

#	Question	Asker Name	Asker Email
1	Why not think that it is a normal assertion in a special context, where if it had been false people in that context were particularly well-positioned to note this. This might account for why we are inclined to note the context when we ascribe the assertion, and why we are more likely to accept it.	Sandy Goldberg	
2	If the healthy facebook group has something in its bio like "Likes are not an endorsement", would the group likes still be a kind of endorsement/assertion?	Nicolas Nicola	
3	Speech act theorist rarely include sinceirity as a nec. condition for performing a speech act. Sincerity depends on internal mental states; it is, in a way, a private matter, that cannot be displayed by the speech act itself, or recognised from syntax, etc. Given this, how could an account that requires sincerity as a necessary condition for assertion work?	Neri Marsili	Nerimarsili@gmail.com
4	<p>I at first thought that this was going to be a kind of misattribution, the way that people sometimes say "Harvard university says ... " when one researcher there has said it, or "The Washington Post says ... " when one op-ed columnist says it. The presence of endorsement by many group members does seem to provide an important difference here.</p> <p>But is there still an important difference from the summative and non-summative accounts? At least one group member must have actually *made* the post and not just endorsed it, even if most group members haven't needed to do anything beyond endorsing. (It might be interesting to see what fraction of a group needs to endorse - a post that is liked by 200 members might be sufficient even if there are 10,000 members, most of whom don't click "like" very often.)</p>	Kenny Easwaran	easwaran@gmail.com
5	In cases where a group's top and second top answers push in different directions, does the group assert both? Can a group assert P and not P?	John Guelke	j.guelke@warwick.ac.uk
6	Philosophical disagreements are often cited as paradigmatic instances of deep disagreements. Are you intending to be taken to mean that whenever this is so, this is an ideological disagreement?	Sandy Goldberg	
7	I hope this doesn't go too far off the board. Is there a third position (or fourth, now) view that there are no deep disagreements? Or, anyhow, that the closest thing to them are pragmatic matters of giving up on making progress (at least for the time being). This seems like it would capture your interesting observation about shallow but situationally	Tim Kenyon	tim.a.kenyon@gmail.com

	intractable disagreement. So, like, that disagreements aren't really distributions of incompatible propositions in different people's belief boxes, but are activities or events.		
8	If ideologies are mostly epistemically justified, and if those are justified by people's evidence, then does the deep disagreement ultimately bottom out in just having radically divergent bodies of evidence?	Kolja Keller	kolja.keller@rochester.edu
9	This is super interesting and important. I'm curious about the relationship between discrimination concerns and concern over inciting racial hatred.	Jenny Saul	
10	Ideology consists not only of disagreement on facts, but on also on values. Do you take such disagreements to be epistemic?	Boaz Miller	boaz.miller@gmail.com
11	In describing deep disagreements as ideological disagreements, and if ideology could be seen as some sort of group attitude, then a deep disagreement will be some sort of group disagreement? What are your thoughts about that?	Leonardo Ruivo	jleonardo.ruivo@gmail.com
12	There seems to be a tradition that says: Yes, you do have freedom of expression, but only UNLESS and UNTIL it harms others in particular ways. (think Mill's harm principle?) Could some such principle not be applied to break the tie between the two demands of freedom of expression and harm? Or rather: why would it not?	Katharina Bernhard	kb242@st-andrews.ac.uk
13	Have you thought about other kinds of press coverage that undermines agential epistemic participation? Would a general account be useful, or are there too many different forms for a general account to be interesting?	John Guelke	j.guelke@warwick.ac.uk
14	Do you have any thoughts about how we SHOULD respond to the epistemic chaos, or deal with the epistemic exhaustion? (Asking for a friend)	Jenny Saul	
15	Is it possible to have epistemic chaos without epistemic exhaustion? It seems to me that it might be, if there is no societal expectation of shared social epistemic facts. In a limited way for instance, we may have epistemic chaos about music, with different genres having different critics that don't listen to each other, without individuals being exhausted.	Kenny Easwaran	easwaran@gmail.com
16	Do you think that epistemic chaos is a good first response to some widespread but consistent bad epistemic habits? That is, should we sometimes cause it as a first line of resistance?	Kolja Keller	kolja.keller@rochester.edu
17	What are the theoretical advantages or roles of the notions you propose? Are they supposed to be illuminative for the Trump era? Do they point out solutions that we will not notice without them?	Boaz Miller	boaz.miller@gmail.com