. Such evidence is used every day to form beliefs (rationally), and it doesn't need to be grasped (or considered) in order to function in this way.

Again (bottom p. 199) TW says that recognition is required for something to be evidence for one. He uses that to say why the hallucinator—someone given a pill that gives him appearances as of food ahead, who cannot formulate or understand the notion of appearances or it being "like" something else; he forms the belief that there is food ahead—does not have evidence that there's food ahead: he doesn't recognize the propositional evidence. Why did he have to make this guy a hallucinator in addition to being someone who doesn't understand the difference between appearance and reality? Perhaps because making a person who fails to recognize the evidence isn't enough to make them not have the evidence. The reason why the hallucinator doesn't have evidence is that that which is causally responsible for her belief isn't evidence, that is, doesn't

track that there is food ahead at all (or any other popular criterion). One doesn't *need* recognition in order to have evidence and evidence-based beliefs. To see this one should focus on a normal case like those above with properties of the world one is unconsciously but appropriately responding to.

### Revisiting Chapter 8: Skepticism

If I'm not mistaken, there's a problem with TW's argument against the sameness of evidence claim of the skeptic. Recall that it's a sorites argument that depends on, among other things, the premise that:

$3_i$  It is consistent with what one knows in  $a_i$  that one is in  $a_{i-1}$ . (p. 175)

The sorites argument shows, if it works, that premise 1 (crudely, we know every property our evidence has) is false. There's a relevant case for which a different premise,  $3_i$ , is false. (Proof in a moment.) If so, then premise 1 need not be false just because of the contradiction found at the conclusion of TW's argument. Thus, for that case, we could assume I true as far as TW has shown.

Here's the case. The following is an instance/analog of  $3_i$ :

$3_i'$  It is consistent with what one knows in the good case that one is in the bad case.

This is false on any externalist view of knowledge (including, therefore TW's) because the externalist thinks that as a matter of fact if you're in the good case you know things like that you have hands. That you have hands is something you know in the good case, but being in the bad case is not consistent with having hands.

So it appears that as far as TW has argued, the burden has not shifted to the skeptic to show the sameness of evidence claim.