

#	Question	Asker Name	Asker Email
1	We might still want to distinguish between roughly internal justification and situational/social justification. So why don't we end up with a similar distinction between kinds of coherence, rather than judging that one kind is the right or real coherence?	P.D. Magnus	pmagnus@fecundity.com
2	Does your theory entail that a rogue scientist who has excellent evidence for his minority view will always be unjustified? What role do you see this kind of justification playing?	Dan Singer	
3	Why not say that "one has a pro tanto reason to reject p" rather than "one is unjustified in believing p"? I ask this for several reasons, including the fact that one may be a member of multiple communities.	Branden Fitelson	
4	Do you think that Paul Thagard's individualistic model can be extended to groups	Miriam Solomon	
5	What would you say about cases in which an individual has good reasons to think the entire community is wrong in their relevant background beliefs?	Finnur Dellsen	
6	Will people be justified in some contexts but not others, based on which research community they are currently engaged with? (That seems reasonable enough to me, but I'm curious about your take).	Will Fleisher	fleishwp@gmail.com
7	Why does D1 require explaining the need and encouraging cooperation? It might be just as good (from an individual's point of view) either to acquire a position of power over some other agents or to entice them with other (epistemically or ethically relevant) incentives.	P.D. Magnus	pmagnus@fecundity.com
8	Joshua Alexander and I are working on a somewhat similar set of ideas, about group methodological norms for the avoidance of error in inquiry. But we have been thinking of these issues more in terms of prudential norms of instrumental rationality: if we want to succeed in inquiry, then we ought to take appropriate measures to avoid error. So I am wondering whether we should be framing it more in terms of epistemic _duties_, as you are doing? What are the advantages of a duty-based approach, do you think? (So, in short: why duties instead of practical cost-benefit rationality?)	Jonathan Weinberg	jmweinberg@email.arizona.edu
9	Thanks! Presumably, those with more power in a research community, e.g. editor or lab leaders, are more responsible than others. Does your account explain this as well?	Finnur Dellsen	fud@hi.is
10	How does EDJF deal with the many-hands problems and other problems with using algorithms, and with the problem of pinpointing an accountable party in radically collaborative research (Kukla/Winsberg)?	Boaz Miller	boaz.m@zefat.ac.il
11	Does the account assume that the interests of the different scientists will be aligned? Say that they are all primarily involved in the project of advancing human knowledge. I'm asking because it's a substantive assumption, maybe their interests are NOT aligned.	Catarina Dutilh Novaes	cdutilhnovaes@gmail.com
12	What if I'm a scientist that just doesn't get excited by H2, and I know that if I were to engage in inquiry into this hypothesis it likely wouldn't be as fruitful or productive for the community compared to my sticking to H1 - do I still have a duty to join forces? BTW - I really like the project thanks so much!	Arianna Falbo	arianna_falbo@brown.edu
13	Thanks for the talk! How can scientists -reliably- estimate the risk of keeping or abandon a research project? Would the strategies that help them to estimate risk differ from more established disciplines -- with a long history from which scientists might be able to learn-- to new or emergent scientific disciplines?	María Martínez Ordaz	martinezordazm@gmail.com
14	Love the talk! Definitely on board with the project. Question/objection: How does your account work in the children/boat case? It seems like we want to say in that case that only two parents (but not any particular two) should spend time trying to get the boat. If more than that do it, they'll risk more lives than needed. So wouldn't you want to say that only the minimum number of needed people (but not any particular ones) have the obligation? Your account seems to imply that everyone in the group has the obligation, which would be needlessly risky.	Dan Singer	
15	For Dunja & Will: does your account only deal with unstructured groups, as implied by the examples? Most groups in science, even in radically collaborative research, may have more institutional structure.	Haixin Dang	
16	Hi Kevin, thanks for the talk. Wouldn't you say that the problem with transparency you are highlighting, actually occurs with all values and at different levels? That is, you can always question the values behind the values you are defending or putting forth in scientific inquiry. I'm wondering if you have an idea to address this more general issue.	Manuela Fernández Pinto	

17	Seems to me that the autonomy and beneficence considerations interact via *trust*. If scientists violate autonomy often or flagrantly enough, scientists lose trust, which in turn means that they can't testify effectively in future. If you think about it longitudinally, these are not separate concerns, or at least not as much in tension with each other as it might seem. This kind of tradeoff crops up a lot in bioethics. I guess my worry is that you might be able to fool people into benefiting themselves once, but then they never trust you again. You see this in the mask vs. no-mask thing in the USA a few months ago. CDC said "don't make" because they wanted to preserve PPE for health workers but CDC said that it was because masks don't work, which they probably knew was false or at least didn't know was true.	Mark Alfano	mark.alfano@gmail.com
18	I'm totally sold on the pluralism. But I am wondering if — given the concerns about how a clinical discipline can only perhaps tolerate so much of it — is there perhaps an argument here for even more pluralism, that is, that perhaps "the" discipline of clinical psychiatry may need to turn itself into a set of distinct (if of course related) disciplines?	Jonathan Weinberg	jmweinberg@email.arizona.edu
19	Question for Miriam: Thanks for the talk! is the framework from _Social Empiricism_ providing prescriptions for how models ought to *pursued* or *accepted*?	Kareem Khalifa	
20	Thanks for this Miriam, very interesting! Do you think a concensus in this case would be a case of epistemic harm?	Dunja Šešelja	
21	how can we reconcile the pluralism with the health insurance industry's need to associate disorders with codes in order to decide which treatments to cover?	Mark Alfano	mark.alfano@gmail.com
22	Miriam: thanks for the talk. Dissent is a good for inquiry, but when it gets to be systematic, one wonders whether it is a ground for greater skepticism. Is this a worry in the case you discuss? (I realize you spoke of this at the very end of your talk, I'm inviting you to say more.)	Sandy Goldberg	
23	Perhaps psychiatry becomes a kind of meta-discipline, like cognitive science? If it turns out that different sorts of nomological models start to require very different sorts of training, say.	Jonathan Weinberg	jmweinberg@email.arizona.edu