

#	Question	Asker Name	Asker Email
1	'-Thanks for laying out this framework. Could you say something how it applies specifically to voting? For example, If you know from polls that your party polls about 7%, should you think that you're probably wrong about who the right party is and therefore vote for a more popular party?	Kolja Keller	kolja.keller@rochester.edu
2	Thanks so much for this. I was wondering if you could say a bit about how we go about determining what type of disagreement you're in?	Chelsea Rosenthal	croseath@sfu.ca
3	Do you think that there might be some general principles that would apply, indicating a difference between how to address disagreements of facts vs. values? Or what about disagreements where it isn't clear if it's a matter of fact or value?	Sharon Crasnow	Sharon.crasnow@norcocollege.edu
4	I have a question and a suggestion. 1. Does this hold for theoretical (core philosophical) disagreements, too, or meant to be specialized for political disagreement? 2. I think the particularist/contextualist view must be right, but maybe a way forward would be to specify the relationships people have when it comes to your toolkit (content/scope/geneology/consequences). e.g., by picturing people in relationships as engaged in a kind of bargaining situation, as opposed to a pure Socratic exercise.	Ben Nelson	bsnelson@uwaterloo.ca
5	In thinking about your four dimensions, three of them seem to be pretty straightforward and patries could agree on them, but when it comes to genealogy, would either party see the disagreement as unreasonable?	Miriam McCormick	mccormick.miriam@gmail.com
6	Why is sharing necessarily considered as asserting?	Nikolai Klix	klixnikolai@gmail.com
7	Just a quick note (need not read aloud): I think there is an ethics risk. Some past studies have shown that people don't trust the "reveal" of researchers, so if they do share it, and if a vegan reads it, this could lead to them being less careful about this. That would be them, without consent, being harmed by the experiment.	Kolja Keller	kolja.keller@rochester.edu
8	This is very interesting, but I wonder if those who were willing to be interviewed are ones who are willing to listen and reflect. I, and am sure, others here have engaged with people and shown them facts that show what they are presented is false but this doesn't lead to any change. I mean what if you showed the real picture and date where the praying happened and the interviewee did not believe you, thought you altered it?	Miriam McCormick	mccormick.miriam@gmail.com
9	What kind of psychological profiles did your participants have? I have a family member who has a confrontational-contrarian personality traits and shared the recent "Plandemic" nonsense video. My reaction was to offer a comment that took it was false as a given and then sparked a discussion about its falsity. Do you have an idea if this technique of presupposition-smuggling might be effective, generally or with particular personality types?	Ben Nelson	bsnelson@uwaterloo.ca
10	Steve Stich and his French collaboration offer an evolutionary account of discourse and one's goals. I'm surprised not to see it mentioned in this context.	Anne Jacobson	ajjacobson@uh.edu

11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> '- I don't think uncritical transmitters are intrinsically more reliable. - They are only more reliable if they're right about who the experts are. - But how do you determine who the experts are? o You're back at critically evaluating who the experts are. - Hence, you have to either be a higher order or a first order critic. 	Kolja Keller	kolja.keller@rochester.edu
12	<p>There seem to be two dimensions here: what we believe and what we share.</p> <p>So there is no tension; there're are just two different strategies for the different dimensions.</p> <p>When you are wondering what to share, be critical.</p> <p>When you are wondering what to believe, don't be.</p> <p>There's no prima facie reason you can't do both.</p> <p>I can have a lower threshold for belief than I do for sharing.</p>	Sean Conte	srconte@tamu.edu
13	<p>To connect to Aviv's talk, how do you assume a shared post is understood by its audience? Why think that sharing a post that p it is necessarily understood as an assertion that p?</p>	Boaz Miller	boaz.miller@gmail.com
14	<p>Thanks Daniel. What I care about is long-term accuracy. Is your thesis that critical transmission is more accuracy-conducive, long term, than uncritical transmission?</p>	Zach Barnett	zachbarnett47@gmail.com
15	<p>if I understand it correctly, there seems to be an analogy between your suggestion and the idea of "throwing sand in the gears of markets" to decrease their volatility.</p>	Gabriele Contessa	g.contessa@gmail.com
16	<p>How do you solve the problem of trust in experts, who can be wrong especially these days with epidemiologists.</p>	Francis Remedios	francisxr28@gmail.com
17	<p>[Follow up to Kolja Keller's question]: Can you say a bit more about why you think the problem repeats with respect to assessing reliability of experts? It seems that one can be critical about identifying experts and once THAT is done, one can uncritically transmit?</p>	Katharina Bernhard	kb242@st-andrews.ac.uk
18	<p>This is excellent. It makes explicit what I've been doing without realising it on university committees!</p>	Anonymous Attendee	
19	<p>Thank you! This is extremely interesting. Could you say a bit more about: Why is the problem not merely a game theoretic one of cooperation rather than "creating" something objective/factive/right/good as an output CJT style? In other words, what does the CJT effect contribute here that we don't get already get via cooperation in a game theoretic setting?</p>	Katharina Bernhard	kb242@st-andrews.ac.uk
20	<p>Are there examples of the stag hunt structure in *political* epistemology where this version of CJT may apply?</p>	Simon Rippon	RipponS@ceu.edu