

#	Question	Asker Name	Asker Email
1	Could you perhaps sketch super-briefly the argument for your premise that, roughly, a reason to have a lowered credence in a belief --> that belief cannot constitute knowledge? Follow-up: I wonder whether the argument could also be framed as aiming for the conclusion, "either (skepticism) or (interesting revisions to our old-school conception of knowledge)". Just putting my own cards on the table, I'm very fond of the idea that scientific findings about our minds can give us good reasons to adjust our normative conceptual apparatus.	Jonathan Weinberg	jmweinberg@email.arizona.edu
2	Thanks! Perhaps it could be argued that we also have mechanisms to correct the bias. Thus, premise 1 would be weaker. Do you agree?	Domingos Faria	domingosfaria@edu.ulisboa.pt
3	you made skeptical hypothesis more compelling by weakening it to the degree that it's just sounds reasonable. No harm in being a sceptic like that. Could you comment?	maxim smyrnyi	emaxim@gmail.com
4	Your proposal of a localized scepticism reminds me of certain moments in Quine's epistemology. Do you make this connection?	Catherine Hundleby	hundleby@uwindsor.ca
5	The last thing you said was beginning to address this. The conclusion was that many of our beliefs do not constitute knowledge, but how are we able to say one belief is more reasonable (or justified) than another? Do these limitations do not affect beliefs being justified?	Miriam McCormick	mccormick.miriam@gmail.com
6	My lab group and I have a forthcoming paper in Episteme ("Don't Forget Forgetting") that has the exact same thesis as your talk (that memory should be a core topic for social epistemology). We get there in a very different way though. One objection we often field is about memory not being subject to rational evaluation. Sarah Moss, for example, claims that if you forgot what you had for dinner, I can't accuse you of being irrational. This purports to show that memory isn't in the domain of epistemology (presumably because epistemology can only evaluate things as rational or irrational, justified or unjustified, etc). It would be the domain of social PSYCHOLOGY, these objectors claim, not social epistemology. Thoughts?	Daniel Singer	singerd@phil.upenn.edu
7	Not really a question but perhaps a suggestion: If you would like to relate this to epistemic injustice, I would suggest Sue Campbell's work on relational remembrance/the "false memory debates"	Melanie Altanian	melanie.altanian@philo.unibe.ch
8	a related point to this question of whether memories are rational, in light of the 2013 Michaelian paper you mentioned. (I don't know if this is better a question for them than for you!) If the (mis)information effect can make memories more accurate, this then becomes another point at which we can consider the tension between accuracy-based and evidence-based conceptions of rationality. Some epistemologists will think of these examples as like Gettier cases, but others might think this is good for accuracy.	Kenny Easwaran	easwaran@gmail.com
9	Perhaps this could be related to epistemic systems. Do our epistemic systems (like the criminal justice system) rely on memory more than they should?	Richard Miller	millerr@ecu.edu
10	Does what you say also apply to cases of collective memory, like eg genocides? Would you see any relations?	Axel Mueller	muell@northwestern.edu
11	Quick comment: This will relate to delayed accusations in rape accusations. For example: Many Catholic Priests were revealed as child molesters. This social process will cause people to remember that they were also molested as children by Priests. This related to epistemic injustice because delayed accusations are seen as evidence the accuser is lying, but this research can help explain why this source of doubt is spurious.	Georgi Gardiner	georgicloud9@gmail.com

12	Just a suggestion related to Daniel Singer's question. In the cognitive penetration of perception literature, some argue that even if the experiences are not rationally assessable, their etiology can make a difference to the rationality of our perceptual beliefs. Perhaps you can make a similar claim regarding memory.	Ali Hasan	ali-hasan@uiowa.edu
13	I wonder if Sushruth endorses coherence as a theory of justification across the board, not only in ethics	Sandy Goldberg	s-goldberg@northwestern.edu
14	While the epistemic benefits of group deliberations are well known in cases involving logical puzzles, I thought there was more skepticism about it working in cases involving morality, politics, etc. Isn't there literature about how people in such contexts become even further entrenched in their existing moral views? (I don't think this begs the question against McGrath because the epistemology of them could be the same.)	Michael Hannon	Michael.Hannon@nottingham.ac.uk
15	Thank you! I think you are absolutely right that RE needs a social component. It might be interesting for this point to also look into the epistemological literature on RE, where for example Elgin makes this point in Considered Judgment. This also brings me to my question: In epistemology, RE is often part of an epistemology that focuses on understanding as its main goal. Could this maybe be an answer to the criticism of McGrath - that is, while RE is not necessary for moral knowledge, it might be necessary to have moral understanding (which can of course incorporate moral knowledge)?	Tanja Rechnitzer	Tanja.rechnitzer@philo.unibe.ch
16	People sometimes understand their community as being composed of all and only people who share their moral perspective. A socialized RE that included only the "right people" might be problematic.	Richard Miller	millerr@ecu.edu
17	for the sake of contrast, could you say few more words about other popular models that you find less adequate? could you say few words about how one would go about testing if your model is better??	maxim smyrnyi	emaxim@gmail.com
18	Question: as I understood things, there are two big ideas being advanced: the idea that our reasons must be shareable ("we can share" them); and the idea that we can use Brandom's inferentialism to articulate the semantics of our language. I wasn't quite sure how these were supposed to go together. Could you clarify?	Sandy Goldberg	s-goldberg@northwestern.edu
19	I think you suggested that modelling the objective commitments of assertions could provide a way of guarding against the spread of misinformation. Could you say a little more about how this would work, particularly in cases in which assertions have false commitments?	Claire Field	claire.a.field@gmail.com