

#	Question	Asker Name	Asker Email
1	The initial claim (that the prospect and significance of believing truly matters) is something well established in the philosophy of science literature on inductive risk.	P.D. Magnus	
2	I only caught the end, did Grace say that in cases of rape, the victim is fungible? If so: That only applies to a subset of cases. Lots of rapes are very interpersonal: it is *because* you are the person who shunned him, are dating him, etc that you are the victim.	Georgi Gardiner	
3	I think you said you want to focus on the cases where there's harm in failing to believe truly and no comparable harm in believing falsely. But: In these cases, why is there no harm involved in believing? Surely, if withholding true belief harms the accuser and others (independently of causal effect on the accuser and others), believing falsely harms the accused (and many others as well), no?	David Enoch	david.enoch@mail.huji.ac.il
4	For the second harm, perpetuating the harmful system, does this harm also occur when failing to believe non-veridical reports?	Anonymous	
5	I'm not sure I know what intellectual domination (or non-domination) is. If you are ever so smarter than me, and I – fully sensitive to the evidence – acknowledge this, so that whenever you say that p, I believe p. Am I intellectually dominated by you? Is there a problem – epistemic, or moral, or both – with being in this way “dominated”? (Notice that a practical case that's analogous to this one – say, a case where I always do what the Guru does – is a case of reduced autonomy.)	David Enoch	david.enoch@mail.huji.ac.il
6	I'm wondering what the relation is between interference and ideology. Ideology rarely *interferes* with my thinking. Rather, it structures my thinking in a particular way, for the benefit of particular others. But the ‘interfering’ language encourages the picture that there is some pure form of thinking that ideology later infects. Is that so?	Eric Wiland	wiland@gmail.com
7	Nice talk. Not disagreeing with your own arguments, but some of your quotes re intellectual autonomy suggest that such autonomy is inconsistent with intellectually relying on others. The root meaning of autonomy is “self-governance.” It is a substantive position (and, I think, incorrect) to think that self-governance entails independence in the sense of self-sufficiency or non-dependence, or non-reliance on others. On the contrary, dependence on others (of the right sort) can empower and expand self-governance. For example, the division of labor does this. Imagine the ways in which one's ability to self-govern would be restricted if one could not depend on others in various ways.	John Greco	john.greco@georgetown.edu
8	I'm not sure that it's always possible to distinguish interfering from enquiry (domination) from failing to support it (not domination?). Is that a problem for your account?	P.D. Magnus	pmagnus@fecundity.com
9	In the charismatic movement in Christianity that developed over the last 100 years women have been taking a more prominent role than in more traditional Christian denominations. This is in part due to them deriving authority from what are considered prophetic insights as sources of knowledge. These spiritual experiences frame a large part of framing reality in this sense. What do you think is a fair way to evaluate these epistemic methods?	Kolja Keller	kolja.keller@rochester.edu
10	How is lived experience different from perception and memory?	Tony Ward	tony.ward@northumbria.ac.uk
11	what would you say if “emotional” and other less approved sources of knowledge were used by a group you deem to be an oppressor? A lot of evil in 20th century was done with appeal to emotions. Would you modify your approval?	maxim smyrnyi	emaxim@gmail.com
12	One very different application of SBEI might be in the philosophy of religion. Christians disagree about whether tradition and/or church hierarchy are epistemic sources, or whether only Scripture and one's individual conscience count. It's interesting early Protestants were also Northern European, and I now wonder whether some proto-racism toward southern Europeans played a role in their discounting of some epistemic sources. Does that sound right to you?	Eric Wiland	wiland@gmail.com
13	What about cases where a white privileged cis man shows emotion in a certain case, and this is taken to provide significant *strong* evidence (“if he's crying then it must be serious”). How might this kind of example relate to your account of source based epistemic injustice?	Arianna Falbo	arianna_falbo@brown.edu

14	I really enjoy your talk. I just wanted to add that intuition as a source of knowledge has not been always dismissed in the history of philosophy, but on the contrary (think about Descartes' cogito, and Pascal notion of intuition). And on the other hand, perception has not been always considered as a good source of knowledge (Plato, Descartes, etc.)	Marina Trakas	marinatrakas@gmail.com
15	Very insightful (and useful) to introduce the category of source injustice. But there seems to be a decent amount of work on the epistemology of emotion, for example in the moral perception literature.	John Greco	john.greco@georgetown.edu
16	Are you distinguishing emotion from introspection as a source of knowledge?	Felipe Medeiros	felipe.cstlbrnc@gmail.com
17	Does 404 prevent prosecutors from using character evidence of the *very same* kind, e.g. a defendant's *past* tax fraud violations as evidence that they committed tax fraud (again)? The Narrow Traits Response doesn't justify excluding character evidence in such cases, it seems, right?	Eric Wiland	wiland@gmail.com
18	In order to epistemically justify the character evidence rule, it's not enough to show that character evidence is epistemically problematic. You also have to show it's *more* epistemically problematic than other kinds of evidence. Given what we know, say, about confessions and about eye witnesses, I'm not sure this would be easy to show.	David Enoch	david.enoch@mail.huji.ac.il
19	What is the status of evidence on the side of the defense (the defendant doesn't have a certain character — e.g. isn't cruel), and how does that intact with your view?	Levi Spectre	levi.spectre@gmail.com
20	Do these defenses of the rule of evidence suggest that our common practices are mistaken? That is are we generally in a better position or have more evidence than we'd be in a legal context?	P.D. Magnus	pmagnus@fecundity.com
21	Suppose that we have evidence that S has several times committed the same crime in the same circumstances. Is/should that evidence of track-record also inadmissible? If so, does it undermine your virtue-theoretic defense of 404?	John Greco	john.greco@georgetown.edu
22	Does your argument show what we shouldn't use character evidence in daily life — e.g., in deciding who to hire as a babysitter?	Catherine Elgin	catherine_elgin@harvard.edu
23	I think Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher's argument about statistical evidence can be easily translated to defending 404. (They might even do this in their paper — excuse me if I'm misremembering the literature.) The idea would be something like this: character evidence should be barred because counting it encourages (in a sense) bad behavior: If you have a well-known bad character, then when you're faced with an opportunity to do something criminal, you could think "I might as well just do it, since I know I'm screwed either way because of the extant character evidence." What do you think of this defense of 404? Does your approach have virtues over it?	Daniel Singer	
24	What is your view of evidence of a "propensity" to commit specific types of offence e.g. burglary? (This is the commonest use of "bad character" in England.) Is it "narrow trait" evidence?	Tony Ward	tony.ward@northumbria.ac.uk