#	Question	Asker Name	Asker Email	Answer(s)
1	Asks for Gabriel: When scientists genuinely disagree, doesn't that decrease the level of trust in what they are saying?	Domingos Faria	domingosfaria@edu.ulisboa.pt	live answered
2	Hi Gabriele, my question is whether you think that there are two relations between SCI — citizen & SCI—SCI.	Axel Mueller	muell@northwestern.edu	I mean: Is the trust-relation in both types of cases different in kind, or different in, e.g. number of ceteris paribus considerations dampening trust (where SCI SCI is max
3	Any thoughts on why people trust all these others too much? And how to rectify that?	Sharon Crasnow	Sharon.crasnow@norcocollege.edu	
4	There's a lot to agree with here, but I wonder about the inference from scientists treat each others' testimony critically to laypeople should treat scientists' testimony critically. Might the reasonableness of scientists' critical attitudes towards one another depend on the wealth of their relevant background knowledge?	Ian Olasov	ianolasov@gmail.com	
5	It seems that, even for scientists at least sometimes, the speech act that they perform in public discourse isn't assertion. Does that have consequences for what it would even mean to trust them?	P.D. Magnus	pmagnus@fecundity.com	
6	I wonder if you think this is a new phenomenon? Assuming it's true that politicians tell lies to raise party flags, has this always been happeneing? It seems like this is a new phenomenon, or at least exacerbated now. Why the change?	Michael Hannon	michael.hannon@nottingham.ac.uk	
7	Does your view have any condequences for the more ordinary cases of epistemic reliance? For instance, should young children take the advice of their parents with a pinch of salt (in an epistemic sense of "should")?	Nathanael Smith	n.smith@rochester.edu	
8	Should we trust scientists to state the truth or to say what they think the evidence supports? If the publiic makes that distinction would it make any difference?	Catherine Elgin	catherine_elgin@harvard.edu	
9	Any thoughts on the accessibility of scientist's testimony? i.e. it seems that an important reason for lack of trust is a matter of difficulty/effort vis-a-vis accessibility rather than trust.	Adham El Shazly	19aes2@queensu.ca	
10	Do citizens trust scientists in the same relation as scientists trust scientists?	Axel Mueller	muell@northwestern.edu	
11	If people have a high level of trust in "science" in the abstract is this likely to make them more distrstful of scientists who disagree - i.e. there can't be good-faith disagreements if science is the objective truth?	Tony Ward	tony.ward@northumbria.ac.uk	
12	Hi Gabriele: I'm wondering about the different motivations of scientists relative to politicians. The personal benefit of politicians can seem to make them less accountable, but can't it also make them more accountable? By contrast, scientists can be insulated from the implications of their predictions. At least, isn't it somewhat reasonable that the public views scientists as in this sense "above" and beyond accountability?	Catherine Hundleby	hundleby@uwindsor.ca	
13	To Gabriel: different disciplines have different definitions of trust – they often differ on whether it is a mental state (I decide to believe), an internal decision (I might act but not always believe), an action (I Believe and therefor I will act) etc.. The approach might determine whether you want people to "trust", or prefer they doubt (scientists, pelicans, other people). What do you mean by "trust"?	Aviv Barnoy	avivbarnoy@gmail.com	

14	Asking seems like a reasonable move. But what do you do if they just don't respond?	P.D. Magnus	pmagnus@fecundity.com	
15	For Karen: Hi! Don't issues of context collapse, further exposure to harrassment, and treating people as "thermometers" also apply to many non-internet resources (e.g. a public speach, a public letter/editorial, and even books)? If that's right, then it seems like your argument would apply to basically anything we might cite. If that's right, then do you think what you're saying as giving a general ethics of citations rather than something special about internet citations?	Daniel Singer	Singerd@phil.upenn.edu	
16	Hi Karen! I totally see the value of the sorts of norms you are suggesting for _quoting_ members of marginalized or vulnerable groups, especially if they thought they were primarily speaking to other members of their group. But what if someone is doing a more quantitative and anonymized mode of research? E.g., treating tweets not as a _source_, but collectively as a _corpus_?	Jonathan Weinberg	jmweinberg@email.arizona.edu	
17	Question for Karen — have you thought about how interpretation comes into play for citing public internet posts? I often am in the position of citing content that is originally published in American Sign Language, and so I provide a translation when I ask for permission to cite. Yet the concern for me is also about insider/oursider positioning — as a member of the signing deaf community who has considerable privilege, I have thought a lot about how to selectively choose what to signal boost from within the signing deaf community (that isn't accessible to nearly all the philosophers I know), and how to handle this. Your thoughts on interpreting minority languages are very welcome.	Teresa Burke	teresa.burke@gallaudet.edu	
18	There is a question by Jenny saul in chat	Alessandra Tanesini	alessandra.tanesini@gmail.com	
19	What is the role of platforms (Twitter, Facebook) in the relations between the content creator and academic researcher? It seems they already exploit people free labour to make profit and need to be accountable in some way.	Boaz Miller	boaz.miller@gmail.com	
20	These seem like really important concerns that I hadn't been thinking about enough. I was curious about how you see citing online work that's e.g., a Medium post, rather than tweets. It seems like privacy concerns might be more serious for social media in particular.	Chelsea Rosenthal	crosenth@sfu.ca	
21	Is there anything that an independent (non-institutionally-affiliated) researcher can do to protect themselves from online harassment, without giving up on doing public philosophy?	Ben Nelson	bsnelson@uwaterloo.ca	
22	Thank you Karen!	Teresa Burke	teresa.burke@gallaudet.edu	
23	Does this mean that we should never publish in philosophy?	Catherine Elgin	catherine_elgin@harvard.edu	
24	Hi Josh! How strong this norm is depends a bit, I think, on what we take the content of a typical publication to be. If a lab does a study and their end result is P, do they need to know that: "P" — or is it enough if they know that: "we did such-and-such a procedure with so-and-so an analysis, and the outcome of that analysis is P"? The latter seems plausible, the former does not. [This might be what you have in mind with the 'hedging, conditional conclusions, etc.' bit.]	Jonathan Weinberg	jmweinberg@email.arizona.edu	
25	What if someone started a journal titled "Speculative Ideas" and people published in it?	Michael Hannon	michael.hannon@nottingham.ac.uk	

26	According to Longino, uptake of criticism is a norm of scientific reports, including publication. This seems in line with mainstream scientific views. If knowledge is the norm of publication, what is the point of opening a publication to challenges and criticism by others? Put differently, what is the point of challenging what is already known?	Boaz Miller	boaz.miller@gmail.com	
27	I'm wondering about where your argument leaves us viz-a-viz peer review. If knowledge-assertions are inputs to evaluation processes (peer review), and not rather an outcomes of those processes, this seems to suggest that peer review is a form of scientific disagreement - authors say that P, and reviewers say that not-P, because of X problem. Who wins? Why? This would be a strange way to think about peer review, right?	Kelli Barr	kelli.barr@pitt.edu	
28	Two cases where the norm seems difficult to directly apply: 1) proposing models to understand known phenomena, 2) idealizations etc. used in modeling and explanation are known to be false but necessary to assume. What is their status?	Axel Mueller	muell@northwestern.edu	
29	Sometimes when papers have large numbers of authors, some of the authors don't understand (and so don't know) some of the claims in the paper. For instance, maybe some experimentalist or theorist on a paper doesn't understand some of the mathematics that were put in by the statistican on the paper. What do you think of these cases? Maybe they are cases where the authors jointly know each of the claims in the paper, even though not every author knows every claim. So maybe the relevant k-norm is satisfied, if it says: "The authors of the publication must: collectively know each claim in the publication". WDYT?	Dennis Whitcomb	Dennis.whitcomb@wwu.edu	
30	If generics don't express knowledge, then does this mean that all assertions of generics would be essentially defective when used in scientific publication?	Ben Nelson	bsnelson@uwaterloo.ca	
31	Comment: I think Goodhart's Law is applicable here, which is often paraphrased, "When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure".	Andrew McFarland	andrewlmcfarland@gmail.com	
32	Arguably, grades also force people who don't have the aim of learning and understanding to engage with the course in some ways. So the gamification might change their target to bring it close to legit education. Maybe?	P.D. Magnus	pmagnus@fecundity.com	
33	Super cool work. Is there a way to have the goodies we get from value clarity, without the drawbacks, by incentivizing people to not internalize the clarified versions of the values?	Dennis Whitcomb	Dennis.whitcomb@wwu.edu	
34	Hi Thi! I feel that these issues at least rhyme with issues about the principal-agent problem. Good institutional design tries to align those interests in a socially productive way, whereas bad institutions let agents get ripped off. Similarly, can't _good_ institutional game design keep the game elements lined up well with the externally valuable ends? Like, the points system for grades in a well-designed course?	Jonathan Weinberg	jmweinberg@email.arizona.edu	
35	Would you also say nudging hampers autonomy given that it also involves some gamification	Sushruth Ravish	sushruth.ravish@gmail.com	
36	I'm thinking about gamification in logic classes. (Proof relay races, say.) There, the narrow goals induced by the game are consistent the initial richer goal of learning logic. So sometimes gamification crowds out the initial richer, more inchoate values, and sometimes it doesn't. Any ideas about the differences between the two sorts of gamification?	Ian Olasov	ianolasov@gmail.com	

37	(Er, the principals get ripped off, i guess.)	Jonathan Weinberg	jmweinberg@email.arizona.edu	
38	Could some infinite games represent an exception to this rule? For instance, I've heard political commentators refer to democratic governance as a sort of infinite game.	Nathanael Smith	n.smith@rochester.edu	
39	Thi. Re the idea of institutional pressure. The quantification in social policy offfers interesting examples due to the shortness of the policy cycle. Politicians want quick results	Alessandra Tanesini	alessandra.tanesini@gmail.com	
40	I'm wondering what you think about the following: maybe (at least some) of these forms of speech that seem declarative aren't really questions but are proposals or hypotheses being raised in the context of a tacit, cooperative investigation.	Nathanael Smith	n.smith@rochester.edu	Would these sort of utterances count as interrogative in some more general sense? Is this more general sense the sense of "question" you're operating with?
41	For potential additional examples of asking questions with declarative sentences, I think this often comes up with sentences that start with "so," and are asking the conversational partner not to confirm/deny, but to give explanation/background (for example, "so, you stopped eating meat.")	Chelsea Rosenthal	crosenth@sfu.ca	
42	Fascinating, thanks Jennifer. Your work here seems related to Fiengo's book "Asking Questions", where he argues that different kinds of questions are better or worse tools for displaying different kinds of "lacks" - lack of information and lack of confirmation being key among them. Have you explored that connection?	Dennis Whitcomb	Dennis.whitcomb@wwu.edu	
43	Really interesting work! Thank you! What do you think about fragments? For example, say I'm walking down the street and I see someone walking a dog. I say "Oh, Siberian Husky" (the discourse particle "oh" seems to be doing some work here). What do you think of this case?	Arianna Falbo	arianna_falbo@brown.edu	
44	It will be interesting to see how this will extend to the use of emoticons.	Alexander Stingl	alexanderstingl@hotmail.com	
45	A comment, not a question: I have a discussion in an essay about using questions to gaslight a person. Question can raise irrelevant alternatives, and so make them seem relevant. (Or maybe even make them relevant.) Asking questions can thus undermine knowledge, and can gaslight a person. This discussion is in 'Risk and Relevance', in Synthese.	Georgi Gardiner	georgicloud9@gmail.com	