

#	Question	Asker Name	Asker Email
1	I'd like to suggest a dilemma: Either Bhagya is (as Ayca knows) more likely to get it right than Ayca, or not. If not, deference is not justified. If yes, Bhagya is after all an expert (in your helpfully thin sense). No? (Division of labor seems to me different: It's not about deference, but about not investing resources in inquiry. And then, once Bhagya has invested more resources, she is more likely to get it right.) Different question, re forestalling peer disagreement: This is intentionally avoiding evidence! It's like refusing to look outside to see if it's raining, in order not to cause trouble for one's trust of the forecast!	David Enoch	david.enoch@mail.huji.ac.il
2	You were skeptical of the probative value of peer disagreement because you claimed that genuine peers would judge on the basis of the same evidence and same faculties. If we go with a more general conception of peerhood whereby we treat two people as peers when they have the same amount of evidence (but not necessarily the same evidence) and the same goodness of epistemic faculties (but not necessarily the same faculties), don't we recover the potential probative value of peer disagreement? If so, doesn't this seem like a reason to grant this more permissive conception of peerhood to your opponent?	Dan Singer	
3	Really interesting and useful talk! This might fall somewhere among the grounds for optimism you canvass, but I'd note especially the role of peer deference in mitigating bias blind spot I.e., that I am especially poorly positioned to recognize and self-correct for a distortive influence on my reasoning at the moment it is influencing me. I don't need input from an expert at that point just someone competent whom I trust to help debias me.	Tim Kenyon	
4	You referenced Frickers discussion of epistemic injustice, specifically credibility deficits, in support of peer deference as opposed to autonomous judgment. However, its not clear to me that her views support full deference as opposed to assigning -appropriate- (but still fallible) credibility.	Cat Saint-Croix	
5	Might we think that a value of autonomous judgment is that it can be a check on the possibility of groupthink or group polarization? (This may be Dellsen's point in his 2020.) How do you factor this in?	Sandy Goldberg	
6	I was wondering about that too. Maybe the literature on the independence condition in Condorcet JT in contrast to information cascades would be useful here too. Kevin Zollman gave a fascinating talk on that a little while ago here (recordings on SEN website).	Katharina Bernhard	
7	Thanks for the talk Michael, I really enjoyed it. I wonder how you would respond to someone who says something like, Look, dividing epistemic labour, cultivating epistemic virtues, and forestalling peer disagreement are all things that occur with peer deference. But this is because these things are a product or result of peer deference and not reasons for doing so.	Nicolas Nicola	

8	What sort of procedure for belief revision one would have to adopt on cases of peer deference (a possible worry here would be that one would not know to with do with evidence acquired at a later time when one simply defers)?	Felipe Medeiros	felipe.cstlbrnc@gmail.com
9	APT* seems to presuppose a sufficiently well-working epistemic community, in which people are rewarded for speaking the truth diligently and punished for either speaking the truth undiligently or speaking falsely. Good default in many cases, not others. So, it's not a feature of assertion/telling but a feature of the incentives present and recognized to be present in your community. Is this a fair characterization of the background conditions assumed in your argument? Anti-reductionism for adequately well-functioning communities, not otherwise.	Mark Alfano	mark.alfano@gmail.com
10	Why think (c) undermines (a) and (b) any more here, wrt testimony, than it does wrt corresponding principle regarding perception: one is entitled to accept the perceptual appearances, unless one has reasons for doubt? (If it seems to me perceptually that there is a pink elephant, then this defeats the entitlement to accept, doesn't it? If so in the perceptual case, why not in the testimonial case?	Sandy Goldberg	
11	One might think that the default permission to accept testimony is parallel to the default of believing sensory appearances, and that the defeasibility is also parallel. Does that analogy hold, do you think?	P.D. Magnus	pmagnus@fecundity.com
12	Can we get (c) back, on your account, if we stick a "prima facie" in it? Or would that vitiate it too much?	Jonathan Weinberg	jmweinberg@email.arizona.edu
13	Suppose I'm in a restaurant and entitled to a free desert. I am full, and if I eat the desert I'll probably vomit. The desert is not very tasty, and I won't enjoy it. But I'm insisting on eating it because I'm entitled to it. Am I still rational?	Boaz Miller	boaz.m@zefat.ac.il
14	Here is a nice paper that I think will help support your position: "Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement," Peter J Graham and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen 2020, <i>American Philosophical Quarterly</i> .		
15	I think it's also very often reasonable to assume that the epistemic community is sufficiently well-working, because well-working communities are going to be more successful for evolutionary game theory reasons.	Mark Alfano	