

#	Question	Asker Name	Asker Email
1	Do you think that there is any analogy between some of your results and Scott Page-style results showing the value of diversity in groups? In those results, if I remember correctly, diversity is cashed out in terms of group members' problem-solving abilities, whereas in these results there is diversity in terms of the kinds of signals group members use to form opinions.	David Kinney	david.kinney@santafe.edu
2	Would I be right to ask if Aislinn's result is a special result and might not have general application? I will take a look at the paper. But the moral, "don't inform people" seems odd.	Rohit Parikh	rparikh@gc.cuny.edu
3	Real agents are not perfectly rational. How does injecting a bit of ignorance compare to injecting a bit irrationality to the model (to stop the cascade)?	Eleonora Cresto	eleonora.cresto@gmail.com
4	In his recent book, Sunstein blames right-wing media in the 2016 elections for keeping alive stories that were refuted, and argues that this explains their persistence. But your model suggest this is just a by product of the topology of networks. Which explanation is right?	Boaz Miller	boaz.miller@gmail.com
5	On the point about subgroups leading to worse outcomes: does this indicate that politicisation of these topics (e.g. using masks) will exacerbate these effects *without* many (or any?) individual agents reasoning in partisan ways i.e. it's simply a result of less connected networks?	Emilia Wilson	ew58@st-andrews.ac.uk
6	Hi Cailin! I am curious about what you think this would mean for the increasing tendency to share info through Arxiv and other preprint services. This now seems inevitable (not just bc of Covid, it's the same in e.g., climate science). What can scientists do, at the time of publishing on a preprint server, to make sure erroneous results don't become informational zombies?	Helen De Cruz	helen.deacruz@slu.edu
7	This discussion reminds me of discussions of citations in bibliometrics: commonly they are treated as expressions of evaluative judgments - we cite the work that we think is good or high quality - but without theoretical or empirical justification for this. We know as researchers that there are a myriad of reasons and goals at play when we cite. Is there a way to understand, via modeling, the context of sharing something? For what purposes are people keeping information zombies quacking, with what evaluative flavor, etc? And, do we have good reason for thinking that amplifying signals (like retractions) actually results in belief revision?	Kelli Barr	kelli.barr@pitt.edu
8	Boaz: have a look at <i>Network Propaganda</i> by Benkler, Faris, & Roberts	Mark Alfano	mark.alfano@gmail.com
9	That's super interesting, I wonder if this data recommends certain policies that otherwise we would not be inclined to take seriously. In particular, should we worry more about double checking than it is standardly thought on domains like COVID news?	Felipe Medeiros	felipe.cstlbrnc@gmail.com
10	Two questions: (1) How shall we weigh the problem of information zombies against the usefulness of dissesus? (2) I was missing the role of risks in the disussion a bit. Would you say that maybe risk considerations are an issue here too? Maybe research that is "high stakes" should have a higher epistemic threshold for acceptance/publication? However, in case of Covid, we need to act on the basis of something, and it seems not throwing out data prematurely is not a solution either (cf. necessity for fast science)?	Katharina Bernhard	kb242@st-andrews.ac.uk
11	Loved this Richard. Does this show that justification needs to have an internal dimension or that it needn't have any external dimension? Knowledge, for example, has internal and external dimensions but it is, in some sense, an externalist notion because it involves both	Clayton Littlejohn	cmlittlejohn@gmail.com

	dimensions. Coherence, by contrast, seems like a more purely internalist notion and it wasn't clear where we should locate the defensive goods you had in mind.		
12	Wondering about the theoretical upshot here: do you think your taxonomy offers a more precise, or somehow better, characterization of the way in which (ex.) gaslighting can be used as epistemic weaponry? If so, what's better about it?	Kelli Barr	kelli.barr@pitt.edu
13	Suppose a kind of fallibilism according to which no beliefs are ultimately terminal. Does it follow that all beliefs are transitional? or perhaps that the difference is a matter of degree? (Sorry for the double post)	P.D. Magnus	pmagnus@fecundity.com
14	Is there a clear distinction between these "transitional attitudes" and attitudes like supposition and imagination? It seems to me that suppositions can have multiple layers, and might not be expected to become terminal attitudes the way that transitional attitudes might have some prima facie claim to, but would it make sense to see them as somehow species of the same genus?	Kenny Easwaran	easwaran@gmail.com
15	Some reasoning processes go on for a while, even when I'm not actively engaged in it. How should we distinguish between a settled credence, when I don't assume I have all the evidence there could ever be, and a transitional credence in some bit of reasoning that is going on for a while, maybe largely in the background?	Justin Snedegar	js280@st-andrews.ac.uk
16	Should we have transitional attitudes about proposition over which we deliberate over long times and often disagree, such as philosophical claims? Or are these attitudes something we can at most be justified in having for a few minutes, or does the justification degrade over time the longer we do not land on a terminal attitude? (If thaanswered in paper, just point me there)	Kolja Keller	kolja.keller@rochester.edu
17	Thank you! This is so interesting! Should we respond to evidence of the transitional attitudes of others? Can the transitional attitudes of others give us any higher-order evidence that we should account for? If so, how? (Also, side question: Do you think that we should just always have transitional attitudes in our controversial philosophical views?)	Arianna Falbo	arianna_falbo@brown.edu
18	great talk, Julia. Would you count curiosity, wondering, doubting, and other motivations to engage in inquiry as transitional attitudes? Sounds like you're moving in the direction of inquiry responsibilism	Mark Alfano	mark.alfano@gmail.com
19	didn't rich thomason argue years ago for a degreed notion of supposition, in some of his work on the semantics of conditionals? i can't remember....	Scott Sturgeon	s.sturgeon@bham.ac.uk
20	How does the model you're presenting apply to Mallory's doxastic attitudes, and what Mallory should do when confronted with the HOE that Claire disagrees with her? Is it in the exact same way, or is the fact that Mallory is incorrect in her math change anything?	Kieran Britt	kieran.britt@colorado.edu