From Jonathan Weinberg : I hope that theres a plausible modification of this thesis that can be quasi-attributed to either Zeno of Elea and/or Linda Zagzebski, so we can have an IROC-Z

Will Fleisher: Response Jonathan's question (see Q&A file): I think it is worth calling this an "epistemic duty" because of its connection to epistemic goals: if you care about epistemic values, you will care about following these rules (or maximizing these values, if you are into consequentialism). Generally, I think we should go in for a more expansive notion of "epistemic", and that this should be in that account. But there is more to be said to support it than we have here.

Will Fleisher: Response to Dan's question (see Q&A file): I think all the parents have the duty to communicate, the D1 duty. But the group that mobilizes, the group that has the D2 duty, need not have the same membership as the initial unorganized group. Moreover, the plan the mobilized group chooses to implement can include a specificiation of which members do what. So that might include the third parent not joining in the boat-rowing, but instead doing something else. Hope that helps a bit.

Jonathan Weinberg: Thanks Will! We are definitely very much on board for thinking of this as distinctively _epistemic_, precisely because they are grounded in the goals of inquiry, and the norms in question are ones for directing inquiry. But Im still not seeing why they are _duties_ as opposed to, say, considerations to be given weight and entered into our instrumental deliberations _qua_ inquirers.  E.g., the _costs_ of engaging in such interventions, it seems to me, need to be incorporated into here somehow. But talk of duties seems to obscure that. I think?

Will Fleisher: Ah, I see. I think you are right that these are not always going to be perfect duties, in fact in the paper we mention that they can come into conflict with other duties. We were essentially thinking of them as imperfect duties. I suspect this is mostly a terminological difference from treating them as pro tanto reasons/considerations. Even if it isn't only terminological, I think you could give our view in terms of pro tanto reasons.

Jonathan Weinberg: Ok cool.

Kevin Elliot: Response to Manuela Fernndez Pinto (se Q&A file): Hi Manuela, thanks for the question! I do think there is a general problem here. I think it might be helpful, though, to distinguish the kind of regress that occurs with communicating about values (which is my focus) from the regress that occurs with justifying or evaluating values. I need to think a bit more about how insights regarding the two regresses might inform each other. At the very least, I think there might be specific goals or concerns in the communication context (like Mark's point about trust) that might be a little different from the concerns involved in evaluating values.

Dunja eelja: Response to Haixin Dang (see Q&A file): Thanks for the question Haixin! In our two initial examples, it'll be hard to find an institution relevant for the given problem (abandoned hypothesis, or detected biases). Even in radically collaborative research it will be hard to argue that there is institutional control behind it, as Kukla (2014) writes, in such cases there is no clear group involved that has enough unity or cohesion to serve as a group author. . . . Instead we have loosely gathered teams and researchers with different disciplinary training, working simultaneously at great distances from one another and with little or no direct contact.

Haixin Dang: Hi Dunja - thanks for the reply! I think there is difference in there not being a group author and there being some kind of structure. Ive always found the Kukla/Winsberg stance odd because in the end there is a sophisticated paper produced and it has to be written by * someone *. Regardless, other collaborations and groups in science are highly organized (e.g. ATLAS), how does your account apply to these structured groups? (We can speak over the coffee break)