

#	Question	Asker Name	Asker Email
1	Thanks, Zach, super interesting. Question: Why think different people's philosophical inclinations will be distributed in a way that will ensure a good, productive debate between the relevant positions?	Will Fleisher	wfleisher@wustl.edu
2	The idea of inclinations sounds very close to what Alison Hills in her 2013 "Faultless Moral Disagreement" calls 'moral conscience' in moral disagreements in particular: "What does it mean to follow your conscience? All that I mean by that I this context is: you use your own judgement to form your moral belief." (417)  Here is a question related to this: If 'inclinations' are the kind of things we get by bracketing the evidence from peer disagreement, then could we analyze this as 'whatever you believe to be the attitude justified by your evidence without the evidence from disagreement'. So, it isn't a new species of doxastic attitude, but a belief about justification.	Kolja Keller	kolja.keller@rochester.edu
3	Could you say a little bit more about how inclination is supposed to bridge the gap between second hand knowledge and understanding? I'm really not seeing what the connection is supposed to be there	Felipe Medeiros	felipe.cstlbrnc@gmail.com
4	Can you maybe sketch out the contrast between inclinations and pretheoretic intuitions? (And are inclinations being used in a way that is different from, say, dispositions?)	Ben Nelson	bsnelson@uwaterloo.ca
5	Possibly related to Kolja's question, is there some possibility that these "inclinations" may be what people are thinking about in the literature about difficulties regarding moral or aesthetic testimony? Perhaps the issue is that these are topics where we usually want to hear about inclinations	Kenny Easwaran	easwaran@gmail.com
6	Could you locate cognitive or epistemic inclination with respect to "thinking that"? I am thinking about "Belief is weak" type of perspective	maxim smyrnyi	emaxim@gmail.com
7	what is the evidential import of inclinations themselves? are one's inclinations also insulated from other people's inclinations?	Arianna Falbo	arianna_falbo@brown.edu
8	Hi. What is the difference between inclination and acceptance (Bas van Fraassen, L. J. Cohen) or enforcement (Hugh Lacey)? What is the motivation for another concept of a factive cognitive attitude that falls short of full-blown belief.	Boaz Miller	boaz.miller@gmail.com
9	Some people might say that there is no common measure of "handling COVID crisis well". "As well as possible" seems to highly ambiguous. Could you comment on that?	maxim smyrnyi	emaxim@gmail.com
10	Is there anything distinctive about covid that drive this argument? It seems like we use biased psychological processes to form beliefs about nearly everything and evidence surrounding nearly everything is ambiguous. So, then irrationality is very very rare in general.	Daniel Saunders	Dsaunders406@gmail.com
11	If I conclude that both sides are rational, is it then stable to maintain my belief? I mean, wouldn't I be thinking that the evidence didn't clearly support my view?	David Christensen	david.christensen@brown.edu
12	'people you trust' feels ambiguous here. Do I trust folk who hold similar beliefs OR folks who I think reason well about this sort of thing? In general the trust principle seems to run up against the epistemic value of 'red teaming' (deliberate attempt to find flaws in a model)	Stephen Crowley	stephencrowley@boisestate.edu
13	Doesn't asymmetric polarization allow you to say that "all sides are subject to cognitive bias re: COVID-19" but the other side is more subject to these kinds of biases?	Jay Carlson	Rcarlson3@luc.edu
14	Here, can the reasonable polarization imply that both parties are reasonable in their positions?	Kazi Huda	huda@ou.edu
15	It's notable that a large number of topics in contemporary political discussion (including some that are covid-related) correlate very strongly with party, with 80+% of each party holding the associated attitude (attitudes to abortion, about tax rates, about whether Trump has handled the crisis well). Your account seems to explain these things well.	Kenny Easwaran	easwaran@gmail.com

	<p>But there are also notably polarized beliefs (often called “wedge issues”) where one party is completely unified and the other is split (whether criminalization of illegal immigration is inappropriate, whether social distancing should be ended this week, etc.) Can you explain these?</p> <p>The party that is split shouldn’t obviously remain split if they are reasoning as you say.</p>		
16	<p>More a comment than a question and possibly something Kevin knows already but both models have been formulated and, to some extent, tested by political scientists, so it might be worth looking into that literature.</p>	Gabriele Contessa	<a href="mailto:g.contessa@gmail.com">g.contessa@gmail.com</a>
17	<p>If you could, please post the full citation to Klein 2011 that you mentioned — thanks.</p>	Ben Nelson	<a href="mailto:bsnelson@uwaterloo.ca">bsnelson@uwaterloo.ca</a>
18	<p>I agree that some of the evidence is ambiguous, but what about claims like it might be a good idea to inject disinfectant? Is your analysis meant to apply to disagreements over claims like these or only a subset of covid beliefs?</p>	Jenny Saul	<a href="mailto:j.saul@sheffield.ac.uk">j.saul@sheffield.ac.uk</a>
19	<p>Just a comment: The network of expectations is needed for solidarity or unity at the societal level. Similarly, the network of expectation between parents and children is needed for familial solidarity. So, when a child says to her mother "You don't know me," she harms familial solidarity. This is possibly another reason for which the child is wronged.</p>	Kazi Huda	<a href="mailto:huda@ou.edu">huda@ou.edu</a>
20	<p>I’m interested in the direction of fit for expectations, and the role it plays in your project. You mention two possibilities, the belief- and desire- like types. I might be that we could split the difference, and then say that, in general, expectations are ontologically neutral (like presuppositions). But then, perhaps, the parental relationship adds a peremptory quality to the expectation that transforms it into something like an imperative. Does that sound plausible, or close to the account you are working on?</p>	Ben Nelson	<a href="mailto:bsnelson@uwaterloo.ca">bsnelson@uwaterloo.ca</a>
21	<p>Very interesting! Small point/question: I take it that ‘expectation’ as used here doesn’t imply prediction so it’s not clear that there’s anything cognitively puzzling about holding on to expectations (in this sense) in face of evidence that the kids won’t ever conform.</p>	Anna-Sara Malmgren	<a href="mailto:malmgren@stanford.edu">malmgren@stanford.edu</a>
22	<p>“You don’t know me” is a compelling slogan. Could you give a few specific examples of things your parents (or racists) _can_ safely know about you, know without wronging you? One could argue that in principle anything can destroy you under the right conditions, but nothing is going to destroy you with necessity.</p>	maxim smyrnyi	<a href="mailto:emaxim@gmail.com">emaxim@gmail.com</a>
23	<p>On finding it damaging to see ourselves as our parents see us - but for many the kids may spend some of their lives sharing the expectations.</p>	Anne Jacobson	<a href="mailto:ajjacobson@uh.edu">ajjacobson@uh.edu</a>
24	<p>Are you? Isn’t the word plain ambiguous in this respect? (But thanks!!)</p>	Anna-Sara Malmgren	<a href="mailto:malmgren@stanford.edu">malmgren@stanford.edu</a>
25	<p>Thanks, Rima! You say “If we cannot understand ourselves as another understands us, without losing ourselves.” It strikes me that this is also true of, e.g., an alcoholic. They cannot understand themselves as an alcoholic because to do so would be to destroy a part them, in some sense. (At a minimum it would force them to come to terms/fess up to their alcoholism). What do you think of that kind of case?</p>	Lauren Leydon-Hardy	<a href="mailto:lleydonhardy@amherst.edu">lleydonhardy@amherst.edu</a>
26	<p>The understanding requirement seems too strong - we don’t always grok our trainers goals (and the value of those goals for ourselves) until after we’ve made the changes suggested. Is there a weaker claim - its not impossible that the future me is compatible with the current me?</p>	Stephen Crowley	<a href="mailto:stephencrowley@boisestate.edu">stephencrowley@boisestate.edu</a>
27	<p>Thanks for a really interesting set of ideas. I wonder if there's an important difference between the beliefs of parents and racists. Even if the belief of the parent in some way wrongs the child, it's at least reasonable to attribute to the parent in some cases that the parent has the child's best interests in mind. That doesn't seem true of the racist. Does that change the way in which the beliefs harm?</p>	Charles Lassiter	<a href="mailto:lassiter@gonzaga.edu">lassiter@gonzaga.edu</a>
28	<p>Sorry! The thought was that that’s the locus of harm!</p>	Lauren Leydon-Hardy	<a href="mailto:lleydonhardy@amherst.edu">lleydonhardy@amherst.edu</a>

29	Very interesting talk. It seems plausible that there is an ambiguity in expectations between something like expecting-that and expecting something of someone. There seems to be a parallel here between normative trust and trust as expectation. I'd be interested to hear if you have thoughts on this connection.	Keith Harris	<a href="mailto:keith-harris@uiowa.edu">keith-harris@uiowa.edu</a>
30	I'm interested in the view that were wronged if it would destroy our sense of ourselves to see ourself as the other person does. I have known people with such a negative sense of themselves that encountering someone who sees them positively is experienced as extremely upsetting and even sets off a crisis. I worry that this might count as wronging.	Jenny Saul	<a href="mailto:j.saul@sheffield.ac.uk">j.saul@sheffield.ac.uk</a>
31	Thanks Rima. More of a comment than a question, but I wonder if you've looked at Andrew Solomon's book <i>Far From the Tree</i> , which came to mind as you were talking about the child's claim 'you don't know me'. In particular the chapter on deafness deals with the idea of horizontal transmission of language and culture (from peers rather than vertically from parents). So this may be a way that this comes apart that differs from other cases.	Teresa Burke	<a href="mailto:teresa.burke@gallaudet.edu">teresa.burke@gallaudet.edu</a>
32	What about in cases where the child (or the object of the belief in general) is the one who is mistaken? Doesn't the "Problematic" condition hold (that is, you can't make sense of their belief about you). But if you hold fixed that the child is right (has a true belief) in their self-conception, then it is the parent's being *wrong* (having a false belief), not the child's understanding (Rima's condition), that is doing the work?	Georgi Gardiner	<a href="mailto:georgicloud9@gmail.com">georgicloud9@gmail.com</a>
33	(Ah, my question related to Lauren's question. I was pressing "send" when I heard her question being read.)	Georgi Gardiner	<a href="mailto:georgicloud9@gmail.com">georgicloud9@gmail.com</a>
34	do you see connections with Bernard Williams et al on the potential alienation of moral demands when they conflict with our own life-shaping projects?	Naomi Scheman	<a href="mailto:nschema@umn.edu">nschema@umn.edu</a>
35	Isn't the phenomenon in question more a matter of more general non-shared epistemic features. E.g., one group is conservative.	Anne Jacobson	<a href="mailto:ajjacobson@uh.edu">ajjacobson@uh.edu</a>
36	some of the thematic topics you mentioned are factual ones, but some feel like desire-related or expressive ones (like gender roles) - does the same argument work for those? That is, is it more or less reasonable to think a person who has the wrong values also has wrong factual beliefs, rather than someone with one wrong factual belief having another?	Kenny Easwaran	<a href="mailto:easwaran@gmail.com">easwaran@gmail.com</a>
37	I'm mostly convinced by your arguments here, but I'm worried about the response to the objection to Premise 1. If I really buy that this is a peer disagreement, and then suspend judgment, I don't think I can be committed to thinking that their initial belief is false and mine true. Isn't that just what it means for me to suspend judgment, that I no longer think that P is true (and so suspend on whether any belief in P is true)?  Instead, to block the objection you could lean on just suggesting that genuine peerhood is a rare ideal. I think that would work.	Will Fleisher	<a href="mailto:wfleisher@wustl.edu">wfleisher@wustl.edu</a>
38	Re - defense of premise 1 -  the restated argument in terms of initial beliefs seems odd - why think (after reconciliation) that my initial belief that P is true?	Stephen Crowley	<a href="mailto:stephencrowley@boisestate.edu">stephencrowley@boisestate.edu</a>
39	From Kevin Dorst to All panelists and other attendees: (01:33 PM) <small>SEP</small> Can't figure out how to submit a question in the Q&A thing. Liked the talk! Question about the (1') / 'initial belief' move. If I've suspended judgment about P, won't I no longer believe (1'), i.e. I won't believe that my initial belief was true and yours was false. So how will I be able to reason my way to downgrading?	Stephen Crowley	<a href="mailto:stephencrowley@boisestate.edu">stephencrowley@boisestate.edu</a>
40	Have you come across any of the philosophy literature discussing conspiracy theorist communities? Often there is reference to what seems to be a similar phenomenon: rabbit-holing. That is, someone who	Kelli Barr	<a href="mailto:kelli.barr@pitt.edu">kelli.barr@pitt.edu</a>

	becomes involved in a conspiracy theory community is much more likely to later adopt more conspiracy theories than they initially believe/accepted. But there's not much discussion of how this might happen epistemically, or how it might be explained from a socio-epistemic perspective.		
41	The line of thinking modeled might be improved by sensitivity to whether the various domains turned on related bodies of evidence or reasoning—right? So, disagreement re climate change may reflect differing sources of evidence, while those differing re chemistry might be sourcing evidence similarly?	David Henderson	<a href="mailto:dhenderson2@unl.edu">dhenderson2@unl.edu</a>
42	Your definition of Agential Testimonial Injustice seems very similar to what McKinney (2016) calls "Extracted Speech". McKinney discusses coerced testimony as an epistemic injustice, using the 'Central Park Five' as an example. Is there a significant difference between your account and McKinney's Extracted Speech?	Karl Landström	<a href="mailto:Landstrk@uni.coventry.ac.uk">Landstrk@uni.coventry.ac.uk</a>
43	In my “she said, he said” research on the epistemology of rape accusations, I describe epistemic injustice through credibility excess when the following happens: A rape victim is friendly to the perpetrator after the rape, and that friendliness is used as evidence that the later accusation is false. (Also for accusations that aren't articulated for a long time afterwards.) I argue that the earlier friendliness is given too much epistemic weight, in a way that is testimonial injustice through credibility excess. I articulate various reasons why rape victims are friendly to their attackers after the rape. One way these projects (Lackey's and mine) connect up is when those reasons are “failures of agency” on the part of the victim, owing to (say) trauma or coercion. (I put “failures of agency” in quote marks, because there is a lot to say about agency and responses to victimisation! I mean things like failing to realise that she was raped, despite the manifest evidence.) (The essay is “She Said, He Said: Rape Accusations and the Preponderance of the Evidence”)	Georgi Gardiner	<a href="mailto:georgicloud9@gmail.com">georgicloud9@gmail.com</a>
44	what reason do we have to think that the interrogators or anyone else involved in the prosecution actually believes that extracted testimony is more reliable? Isn't it likelier that they cynically use the person's words because they are what they already believed (or even more cynically thought it expedient to act on)—whether extracted or not; it doesn't matter. It's not that the genuinely agential testimony is discounted because it's agential, but because it's not what the prosecutors want to hear.	Naomi Scheman	<a href="mailto:nschema@umn.edu">nschema@umn.edu</a>
45	Great talk. Someone like Fricker, who thinks that credibility excess does not constitute epistemic injustice, might argue that testifiers are wronged in the cases you describe, but the wrong is moral, rather than epistemic. How would you reply?	Boaz Miller	<a href="mailto:boaz.miller@gmail.com">boaz.miller@gmail.com</a>
46	Thanks Jennifer! Do you think there is any difference between the cases that happen in virtue of cognitive biases and the other cases? If so, what should we say about that?	Felipe Medeiros	<a href="mailto:felipe.cstlbrnc@gmail.com">felipe.cstlbrnc@gmail.com</a>
47	I'm wondering if a different and separate epistemic injustice is the injustice committed by the jurors' failure to empathize with the situation under which the testimony was obtained (in other words, their believing that no-one would ever confess without being guilty because *they* would never have confessed had they not been guilty...)	Gabriele Contessa	<a href="mailto:g.contessa@gmail.com">g.contessa@gmail.com</a>
48	What's epistemic agency?  One story is that I have control over what information I share. Another might be that I'm a reliable proxy measure of what actually occurred.  If you think folk have an interest in not reporting accurately you might think there's value in turning someone into a reliable proxy measure rather than a decider of which information is shared.  So I feel like there's a rationalization of the way criminal justice works?	Stephen Crowley	<a href="mailto:stephencrowley@boisestate.edu">stephencrowley@boisestate.edu</a>