

#	Question	Asker Name	Asker Email
1	Thanks. What about someone who's much better epistemically than their community, and they see all the flaws in the standards their community accepts? Can't they have knowledge even without satisficing the (poor) community standards?	David Enoch	david.enoch@mail.huji.ac.il
2	We belong to multiple communities. How do we choose the standard operative in given situation?	maxim smyrnyi	emaxim@gmail.com
3	You mentioned a problem with HL's account to the effect that the community might not be "good enough". Doesn't a similar problem occur for your view on the individual level? I say this because of the way that your individual responsibility clause is formulated.	John Greco	john.greco@georgetown.edu
4	are there meta-communities that set out to revise the standards of existing epistemic communities (follow-up to Maxim's question)?	Mark Alfano	mark.alfano@gmail.com
5	If I understand the proposal, it's that "justification" can be understood in individual-level, community-level, or objective terms. So your suggestion is that $K=JTB$ for all J. Are you OK with this construal of your account?	P.D. Magnus	pmagnus@fecundity.com
6	Aviezer Tucker: What is epistemically relevant consensus? If everybody must agree, there is no consensus on anything (including the earth being round). If only institutional "scientists" count, the agreement may reflect institutional biases, coercion, and so on. Or does consensus is one indicator of something else, like lack of bias, so only properly heterogenous consensi count?	Aviezer Tucker	avitucker@yahoo.com
7	Related to previous talk: different communities have different epistemic standards. E.g. social psychology has much lower bar for accepting claims as "settled" than fundamental physics. Arguably, consensi in different fields may have very different probative values. How would you suggest we assess probative value of consensus in different fields for the "consumer"?	maxim smyrnyi	emaxim@gmail.com
8	Can a consensus report on disagreement? That is 100 % agree that the oceans will rise at least X, while 85% agree that it will rise at least X + Y, and 80% agree X + Y + Z?	Mark Walker	
9	I totally agree that consensus should not be an epistemic ideal, if we're doing, so to speak, ideal epistemic theory. But if we're doing non-ideal theory – taking into account expected epistemic and other violations, other practical and political problems etc. – then, in some but definitely not all cases, consensus may yet be an important thing to aim at, no?	David Enoch	david.enoch@mail.huji.ac.il
10	Do you have a positive recommendation? Perhaps something like moving from a binary consensus/no-consensus approach to an approach that focuses on representing the variance in views? This would make it possible to contrast cases where the vast majority agrees versus cases where views are widely divergent.	Mark Alfano	mark.alfano@gmail.com
11	Can we understand the tension better if we consider that groups sometimes form to act? For a group to act as an agent it often wants to reach consensus. But just trying to maximize the epistemic quality of the groups beliefs consensus ought to be avoided. So for groups to act they need to compromise epistemic standards.	Richard Miller	millerr@ecu.edu

12	Can you say more about the individuation of discourses?	David Enoch	david.enoch@mail.huji.ac.il
13	Thanks, this was good. Isn't only unchallenged propositions that are added to the common ground. So we don't need to worry about hearing Michel starting the car, or such. another thing is that the purposes of conversation can be much wider than truth seeking. why not consider assertions as relative to those?	Levi Spectre	levi.spectre@gmail.com
14	I just wanted to make sure I got this right. Is the Maya and Frank example (and some of the other examples) supposed to show that KNA is incorrect? I like that conclusion but some things you said made it sound like you still were committed to it.	Miriam McCormick	mccormick.miriam@gmail.com
15	How would you distinguish your proposal from proposals that see the standard for warranted assertion as varying by context, where this involves what is mutually believed among participants in context? (I have in mind views like Mikkel Gerken's, Rachel McKinnon's, and others. And Rachel's view even allows for warranted false assertions.)	Sandy Goldberg	
16	If an assertion can be justified because it contributes to eventual knowledge, how far off in the future could that eventuality be? Could one always defer to the future— or are discourses temporally bounded?	P.D. Magnus	pmagnus@fecundity.com
17	I'm not sure i tracked what the tension between the constitutive view and discourse being goal oriented is supposed to be. Couldn't it be the case that while attempting to fulfilling the aim of given conversation a subject shifts between different speech acts and that it turns out that those shifts allow the accomplishment of the goals as opposed to different goals on discourse governing shift in the nature of speech acts?	Felipe Medeiros	felipe.cstlbrnc@gmail.com