

#	Question	Asker Name	Asker Email
1	What is the distinction between epistemic "blame" and "scapegoating"? Scapegoating should be of a collective against an individual, increase group cohesion, is done under stress, AND passes the blame from the collective to the individual.	Aviezer Tucker	avitucker@yahoo.com
2	Great paper, Andrew! But do you attribute scapegoating to terms of service online in their very content? or in the way they are deployed against complaints? Perhaps all terms of agreement are a form of preventative scapegoating?	Kathryn Norlock	kathrynnorlock@gmail.com
	Do you distinguish between epistemic blame and allegations that someone should have known? If not, why not? And if so, how does that distinction fit into your picture?	Sandy Goldberg	
3	Following up on Sandy: in ethics, we distinguish between ought judgments, and blameworthiness. For instance, excuses block blameworthiness but not ought judgments.	David Enoch	david.enoch@mail.huji.ac.il
4	great talk, Adam. A couple papers you might find useful: http://shorturl.at/gjBP7 ; http://shorturl.at/cfjmA . The first is about the problem of distrust, the latter about polarization due to trust and distrust in longitudinal interactions.	Mark Alfano	mark.alfano@gmail.com
5	Can one be too forgiving, epistemically speaking? If this is a vice, is it a vice only because it opens one up to having ones trust abused/violated, or for other reasons as well?	Sandy Goldberg	
6	I agree that forgiveness may be epistemically helpful. But so can having a good breakfast, or going for a run. Do you think that forgiveness can be epistemic in a strong sense than that? Why?	David Enoch	david.enoch@mail.huji.ac.il
7	We not only blame individuals we also blame groups. Have you thought about epistemic forgiveness as applied to groups?	Richard Miller	millerr@ecu.edu
8	Is there a difference between excusing someone's behaviour (e.g. when you realise they were rude because they were under pressure) and forgiving them for their behaviour? Does forgiveness require that the person being forgiven recognise they have done something wrong?	Sarah Sawyer	s.a.sawyer@sussex.ac.uk
9	Is recognizing that someone is blameworthy equivalent to blaming them? Can I recognize that someone is blameworthy for doing something even if I can't blame them for doing that thing? The newspaper/murder case seems to involve recognizing that someone is blameworthy, but doesn't seem to involve the kind of interpersonal blame that seems to require standing.	Jeremy Fantl	jfantl@ucalgary.ca
10	One function of blame is to maintain norms. The public is interested in maintaining norms. So there is reason to think that norm violations are everybody's business.	Richard Miller	millerr@ecu.edu
11	Why isn't membership in a common epistemic community — and related social epistemic dependence— enough to make it “our business” when someone flouts epistemic norms?	John Greco	john.greco@georgetown.edu

12	Cameron, from your perspective, I'm engaging in epistemic blame to say anti-vaccination folks quoted in a news story are wrong, correct? What relationship obtains there? (I take it epistemic blame entails relationships with relationship-constitutive norms, yes?)	Kathryn Norlock	kathrynnorlock@gmail.com
13	How much of this is empirical speculations about what can work?	David Enoch	david.enoch@mail.huji.ac.il
14	fantastic and I think I agree, so please say more about beliefs as emotions	Kathryn Norlock	kathrynnorlock@gmail.com
	I wonder if maybe phenomena like epistemic misbalancing might count as a reason to not engage. The problem is this: by engaging one treats the other side as somehow legitimate in their claims. This could lead to the effect of misrepresenting something as a legitimate disagreement that, in fact, is not (think of examples like climate change deniers, anti-vaxxers etc.). This way, engagement can actually lead to a problematic belief only spreading further.	Katharina Bernhard	
15	Thanks, Miriam. This sounds really interesting. Are you thinking about specific ways of helping people change emotions that wouldn't really work for beliefs?	Jeremy Fantl	jfantl@ucalgary.ca
16	Regarding closed-minded engagement: Why should trying to correct a false belief be different from trying to correct some harm more generally? In general, I don't have to pretend that I am open-minded when I confront someone about something that might be wrong or bad for them. For example, I don't say to my kid, "Hey, I am open-minded about your using heroin— let's discuss it."	John Greco	john.greco@georgetown.edu
17	I wonder if theres room for distinguishing between deeply morally problematic fringe beliefs and simply empirically unlikely fringe ideas. In the former case (e.g. antisemitic conspiracy theories) I dont see a problem with being manipulative. But in the latter case, Im not so sure theres much harm in open minded engagement. One is unlikely to be convinced, after all. And the spread wouldnt do a lot of harm.	Jenny Saul	
18	Does your model require that the other person is interested in mutual understanding already? If so, then isn't it a problem that fringe belief often comes with a lack of genuine interest in taking on the viewpoints of others?	Adam Green	
19	Sorry, yeah, I meant what are the ways we might help each other change emotions.	Jeremy Fantl	jfantl@ucalgary.ca