

#	Question	Asker	Answer(s)
1	It seems like lacking conceptual resources will have different epistemic consequences than possessing a faulty concept. Namely, lacking a concept like "sexual harrasment" will prevent one from forming true beliefs about oneself, while having a faulty concept like "hysteria" will result in forming false beliefs about oneself. Does this suggest we should see them as separate categories rather than two instances of the same category of hermeneutical injustice?	Daniel Munro	I wonder if this is true, though... It seems to me that lacking the concept of "sexual harassment" also can result in forming false beliefs about oneself and that having the concept of "hysteria" also can prevent one from forming true beliefs about oneself...
2	"Hysterical" is interesting in that it's ambiguous between a seemingly innocuous meaning (very funny) and an oppressive one. This is really a psychological question, but I wonder what this does to the process of reclaiming.	Ian Olasov	
3	Just a comment. In societies heavily influences by psychoanalysis (like mine), 'hysterical' is still an insult, but it refers almost exclusively to people who tend to seduce without, well, following up. It is still mainly directed to women, though. I thought it could be interesting, especially in the context of sexual harassment claims.	Eleonora Cresto	
4	I wonder what role the faulty (and pernicious) concept of "hysteria" plays particularly in bringing about testimonial injustice, besides hermeneutical injustice, and how these interrelate.	Melanie Altanian	
5	I wonder if these arguments could be extended to lots of other flawed terms, including e.g. slurs. Then I also wonder about phrases that make it harder to accurately make sense of our world, like "make America great again".	Jenny Saul	
6	I'm just wondering what conception of "deliberation" you are working with? I just wondered if you had a technical conception I was not aware of. I think in the argumentation literature that "deliberation" mostly concerns courses of action, but I think it should be more broadly understood — that it's used to make up one's mind, for instance.	Catherine Hundleby	
7	"More scrutiny = stronger evidence". I might need to hear more about what this means. I can imagine a situation where we have scrutinized (e) a great deal, and where we are more acutely aware of how (e) could be misleading with respect to confirming/disconfirming (h) in ceteris paribus conditions. But this does not make (e) stronger evidence of (h), so much as a stronger understanding of the inferential role that it has in relation to (h).	Ben Nelson	
8	Hi Ravit. Under your conception, an individual subject simulates the communal critical discussion in her head to see if it will survive communal scrutiny. But most individuals lack the relevant expertise and meta-expertise about the scientific process to do that. Also, I think that normatively, she should not be required to do that, because she has an	Boaz Miller	

	epistemic right to trust trustworthy members of her community even when she cannot trace their reasoning.		
9	Your notion of norm-conforming is „the norms of deliberation the resistant agent accepts“. Would your approach also work with norms the agent ought to accept, given the practice they’re participating in (eg science)?	Axel Mueller	
10	Resistance so often seems to take the form of disproportionate skepticism towards prima facie evidence, including social evidence, or moving goalposts in how evidence is scrutinized (because one can see what it would lead to, if it were judged compelling). But some background checking and due diligence is just good practice. Can we recover the difference between appropriate and inappropriate scrutiny for defeaters, etc., from the notion of “what evidence e recommends”? In other words, does the evidence itself specify what a reasonable check on the evidence would comprise?	Tim Kenyon	
11	While distinguishing resistance from ignorance, would you agree that norm-violating resistance can lead to pernicious ignorance?	Melanie Altanian	
12	I’m curious about how inquisitive reasons might relate to intuitions. Is an intuition that p an inquisitive reason to believe p? Or, under some circumstances?	Ben Nelson	
13	Are inquisitive reasons generally reasons to assert or propose or work on a theory, or are they sometimes also reasons to believe?	Ian Olasov	Does this mean that you take assertion to not be governed by an epistemic norm?
14	Would you say that “wanting P to be true” is an inquisitive reason to investigate whether P? If not why not?	maxim smyrnyi	
15	Is inquisitiveness measured by the investigator themselves (their estimate of eg premature consensus) or by the epistemic community?	Axel Mueller	
16	Can you say a bit about how you think inquisitive reasons relate to curiosity as a distinct intellectual virtue? Are inquisitive reasons a kind of curiosity as well as a kind/aspect of courage? Many of the details (eg, distribution of labor) you point to seem at least as related, if not more, to curiosity as they do to courage.	Cat Saint-Croix	
17	Could you develop a little more in which sense a desire for p to be true can be considered (or related to) strong inquisitive reasons? I can desire as a scientist that p to be true for reasons that are not related with inquisitive reasons, such as reputation, work stability, etc.	Marina Trakas	