Georgi Gardiner: I only caught the end, did Grace say that in cases of rape, the victim is fungible? If so: That only applies to a subset of cases. Lots of rapes are very interpersonal: it is *because* you are the person who shunned him, are dating him, etc that you are the victim. Alexandra Lloyd: Thanks Georgi! I did argue that in cases of sexual assault, the victim is fungible. I totally agree that a lot of rapes are interpersonal - most rapes are carried out by people who know the victim. However, I dont think that this undermines the claim that women are treated as fungible when they are raped. I just think it means that they got very unlucky that they were the person who happened to say no to this person in a particular circumstance. So, even though women are raped by people who they know, there is still a sense in which they are treated as fungible when they are sexually assaulted. Does that make sense? Georgi Gardiner: Thanks Grace! I dont think that this undermines the claim that women are treated as fungible when they are raped. Georgi Gardiner: So I think in *some* cases of acquaintance rape, I can see the fungibility idea. But in other cases, the rape is very very directed, and so if these cases *also* qualify as fungible then fungibility is too weak to do much heavy lifting. But I think you dont need fungibility to be a *universal* property of rape (applying to all rapes) for it to do explanatory work for you. Alexandra Lloyd: Thanks! I think thats super helpful but I guess I still feel like there is an important sense in which even acquaintance rapes treat women fungibly. Maybe there is a de re/de dicto distinction that could do some work here. Even in some cases of acquaintance rape, the woman isnt raped because of a de re intention, but a de dicto intention: they happen to be the one who turned them down or annoyed them in the wrong way, but that still isnt anything about her as an individual since there are a lot of women who would act that way in the same circumstance. But I agree that there probably are cases of rape in which it is a de re intention, so I should definitely weaken the claim a bit to account for those kinds of cases. Georgi Gardiner: Thanks @Alexandra! My worry is that many social and interpersonal roles will count as fungible by this gloss: they happen to be the one who turned them down or annoyed them in the wrong way, but that still isnt anything about her as an individual since there are a lot of women who would act that way in the same circumstance. (Because for some rapes the pre-conditions could be *years* of intimate relationship with the person) Georgi Gardiner: re. the response about mens emotion: Kavanaughs anger was used as evidence that he was falsely accused. re. the Blasey Ford case Daniel Singer: I think Enoch, Spectre, and Fishers argument about statistical evidence can be easily translated to defending 404. (They might even do this in their paper excuse me if Im misremembering the literature.) The idea would be something like this: character evidence should be barred because counting it encourages (in a sense) bad behavior: If you have a well-known bad character, then when youre faced with an opportunity to do something criminal, you could think I might as well just do it, since I know Im screwed either way because of the extant character evidence. What do you think of this defense of 404? Does your approach have virtues over it? David Enoch: For the record, Daniel: It's not applying our stuff to character evidence. We stole this line from Sanchirico, talking about character evidence! Daniel Singer: Ah! Thanks for clarifying David. Its a good idea, regardless of where it came from. Georgi Gardiner: re. Dans question: One weakness with Enoch et als explanation: In most cases the person would not be a defendant if they didnt commit the crime. So that is an incentive to not commit the crime.