

#	Question	Asker Name	Asker Email
1	Mark, thanks. Regarding fidelity/accuracy: to what extent does loss of message context in online communication amount to loss of message content itself?	Tim Kenyon	tim.a.kenyon@gmail.com
2	Fidelity is about information preservation. How do you interpret independence, given that we believe propositions that are independent, of low prior probability and coherent?	Aviezer Tucker	avitucker@yahoo.com
3	Do you think this means we should make the social networks smaller, so individuals don't have as much affect? If so, is there a worry here about introducing inequities between the people in the smaller networks?	Dan Singer	
4	Any immediate advice as someone who has thought about the ethics?	John Greco	
5	To what degree is this problem something that could be fixed if people reposted or posted in line with any of the going norms of assertion (tweet p only if p is true/justified/known)? If we managed to get these norms roughly in place for non-online interactions, might we not be able to do something similar for online assertions?	Kolja Keller	kolja.keller@rochester.edu
6	What will the enforcement against epistemic transgressors?	Francis Remedios	francisxr28@gmail.com
7	This is a really nice and important project. I like how you explore this at both the individual and institutional level. I wonder if there is room for a middle level, including collectives of individuals who engage in political and legal actions, etc. (This is indeed suggested by your noting class-action lawsuits.) I just wonder if collectives at this level are worth more attention than you give them here.	Avram Hiller	ahiller@pdx.edu
8	(Or perhaps even a spectrum of group sizes with different roles.)	Avram Hiller	ahiller@pdx.edu
9	How does dualism connect to (right) action? That is, do you act on expected utility calculated by your credence, or do you act on your beliefs? I'm especially curious about this in the context of disagreement about the moral status of some action you're about to do or not do (e.g. tweet the article you only read 1/4th)?	Kolja Keller	kolja.keller@rochester.edu
10	I want to raise the natural worry about compromise positions. I agree there are reasons to go one way, and I agree there are reasons to go the opposite way. This doesn't entail that there is any reason to go for a compromise position. (Compare: There are reasons to go Kantian. There are reasons to go consequentialist. This doesn't mean there's any reason to go for a view that is consequentialist on weekdays and Kantian on weekends.)	David Enoch	david.enoch@mail.huji.ac.il
11	Thanks Liz, interesting paper. I'm pro-credences, but I'm not sure it solves the problem. It's plausible that peers could have the same credence about opposed propositions, or else credences about the same proposition that cancel out if they conciliate (say, 0.4 and 0.6). Assuming a conciliationist stance, wouldn't this amount to the same thing as changing belief?	Kyle Whitaker	robert.whitaker@marquette.edu
	Can't the fine-grained attitudes of credences be captured, at least to a large extent, by building modal modifiers into the content of the belief? For example, a credence of .7 in rain tomorrow can be interpreted by a radical translator into belief talk as "I believe there is a 70% chance of rain"?	Mark Walker	
12	Thanks Liz! Do you take higher-order evidence to have a different impact on beliefs/credences in the context of peer disagreement?	Dunja Šešelja	d.seselja@tue.nl
13	Would the credence model have the same advantages if we are thinking about cases of systematic disagreement?	Felipe Medeiros	felipe.cstlbrnc@gmail.com
14	Liz, what do you think of the suggestion, which I take to be Jon Matheson's, that we should drop our knowledge claims in cases of disagreement, or drop the credence to the mid-point between your previous position and your epistemic opponent's, but may be justified in continuing to advocate for our preferred positions, act as if they are true, etc., perhaps being justified in doing so pragmatically rather than epistemically?	Jonathan Reibsamen	jreibsamen@gmail.com

<b>15</b>	How would this sort of dualism fit with speaking of doxastic revision (broadly) instead of conciliation? Conciliation presupposes that the change is always towards the disagreeing position. But one value of disagreement is that it can inspire rational shifts in some other direction. Does the fine-grainedness of credences help us theorize this sort of shift as well?	Tim Kenyon	tim.a.kenyon@gmail.com
<b>16</b>	Could you end up believing that p but having high credence that not-p?	Nora Heinzemann	nora.heinzemann@fau.de
<b>17</b>	John, do you think that the joint achievement view would end up licensing gullibility (think of the objection that Fricker raised against Burge, Coady, et al.)?	Jonathan Reibsamen	jreibsamen@gmail.com
<b>18</b>	Does it really make sense to distinguish pieces of knowledge by their sources? Seems like most — maybe all — pieces of knowledge have multiple sources, even if one is more prominent than others. E.g., with testimonial knowledge, we also pay attention to the speaker's demeanor, gestures, tone, etc., which implicates the perceptual dimension.	Mark Alfano	
<b>19</b>	The “joint achievement” idea tends to be spelled out in a very intellectually demanding way. Do you embrace the idea that testimonial knowledge typically is intellectually involved in this way, or do you have an alternative account of the conditions on joint action?	Sandy Goldberg	
<b>20</b>	Wait, are you just rejecting all purported counterexamples to the generative thesis of testimony (i.e creationist teacher, sandy's unsafe testimony cases, etc)?	Felipe Medeiros	felipe.cstlbrnc@gmail.com