

## When Warrant Transmits

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### I

We can ask about doxastic warrant—which of your beliefs are reasonable, or epistemically appropriate?—and we can ask about propositional warrant—what things do you have **warrant to believe**?

You have **all things considered** warrant to believe Q when Q is the right, or epistemically appropriate, thing for you to believe overall. Usually there will be a story about *why* Q is the right thing to believe: factors that warrant or count in favor of believing Q. As theorists we want to be able to discuss such factors, while allowing that they may be outweighed by other factors that warrant believing alternative hypotheses. Or they may be **undermined** by information that makes them count less strongly in favor of believing Q. In the vocabulary I prefer, we say that the factors at least constitute **prima facie** warrant to believe Q—and leave it open to further discussion how complex bodies of prima facie warrant should add up.

Sometimes your warrant to believe Q consists in warrant to believe **some premises** that entail or ampliatively support Q. For example, what warrants you in believing *An animal is in the pen* may be some visual warrant to believe *That's a zebra in the pen*. Let W be your warrant to believe Q, the factors that count in favor of believing Q. I'll represent the “counting in favor of” relation with a hollow arrow, thusly:

W

⇩

Q. An animal is in the pen.

In this case, W consists in *visual warrant to believe a premise P* that entails Q. We can spell that out like this:

W. [Visual warrant to believe P]      P. That's a zebra in the pen

⇩

Q. An animal is in the pen.

It will be useful to be able to switch easily between talking about *the premise P*, and talking about *the warrant W* you have for Q by virtue of having certain warrant to believe P. Sometimes this is done by overloading the interpretation of a label: using it sometimes for warrants, other times for premises. For instance, we might write:

Z. That's a zebra in the pen.

⇩

Q. An animal is in the pen.

and alternately use “Z” to designate the premise P, or the warrant W. This shortcut is common in the literature I’ll be discussing, so it will be useful to continue it here. Context will always make clear when we’re talking about a warrant, and when about a proposition. Despite this terminological convention, though, we should not forget the substantive difference between warrants and propositions. *The warrant Z* is not itself a proposition or premise. Neither is *the premise Z* ever a warrant to believe Q: not even when it entails Q. Rather, it’s *the visual* (or whatever) *warrant you have for* premise Z (which we may also use “Z” to designate) that constitutes a warrant to believe Q.

On many views, warrants *don’t always* consist in warrants to believe supporting premises. For example, what warrants you in believing *It looks as though there’s a zebra in the pen* may just be *your visual experiences*. Not any *premises about* those experiences. Let’s label this warrant E, and the hypothesis it supports LOOKS. I’ll represent the case like this:

E. [Visual experiences as of a zebra]



LOOKS. It looks as though there’s a zebra in the pen.

In such cases we’ll only use “E” to designate the warrant your experiences give you to believe LOOKS, not to designate any proposition.

Sometimes we’ll be considering factors that warrant belief in a conclusion only *against the background of* other warrants you possess. For example, on many views, your visual experiences won’t be enough by themselves to warrant believing *That’s a zebra in the pen*. But they will warrant that belief against the background of warrant R to believe your vision is reliable. I’ll represent that like this:

E. [Visual experiences as of a zebra]

R ⇓

Z. That’s a zebra in the pen.

Here E on its own *isn’t* warrant to believe Z: only R+E together count in favor of Z. But R has more of a background role than E. So long as you *do possess* warrant R, you might reasonably believe things on the basis of your experiences *without ever considering* or having any beliefs about how reliable your senses are. That is, so long as you have warrant *to* believe your senses are reliable, your perceptual beliefs might not need to be *based on* that warrant. E might on its own be an adequate *basis* for believing Z.

As you’ll see, this is not *my own view* of perceptual warrant; but we want to have the apparatus on hand to talk about it.

## II

Dretske says that reasoning like this:

Zebra-1. [Visual experiences as of a zebra]



Zebra-2. That’s a zebra in the pen.

↓?

Zebra-3. That's not a mule cleverly disguised as a zebra.

fails, and that its failure illustrates a violation of Closure. That is, it may be that premise Zebra-2 entails Zebra-3, and you have warrant (namely, Zebra-1) to believe Zebra-2, without you having warrant to believe Zebra-3.<sup>1</sup>

Wright and Davies are sympathetic to the claim that Zebra reasoning would be defective: you couldn't reasonably base a belief in Zebra-3 on this kind of inference. But they resist the claim that this needs to be a violation of Closure. If you have warrant to believe Zebra-2, then perhaps you must *also have some* warrant to believe Zebra-3. But it doesn't follow that your warrant to believe *Zebra-2 is* your warrant to believe Zebra-3. It may rather be that you'd never get to the point of having warrant for Zebra-2 without some other warrant for Zebra-3 already being in place. So what we have here isn't a failure of Closure, but rather just a **failure of your warrant to transmit** across the entailment from Zebra-2 to Zebra-3. Because Zebra-2 isn't itself your warrant to believe Zebra-3, you can't reasonably base a belief in Zebra-3 on Zebra-2.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dretske 1970, 1981?? denies Closure not just for knowledge, but also for justification or warrant. Few have followed him in this. There are well-known problems for Closure for warrant: Preface- and Lottery-type worries, Harman's observation that sometimes the appropriate response to recognizing that Q follows from your premises is to suspend belief in the premises, and so on. But few have followed Dretske in thinking *Zebra-type cases* also motivate abandoning Closure for warrant.

<sup>2</sup> I'll be drawing on Wright 2000a, 2002, 2003, 2004, and forthcoming; and Davies 1998, 2000,...?? Klein 1981 had a preliminary version of this notion ["evidence for" closure, as opposed to "being justified" closure].

As I say, Wright and Davies contrast failures of Closure to transmission-failure: see Wright 2000, pp. 140-1, 143, 157; 2002, 331-2, 335; 2003, 57-8, 61, 67-8; Davies ?? . But whether these really do diverge is sensitive to what we mean by "Closure." You do have warrant to believe both Zebra-2 and Zebra-3; so it's true we don't have any failure of this principle:

Closure for Propositional Warrant. If you have warrant to believe some premises, which you recognize entail Q, then you also have warrant to believe Q.

However, some [See Williamson ??; Hawthorne 2005; Silins 2005a] have argued that Closure is better understood as a principle about doxastic warrant, like:


Closure for Doxastic Warrant. If you have warrant to believe some premises, and correctly deduce Q from them, then the belief in Q you so form will be a warranted belief.

And in the Zebra case, a subject could correctly deduce Zebra-3 from Zebra-2, but *wouldn't* be able to reasonably base a belief in Zebra-3 on that deduction. Arguably, *this* Closure principle will fail whenever warrant-transmission does.


The phenomenon we're discussing is also sensitive to what *kind* of warrant you have for Zebra-2. If your warrant for Zebra-2 wasn't Zebra-1, but rather the fact that the animal just brayed in the distinctive way that only zebras can, then plausibly you *would*

For this to be a useful diagnostic tool, we need a systematic story about when we should expect warrant to transmit, and when we shouldn't. What features of this case are behind our judgment that you can't reasonably base a belief in Zebra-3 on Zebra-2?


Well, here's one natural story. As we said at the end of the previous section, perhaps your visual experiences don't justify belief in Zebra-2 *on their own*, but only against the background of other warrants you possess. So our diagram ought really to look like this:



We might express what bothers us about the inference from Zebra-2 to Zebra-3 by saying "You were already taking Zebra-3 for granted, when you moved to Zebra-2!" So perhaps Zebra-3, or something close to it, is part of the background warrant that's needed to provide your warrant to believe Zebra-2:



Plausibly, any case with this structure will bother us in the same way. When Zebra-3 is among the background you need antecedent warrant for, to have the warrant you do to believe Zebra-2, then that warrant for Zebra-2 won't itself further warrant or count in favor of Zebra-3. You won't be in a position to reasonably believe Zebra-3 on the basis of Zebra-2. We can call this the **Background Warrant (BW) Model** of transmission-failure:



Some tricky details aside, this is the most plausible and recognizable form of the phenomenon Wright and Davies have in mind. Our central two questions in this paper will be: Q1. Does Moorean reasoning, like:

- Moore-1. [Visual experiences as of hands]
- Moore-2. I have two hands.
- Moore-3. I'm not a disembodied handless spirit, who is merely hallucinating hands.

exemplify the same BW Model? I say it does not. Q2. Can we identify some *other* general model of transmission-failure that Moorean reasoning does exemplify? I will

be in a position to eliminate the mule hypothesis, and so *would* be able to infer Zebra-3 from Zebra-2.

float and criticize some candidates. I'll claim that the BW Model, and variants of it, are the only genuine models of transmission-failure—at least, of the models we'll be able to identify.

We'll begin by sorting out various details.

### III

Let's say you have an **earned warrant** when the warrant is constituted at least in part by some experience or awareness or insight or understanding that you have. Typical cases of earned warrant will be when you perceive that something is so, or when past observations warrant believing further conclusions. But introspective warrant can be earned, too: the experience of having a headache (or on some views *awareness of your headache*) gives you warrant to believe you have a headache. A priori warrant can be earned, too: your understanding of the relation  $\neq$ , the singleton function, and the empty set, together give you warrant to believe  $\emptyset \neq \{\emptyset\}$ .

We can separate *warranted beliefs* into those which are based on premises, or inference from other information you possess, and those which are not. We can separate *warrants to believe* into those which are constituted in part by warrant you have to believe other things, and those which are not. These contrasts will not coincide. Recall our earlier example:

E. [Visual experiences as of a zebra]  
R  $\Downarrow$   
Z. That's a zebra in the pen.

In this scenario, your belief in *Z* may not be inferred from any premises. Nonetheless, part of the warrant you have for *Z* is the warrant you have to believe *R*, that your senses are reliable. You need warrant *to believe* *R*, though you don't need to *actually believe* or even *consider* *R*, for your belief in *Z* to be warranted.

I'll say that a belief is **inferentially warranted** if it's warranted by virtue of being inferred from other warranted beliefs. Derivatively, we can say that **a warrant is inferential** when it's constituted by *the availability* of some inference to the subject from other, antecedent warrants. On the other hand, a warrant is **mediate** just when it's constituted (at least in part) by warrant you have to believe or doxastically accept other things. What our example illustrates is that a belief can be non-inferentially warranted, and so its warrant be non-inferential, even though that warrant is still mediate. You *might* infer *Z* from *R* and some claim about what experiences you're having; but in the case we're considering, the warrant you have for *Z* isn't constituted by the availability of such an inference. It's constituted by your merely *having* the experiences you do, and also *having* warrant to believe *R*.

A warrant is **immediate** when it's not constituted by warrants to believe or doxastically accept other things. Recall the example:

E. [Visual experiences as of a zebra]  
 $\Downarrow$

LOOKS. It looks as though there's a zebra in the pen.

Here, what warrants you in believing LOOKS is just your having certain experiences. Or on some views, it'd be your introspective *awareness of* having them. In neither case is warrant to believe any other claims involved. Warrant of this sort would be immediate.

In addition to earned warrants, some philosophers countenance the possibility of **unearned warrants**. These will be warrants that aren't constituted by any experience or awareness or insight or understanding the subject has. For example, some philosophers talk of us having *default justification* to believe that our senses are reliable, and that we're not brains in vats: these hypotheses, they say, are just intrinsically epistemically probable, without the subject needing to do or experience anything to make them so.<sup>3</sup> Some philosophers say that cogito beliefs are warranted just by virtue of being *hyper-reliable*, that is, impossible to form falsely.<sup>4</sup> And so on.

It's controversial whether there are any unearned warrants.<sup>5</sup> But many philosophers do countenance some. Wright and Davies are among them. They call their unearned warrants "entitlements"; they seem to reserve the term "justification" for earned warrants; and they use "warrant" for the broad class that includes both earned and unearned varieties. I prefer the term "justification"; I think it fits history and broader usage better to apply that term to *any* kind of warrant to believe or doxastically accept things. If there are entitlements or unearned warrants, I'd call them "justification," too. However, in the present discussion I've chosen to stick close to Wright's and Davies' own usage.<sup>6</sup>

Recall again the example:

E. [Visual experiences as of a zebra]  
R ⇓  
Z

I said that your warrant here to believe Z is mediate. This will be so *regardless* of whether your warrant to believe R is earned or unearned. Even if what warrants you in

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<sup>3</sup> See BonJour? Wright 2004? White? Cohen 1999 and 2000 [but not BK?].

<sup>4</sup> See my 2006a and 2006b.


<sup>5</sup> Conee and Feldman's "evidentialism" might be understood as the doctrine that all warrant is "earned," in the way we're understanding that here.

<sup>6</sup> Passages where they explain warrant/entitlement/justification ?? In his forthcoming, Wright says he uses "warrant" only for *all things considered* epistemic statuses (ms p. 6); but I'm not following him in that. I will speak of both all things considered and prima facie warrants.

Wright uses the notion of "warrant" differently in his 1991. Other philosophers use the terms "warrant" and "entitlement" for a variety of epistemic statuses: for example, Meiland 1980; Pollock 1983; and Plantinga 1993a, 1993b. Burge 1993 and 1996 and Peacocke ?? use these notions in something like Wright's sense.


believing R is some default presumption in its favor, rather than any experience or insight you've had, it's still true that part of what warrants you to believe Z is warrant to believe something else. So your warrant to believe Z is mediate.

On the other hand, some theorists including me think our warrant for some perceptual beliefs is immediate. If Z is such a belief, then your warrant would instead be structured like this:




I'm not sure whether claims about zebras are immediately warranted in this way, but I do think that some perceptual beliefs are. I call this view **dogmatism about perception**.

If dogmatism about perception is right, then some instances of Moorean reasoning won't have this structure:



but will instead have this:



and so neither Moore-3, nor anything else, will be among the background warrant you need, to have the warrant you do for Moore-2. *There is* no such background warrant.

If dogmatism is right, then, these instances of Moorean reasoning won't exhibit the BW Model of transmission-failure. It remains to be seen whether there's some other model of transmission-failure that they do exhibit.

A **Moorean Dogmatist** thinks that there isn't—that, whatever its faults, the Moorean reasoning *is capable* of transmitting warrant to Moore-3. That reasoning *can* be a way to acquire some warrant to believe Moore-3; and it can be reasonable to believe Moore-3 on the basis of it.

I've defended Moorean dogmatism elsewhere.<sup>7</sup> My preference is for a version of dogmatism where your perceptual warrant comes from the *phenomenology* of your experience, which I think can be shared between veridical perceivers and hallucinators. However, our discussion here will have mostly to do with dogmatism in general: with any view that holds that your perceptual warrant is immediate. This includes reliabilist

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<sup>7</sup> See my 2000 and 2004.

and disjunctivist versions of the view, too; and views which would explain your perceptual warrant in terms other than what the phenomenology of experience is like.<sup>8</sup>

It's not straightforward *which* perceptual beliefs are good candidates to be immediately warranted. In the Zebra reasoning, I think your warrant *does* plausibly depend on some background assumptions. This is because Zebra-2 goes beyond what's really reported by your experiences. If it *is* a cleverly-disguised mule, or a fur-covered robot, we wouldn't say that you've *misperceived* it. The error wasn't in what you saw, but in what you went on to believe. On the other hand, if you're having illusory experiences as of, say, a light ahead, you *are* victim to a perceptual error. Things aren't the way vision is reporting them. So I'd say that *There is a light ahead* is specifically reported by your senses, and is immediately warranted. It's not obvious which example *I have two hands* is more like.<sup>9</sup> But for expository convenience, I'll treat it as a candidate to be immediately warranted, like *There is a light ahead*.

Care is needed not to confuse dogmatism with alternative epistemologies.

Dogmatism might naturally be summarized with the slogan "You're allowed to *take it for granted* that your senses are reliable, that you're not a brain in a vat, and so on." If you acquire evidence of your *unreliability*, or that you're envatted, that will *undermine* your perceptual warrant; but no antecedent warrant to believe those undermining hypotheses *fail* to obtain is needed. You're "taking it for granted" that those hypotheses are false in the sense of being vulnerable to them as defeaters, without having antecedent warrant to rule them out.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Dogmatist views can also be found in Reid's *Inquiry* V.7; Pollock 1974, Ch 2-3 [Ch 2-5] ??; Ginet 1975, Ch. 6 ??; Pollock 1986, 142-8 ??; Audi 1993, especially Chs. 3, 4, 10, 12 ??; Burge 1993, 458-9 ??; Pollock and Cruz 1999, Ch 5 §4.2 and Ch 7 §§1-3 ??; Brewer 1999 ??; Dretske 2000 ??; Huemer 2001; Peacocke 2003, Ch 3-4 ??; Burge 2003a and 2003b ??; and Markie\_\_\_\_. Chisholm may arguably also be construed as a dogmatist about perception (see Alston 1997 for discussion of this). Reliabilist views like Goldman's and Alston's can also be expressed in dogmatist terms.

<sup>9</sup> Cite Siegel??

<sup>10</sup> Cite Burge?? Newer Davies on "negative entitlements."

Wright usually uses the vocabulary of "presuppositions" to refer to presupposed *information*, that is, antecedently warranted background premises: see for example 2000, 148; and his repeated references to presupposing *warrants* and *entitlements*: 2000, 159; 2002, 345; 2003, 64, 66, 75. [Check 2004, ms pp. 25, 27, 30-31 ??] However, as he points out in his forthcoming ms pp. 4-5, "presupposition" may also be used to describe things one is merely "relying on," in the sense explained above.

Alston 1986 says that when I form perceptual beliefs, I'm "assuming" or "proceeding as if" sense perception is reliable (323-4, 327-9 ??), without my needing to have any antecedent warrant to believe that it is (331-2 ??). I think these notions can be understood as "relying on" something's being the case, in the sense explained here.



This slogan “You’re allowed to take it for granted...” can also be read differently. It can be read to mean that you have an *entitlement or warrant to believe* that your senses are reliable, that you’re not a brain in a vat, and so on—perhaps a warrant you didn’t need to do anything to earn. This view is not dogmatism. It’s just one version of the competing view that perceptual warrants are mediate. This is a popular alternative to dogmatism; it’s the view Wright espouses, and which Davies seems to have held until around 2003.<sup>11</sup> On this view, your perceptual warrants aren’t *inferential*. Your experiences as of hands may warrant you in believing you have hands without you needing to *perform* any inferences or even needing to *think about* whether you’re a brain in a vat. Neither do you need to have any special experience or insight. The antecedent warrants in question are unearned “entitlements.” But to be warranted in your belief that you have hands, on the basis of your hand-like experiences, you do need to *have* this antecedent warrant to believe you’re not a brain in a vat. It can’t come from your perception-based beliefs in the external world; it has to be in place independently.

On this sort of view, the Moorean reasoning exhibits the same BW Model of transmission-failure as Dretske’s Zebra reasoning.

I mentioned earlier that there are tricky details with applying the BW Model of transmission-failure to Dretske’s example. Let’s confront some of them. Consider this alleged part of the Zebra reasoning:

Zebra-1  
 Zebra-3... ↙  
 Zebra-2. That’s a zebra in the pen.

Do you *really* need antecedent warrant to believe you’re not looking at a disguised mule, to be perceptually warranted in believing Zebra-2? What if that alternative is beyond your ken—e.g., because you’ve never heard of mules, or because you never would have guessed that animals can be disguised to look like other animals?

One response here would be to say that you can have warrant *to* believe things that you’re not yet *able* to believe or even entertain, and to maintain that *you do after all* need warrant *to* believe you’re not looking at a disguised mule, even when that alternative is not one you’re yet in a position to consider. A different response would be to say that the mule hypothesis is one you’d need antecedent warrant to rule out *when it arises for you* as a question. Prior to that, perhaps you don’t. In cases where the subject is proposing to reason from Zebra-2 to Zebra-3, however, the question whether it’s a disguised mule has arisen for the subject, so in those cases her warrants will need to have the structure diagrammed above.

But these complications should give us pause. Is it really Zebra-3 that our warrant to believe Zebra-2 depends on? Or is it instead something more general? Perhaps it’s rather this:

Zebra-4. Zoo pens don’t often contain animals disguised to look other than they are.

If the structure of the Zebra reasoning is really this:

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<sup>11</sup> See footnote 3 for some other proponents.

Zebra-1  
 Zebra-4... ⇨  
 Zebra-2  
 ⇨?  
 Zebra-3

then the BW Model we've articulated no longer applies.

Perhaps Zebra-4 and Zebra-3 are closely enough related that some minor variant of the BW Model could apply. The idea may be: Zebra-3 is *really* supported by Zebra-4, or by the interaction of Zebra-4 with Zebra-1, and would already need to be so supported for you to have the warrant you do for Zebra-2. So reasoning from Zebra-2 to Zebra-3 wouldn't track the real structure of your warrants.<sup>12</sup>

I think this will be extremely difficult to spell out in detail. In explicit reasoning we very often "overshoot" the real warrants that we're relying on. For instance, suppose I visit a remote plain of Antarctica, and see what looks to be a woman ahead. I reason:

- Plain-1. [Visual experiences as of a woman.]
- Plain-2. There's a woman walking up ahead.
- Plain-3. So I'm not the first person to walk on this plain.

My reasoning here doesn't accurately track the real structure of my warrants. We can undermine my warrant to believe Plain-2—give me evidence that I'm incapable of distinguishing men from woman at this distance—while intuitively leaving in place the same warrant I have for Plain-3. So Plain-2 is really *stronger* than anything my warrant for Plain-3 depends on. I might more accurately have reasoned:

- Plain-1. [Visual experiences as of a woman.]
- Plain-2\*. There's *a person* walking up ahead.
- Plain-3. So I'm not the first person to walk on this plain.

Yet I'd be very reluctant to say my actual reasoning, from Plain-2 to Plain-3, is *unreasonable*. I think I *can* acquire warrant to believe Plain-3 by reasoning in that way, and can reasonably base my belief in Plain-3 on such reasoning.

What is the difference between the bad Zebra reasoning and the permissible Plain reasoning? Arguably, both have the same structure:

1  
 ... ⇨  
 2  
 ⇨?  
 3

and we want to say your warrant for 3 strictly comes from the interaction of 1 with some of the stuff in the background "..." rather than from 2. Yet in the one case reasoning from

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<sup>12</sup> Compare Wright 2002, pp. 334-5??

2 to 3 can still be reasonable; in the other case not. What makes the difference? If the BW Model of transmission-failure is to be extended beyond cases where 3 itself is in the background, these details need to be ironed out.

I don't think it will be easy to do that; I'm not sure it will even be possible. But for our purposes we can set these difficulties aside. If dogmatism is true, then *no* model of transmission-failure which involves background warrants for the 2-premise will apply to Moorean reasoning. For dogmatism says our perceptual warrant for Moore-2 doesn't depend on *any* background warrant.

#### IV

When people articulate their qualms about dogmatism, they often seem to be applying a general principle like this:

**No Fallible Immediacy (NFI)** If some warrant *W* could be possessed by you in situations other than *A*—for example, if it could be possessed in each of situation *A* and *B*—then *W* can't immediately warrant you in believing that *A* obtains, rather than the alternatives.

But when I point that out, I find that few are willing to endorse NFI as a general principle. They're right to hesitate. Many epistemologies on offer nowadays countenance some form of immediate warrant, and often that warrant is thought to be fallible. Can you have immediate but fallible warrant to believe you have a headache? If so, then let *A* be the situation in which you genuinely do have a headache, and *B* the situation where you don't, but still are warranted in thinking you do, and we have a counterexample to NFI. Can you have immediate but fallible warrant to believe the answer to a simple logic puzzle is *A*? Perhaps you're wrong, the answer is really *B*. The warrant you have is possessible in situations (such as the real situation) where *A* is false; yet it's an immediate warrant for *A*. So we have another counterexample to NFI.

Indeed, Wright himself seems committed to denying NFI. For he thinks we have unearned warrants to believe we're not brains in vats, that we instead have genuine perceptual contact with our surroundings. This warrant is fallible: we might be wrong. But neither does Wright think it's constituted by our warrant to believe other premises. So these unearned warrants can be fallible yet immediate.

If there's no *general* difficulty with fallible yet immediate warrants, we need to know why there should be some *special* difficulty in the case of perception.

Perhaps the problem is that perceptual warrants are earned. Perhaps what's true is not NFI but a more restricted principle:

**No Earned Fallible Immediacy (NEFI)** If some *earned* warrant *W* could be possessed by you in situations other than *A*, then *W* can't immediately warrant you in believing that *A* obtains, rather than the alternatives.

Wright can countenance fallible yet immediate *unearned* warrants, while refusing to allow fallible yet immediate perceptual warrants, because they would be earned.<sup>13</sup>

What could motivate this restriction? What keeps it from being ad hoc?

I'm going to suggest a line of reasoning which may be tempting people here. This will be speculative. But I think it's worthwhile articulating the reasoning, and saying what's wrong with it.

Consider a situation in which you already *know* ahead of time what warrant you're going to acquire for A. For example, suppose you already know that when you open your eyes you'll have visual experiences as of an amber wall. In such cases, it's very plausible that *actually having* the experiences shouldn't make any epistemic difference as to whether the wall really is amber. It shouldn't make you any more confident that the wall is amber, rather than beige but lit by tricky orange lighting.<sup>14</sup>

But now suppose you *don't* yet know what warrant you're going to acquire when you open your eyes. Actually *having* experiences as of an amber wall would then tell you you're among those situations where *you will* have these experiences. It's tempting to think *that's all* it can tell you. For, after you factor in the knowledge that you're among the situations where you will have the experiences, what epistemic role is left for the experiences to play? Didn't we just say that actually having them shouldn't make any further difference, beyond what you've now factored in? And so haven't we arrived at NEFI? All that your experiences can by themselves warrant you in believing is that you have them. They can't give you any immediate warrant to believe the wall is amber rather than beige but lit by tricky lighting.

There's a subtle mistake in this reasoning. The mistake is to equate "learning that you will have the experiences" with "learning *only* that you will have the experiences." On a view where your experiences immediately warrant you in believing the wall is amber, the information that you will have the experiences should support *not just* the claim that you will have them, but also, prospectively, what those experiences will immediately support. That's why actually having the experiences makes no difference: if you knew in advance that you'd have them, then you should already have incorporated the warrant they give you to believe the wall is amber. It doesn't follow that your experiences only warrant believing that you're *either* seeing an amber wall *or* seeing a beige wall lit by tricky lighting. If that's true, it needs to be shown another way.

A different source of resistance, to *Moorean* dogmatism in particular, comes from considerations of probability. Moore-3 can be formulated in such a way that its negation *entails* you'd have the experiences you do. Then even if your experiences did confirm Moore-2, which entails Moore-3, by orthodox Bayesian thinking those experiences should *disconfirm* Moore-3 rather than supply warrant to believe it. Whenever not-M

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<sup>13</sup> Thanks to Carrie Jenkins for identifying this strategy.

<sup>14</sup> Weatherson denies??

entails E but M doesn't, the probability of M given E should be *lower* than the prior probability of M.<sup>15</sup>

Some philosophers want to explicate transmission-failure in probabilistic terms like these.<sup>16</sup> But I propose to set the probabilistic considerations aside for this discussion. There are many interesting issues at play: What's the relation between probabilistically confirming and supplying warrant? Should the epistemic effect of *having* experiences be the same as conditionalizing on *the premise* that you have them? There's so much to discuss that we need to take it up in other forums. Here I'll suppose that transmission-failure is meant to be a novel diagnostic tool, not just another vocabulary for expressing familiar probabilistic theorems.

In fact, I doubt that probabilistic considerations really *can be* the source of our deepest-rooted intuitive resistance to Moorean reasoning. Intuitively, the following reasoning seems just as problematic:

Moore-1. [Visual experiences as of hands]

Moore-2. I have two hands.

Moore-3\*. *I have two hands and I'm not a disembodied handless spirit, who is merely hallucinating hands.*

Yet, whereas Moore-2 merely *entailed* the earlier Moore-3, it's *logically equivalent* to Moore-3\*. So if your experiences supply *any* probabilistic confirmation to Moore-2, they have to confirm Moore-3\* to the same degree. There's no basis for any *probabilistic* critique of the step from Moore-2 to Moore-3\*. Yet our intuitive resistance to this reasoning and to the original Moorean reasoning seem to come from a common source.

Where now are we? Either (i) we accept Moorean dogmatism, so Moorean reasoning can be reasonable. In that case, we owe an account of why that reasoning *seems* intuitively to be problematic. Or (ii) we reject dogmatism altogether, as a false epistemology of perception. Instead, we go for something like Wright's epistemology, and say that Moorean reasoning fails because it exemplifies the BW Model of transmission-failure. Or (iii) we say there's something probabilistically objectionable about Moorean reasoning. This needs much discussion, and we're going to leave it off the table here. Or, (iv) we say that even if dogmatism is true, and so Moorean reasoning doesn't exemplify the BW Model of transmission-failure, nonetheless there are *other* (non-probabilistic) models of transmission-failure which it does exemplify. So even if dogmatism is true, Moorean reasoning should still fail.

My aim here will be to eliminate possibility (iv). I think future debate is best focused on the other three possibilities. I'm not sure whether Wright disagrees about this. Often he seems to me to be backing option (ii). But as we'll see, there's enough interpretive unclarity that he may sometimes be read as backing option (iv). My aim is to persuade you that that's a bad strategy. If you want to charge Moorean reasoning with

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<sup>15</sup> See, for example, Cohen 2002; Schiffer 2004; White forthcoming; Wright forthcoming. ??

<sup>16</sup> Samir, Kotzen.

transmission-failure, you're best off arguing that dogmatism is false and that Moorean reasoning exhibits the same BW kind of transmission-failure that we attributed to the Zebra reasoning. (Or getting into the details of what probability dynamics are at work.<sup>17</sup>)

I've proposed a dogmatist defense of Moorean reasoning in my 2004. It will be useful to quickly review what I said there; that will be section V. In section VI, we'll take up the interpretive task of sorting out exactly how Wright is conceiving of transmission-failure. In section VII, we'll consider and criticize possible models for transmission-failure other than the BW Model.

## V

If the Moorean dogmatist is to be believed, Moorean reasoning can be reasonable. Why then does it strike us as so intuitively problematic?

There are three key questions. The first is: What is the epistemic effect of false higher-order warrant? For example, consider a mathematician who reasons correctly to P, but then acquires warrant to believe, falsely, that the proof strategy she used is flawed. She now has higher-order warrant to believe, falsely, that her original reasoning fails to warrant belief in P. How confident should she be that P? Plausible things can be said on either side of this question; but in the end, I and many others think the mathematician's higher-order warrant should render P somewhat less warranted for her. Warranted beliefs *about* your warrants, even when those beliefs are false, can undermine the prima facie support the lower-order warrants provide.

The second question is: What is the epistemic effect of reasoning that's *in fact* flawed but which *seems* compelling? Suppose our mathematician carefully reasons through another proof, of Q, which *does* have some subtle flaw that she's unaware of. Will she have warrant to believe Q? Perhaps she has inductive warrant: she knows that proofs she finds compelling, and proofs in this journal, have good track-records. But set that aside. Does she have any non-inductive warrant to believe Q? Does the apparent compellingness of the proof, or her experience of seeming to deduce Q in that way, give her any warrant for Q?<sup>18</sup>

I don't know what's the right thing to say about this. I can be persuaded either way. What we say about Moore's argument needs to track what we say.

Suppose we say the mathematician *does* have some warrant for Q, despite the flaw in her proof. Then consider a philosopher who's reading skeptical arguments to the effect that we have no perceptual warrant; or anti-dogmatist arguments to the effect that NEFI is true, and so experiences don't by themselves, immediately, warrant any perceptual beliefs. If dogmatism is true, such arguments are flawed. But the philosopher

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<sup>17</sup> My own view is that when we're dealing with immediate yet underminable warrant, we need a heterodox probability dynamics. A rough presentation is available on my web site as "Uncertainty and Undermining."

<sup>18</sup> Cite Huemer [see Markie for pp]; end of my McKinsey.

may not yet see the flaws, or may not see them as flaws. The arguments may seem compelling to her. Then she'll be in a situation like the mathematician's: she may be warranted in believing the skeptic's conclusions, despite the flaws in the arguments. And then, drawing on our answer to the first question, the philosopher's warrant for these false claims *about* her perceptual warrant may well undermine that perceptual warrant. Even though her experiences really do provide it.

That's not to say that the skeptic is *correct*. The skeptic says that *none of us* are perceptually warranted. We're only describing a mechanism by which *people who read skeptical arguments and find them compelling* may end up in the kind of situation the skeptic falsely claims we're all in. Doing epistemology may be harmful to your epistemic health.<sup>19</sup> Other people, who are ignorant of the skeptic's arguments, or unmoved by them, can retain their immediate perceptual warrant to believe Moore-2, and can reasonably go on to infer Moore-3 from it.

On the other hand, though, perhaps flawed arguments *can't* warrant belief in their conclusion. In that case, the dogmatist is committed to saying that philosophers *lack* warrant to believe the skeptic's and the anti-dogmatist's conclusions, even when the arguments for those conclusions seem compelling. To sort out what's going on in that case, we need to attend to a third question.

Suppose you merely believe P, without warrant for doing so. You also recognize that P entails Q, and nothing about that entailment serves to undermine your confidence in P. What then is your epistemic relation to Q?

It doesn't seem right to say that you have *warrant* for Q. All that Q has going for it is that it follows from P, an *unwarranted* belief of yours. But neither does it seem enough to say that Q is just unwarranted, in the way that any other arbitrary unsupported proposition is. Your unwarranted belief in P seems to put some kind of pressure on you to believe Q too. The overall most reasonable course may be for you to believe neither. But if, failing that, you believe P yet resist believing Q, you're manifesting some further epistemic flaw. If you're going to be unreasonable and believe P, then you "ought" in some sense to believe Q too.

This phenomenon is familiar in the ethics and practical reasoning literature. In recent years Broome has discussed how it operates in epistemology too.<sup>20</sup> I've yet to find a fully satisfying vocabulary for describing the phenomenon. Broome talks about "normative requirements," as opposed to reasons: your unwarranted belief in P normatively commits you to believing Q, but since it's unwarranted, it isn't a *reason* for Q. [Verify??] In my 2004, I talked about "rational commitment." Both expressions are non-optimal. For one thing, the general phenomenon here can also be present in cases where the relation between P and Q is merely ampliative; so talk of "requirement" and "commitment" is too strong. For another thing, talk of "commitment" may mislead. We

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<sup>19</sup> Compare Feldman??

<sup>20</sup> Cite Broome. Cite Dancy, others.

*don't* want to say that the subject is conclusively under any rational obligation to believe Q. Rather, she'd be *best* off believing neither P nor Q.<sup>21</sup>

Perhaps it'd be helpful to borrow a Kantian idiom, and call the relation between your belief in P and a prospective belief in Q one of **hypothetical support**. If you really had warrant for P, on the other hand, that warrant would **categorically support** believing Q. In each case, the support may be a matter of degree, and may be underminable by other beliefs or warrant you possess. That's how I'll talk here. What's important is recognizing the phenomenon, not how we choose to label it.

Some philosophers describe this phenomenon as a relation between P, or your belief in P, and *the proposition Q*, rather than a prospective belief in Q. That may be adequate for some cases, but it won't generalize properly. Intuitively, the same phenomenon is at work when a subject believes, without warrant, that on balance her evidence tells equally in favor of Q and not-Q. In such a case, I'd like to say that the subject's unwarranted belief about her evidence hypothetically supports *suspending belief* whether Q. If we were restricted to relations to propositions, we wouldn't be able to say that. (The subject's unwarranted belief about her evidence *may* well hypothetically support believing propositions about her relation to Q; but it should *also* hypothetically support the prospective attitude of suspending belief whether Q itself is true.) Similarly, if a subject is unwarrantedly agnostic about P, that attitude may hypothetically support being agnostic about further matters. So the phenomenon we're talking about is fundamentally a relation between actual and prospective *attitudes*, not just a relation between propositions.

Here's another generalization of the phenomenon, which will be crucial to our discussion. Suppose you have some warrant W that (categorically but *prima facie*) supports believing Q. This warrant is vulnerable to being undermined by warrant to believe U. Now suppose you *merely do* believe U, without warrant. Earlier, we said that mere belief in P can hypothetically support believing Q. Similarly, I think mere belief in U can **hypothetically undermine** the warrant W gives you to believe Q. In my 2004, I described this by saying your belief in U "rationally obstructs you" from believing Q on the basis of W. You're already manifesting a rational flaw by believing U without warrant; but you'd be manifesting a further flaw if you went ahead and believed Q on the basis of W, while maintaining your belief in U.

It's clear to me that *this is* a flaw, but unclear how it relates to other, more familiar epistemic statuses. Perhaps having doxastic warrant—*warranted beliefs*, not just warrant *to* believe—requires that your beliefs not be hypothetically undermined in this way. I'm not sure.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Also, one referee thought it more plausible to say it's your doxastic commitment to P (which is constituted or manifested by your believing P) that "commits" you to further beliefs, rather than your belief in P itself.

<sup>22</sup> Beebe?? and Bergmann?? also propose that merely believing or doubting certain things, even without warrant, can undermine doxastic warrant.



In any event, let's return to our philosopher who finds flawed skeptical or anti-dogmatist arguments compelling. This philosopher unwarrantedly believes that her experiences don't by themselves, immediately, warrant any perceptual beliefs. Or she unwarrantedly believes things that hypothetically support that conclusion. In response to our first question, we said that *warranted* belief in such a conclusion should (categorically) undermine the warrant her experiences really do give her. Given what we're saying now, *unwarranted* belief in that conclusion (or in premises that hypothetically support it) should *hypothetically* undermine in a parallel way. For a philosopher with such beliefs, it'd be epistemically defective to believe things just on the basis of her experiences—even if those experiences are in fact giving her categorical warrant *to* so believe.

I've described mechanisms by which philosophers who have certain epistemic views—or beliefs that hypothetically support those views—would have their perceptual warrant for Moore-2 categorically or hypothetically undermined. I think that fosters the illusion that our warrant for Moore-2 is structured like our warrant for Zebra-2:

Moore-1. [Visual experiences as of hands]  
 ..... ⇓  
 Moore-2

That is, it fosters the illusion that our warrant for Moore-2 *isn't* immediate, but rather depends on antecedent background warrant to believe things aren't as the skeptic proposes. However, I've shown how these mechanisms may be operating even if that's false, and our warrant for Moore-2 is immediate. I don't think that will be enough to dispel the illusion, but I hope it will begin to counteract it.

We need to confront some important last wrinkles. What if a subject doesn't *believe* the skeptic's conclusion, but is merely *agnostic* as to whether it's true? What if she doesn't *believe* any undermining hypothesis, but merely *entertains doubts* as to whether they're true? Should Moorean reasoning be rationally effective against her agnosticism or doubts? Most likely it *won't* be effective, and it can seem like that's rationally appropriate. Someone who considers Moorean reasoning from such a position *shouldn't* be persuaded by it to overcome her agnosticism or doubts. Can the dogmatist give any account of this?

This is difficult, in part because it's difficult to identify what agnosticism and doubts really *are*. To begin, we should distinguish *agnosticism* from the state of *having no doxastic attitude at all* towards an issue. A subject who's never considered a question isn't yet *agnostic* about it; she has no doxastic attitude at all. Agnosticism is instead a particular kind of attitude, one of suspending belief. As an initial approximation, we may construe agnosticism as a kind of mixed partial belief: you partly believe things are one way, and partly believe they're the other way. This is only an approximation: as Scott Sturgeon has remarked, agnosticism proper requires a kind of "committed neutrality" that a mere state of mixed belief may lack. Still, it will be enough to start with.

As an initial approximation, "entertaining doubt" may also be construed as having a kind of mixed belief. (Or perhaps it's not mixed *real* belief, but instead mixed *pretend- or suppositional*-belief.) This too is probably at best an approximation, but again I think it will be enough to start with.

Now undermining, like support, is a matter of degree. If a subject who *all-out* believes an undermining hypothesis thereby hypothetically undermines his perceptual warrant, a subject who partially believes (or partially pretend-believes) an undermining hypothesis will thereby hypothetically undermine his perceptual belief *to some degree*. So the same mechanisms we've been discussing will be operative; and I think they'll still contribute to the illusion that we need antecedent warrant to believe things aren't as the skeptic proposes.

At one point Wright says:

I cannot *rationally* form the belief that it is currently blowing a gale and snowing outside on the basis of my present visual and auditory experience while simultaneously agnostic, let alone skeptical, about the credentials of that experience. (2004, 193; compare 2003, 61; forthcoming ms pp. 11-12, 15-20; 2000, 142; and 2002, 334-5)

I agree with him; there's nothing in this passage that a Moorean dogmatist needs to resist. When you form any belief, it's irrational to *combine* the belief with a continuing agnosticism about the belief's warrant. Believing on the basis of some warrant would be hypothetically undermined by such agnosticism. It *doesn't follow* that you need antecedent warrant to believe that your perceptual beliefs are warranted after all (that your experiences have good "credentials"). For all Wright says here, subjects who have no doxastic attitudes whatsoever about the credentials of their experience, or subjects who just uncritically accept that their experiences warrant their perceptual beliefs, may be reasonable in holding their perceptual beliefs. Not because that acceptance is covertly warranted—but rather because they merely *lack* the doxastic attitudes that can hypothetically undermine the warrant their experiences are immediately providing. Being perceptually warranted doesn't require us to *have* antecedently *warranted positive* higher-order beliefs, to the effect that our experiences *do* give us warrant. But as we're seeing, it may require us to *lack negative* higher-order attitudes—warranted or not—that hypothetically undermine, and so rationally interfere with, our first-order, immediate perceptual warrants.<sup>23</sup>

I don't expect these explanations to satisfy everyone. In particular, if you think it has to be *less reasonable* for the subject to believe Moore-3 on the basis of Moore-2 than it is for her to believe Moore-2, these explanations probably satisfy you. So be it. They at any rate constitute *some* accounting for why Moorean reasoning should seem sketchy to us, compatible with its retaining its capacity to transmit warrant. I don't expect what I've said here to be decisive.

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<sup>23</sup> This bears on the "Simple Elevation Hypothesis" Wright formulates in his forthcoming (ms pp. 10-13). Roughly, that principle says that if C are the conditions that confer some warrant W, then being in a position to warrantably believe C obtains suffices for being in a position to warrantably believe you have W. I agree that warrant to believe C obtains may *warrant* some subjects in believing they have W. But it can't *suffice* to put them in a position to *warrantably believe* they have W. They'd need also to *lack* interfering higher-order attitudes, including agnosticism.

## VI

How does all this bear on Wright's own understanding of transmission-failure?

Wright and Davies alternate between different glosses on what transmission-failure consists in. One criterion they give is: Can reasoning through an argument, relying on the indicated warrants for its premises, add up to (or constitute, or give you) *any* new warrant to believe the argument's conclusion?<sup>24</sup> The other criterion is: Can reasoning in the indicated way *rationaly resolve doubt or agnosticism* about the argument's conclusion?<sup>25</sup>

In section V, above, I reviewed reasons for thinking that Moorean reasoning might count as transmission-failing by the second criterion even if didn't by the first—that is, even if it *did* give subjects new warrant for Moore-3, and the right kinds of subjects (subjects without interfering higher-order attitudes) would be able to reasonably *believe* Moore-3 on the basis of such reasoning. So if the notion of transmission-failure is to track an argument's inability to do that, then we should take the first criterion as definitive, and set the second aside.

But when does that first criterion apply? What sorts of arguments can and what sorts can't transmit warrant?

Wright has addressed that question in several places. In most of his discussion he seems to be operating with some form of our BW Model of transmission-failure. He does distinguish between two transmission-failure "templates." He calls them the `information-dependent` and the `disjunctive` template. (I'll indicate Wright's terminology with `this typeface`.) These present some interpretive difficulties, but as we'll discuss, they might properly be understood as two subspecies of the BW Model. So it's not clear that Wright countenances any forms of transmission-failure other than the BW Model. If he doesn't, then he should agree that if dogmatism is true (and we set probabilistic worries aside) Moorean reasoning should be allowed to transmit warrant.

However, there are also elements in Wright's discussion that do suggest further models of transmission-failure.

Throughout his discussion, Wright deploys a contrast between `information-dependent` and `non-inferential` warrants. Wright says that what makes a warrant `non-inferential` is that the warranted belief not be *based on any inference*, and that, furthermore, it not draw any of its support from "evidence" or "collateral information."<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> See Wright 2000, 142-3, 154; 2002, 335, 342; forthcoming ms p. 14; Davies 2000, 387, 394, 398 ?? Sometimes this is put as: Can reasoning in the indicated way add up to a *first* warrant to believe the argument's conclusion? (Wright 2000, 141, 155; 2002, 331-2; 2003, 57; Davies 2000, 386 ??) But it's unclear whether every argument that passes the main criterion for transmitting warrant needs also to pass this variant (see Davies 2000, p. 388 and fn. 17 ??).

<sup>25</sup> Wright 2000, 140; 2002, 331; Davies ??

<sup>26</sup> For his definitions of "information-dependent," see his 2000, 143; 2002, 335-6; and 2003, 59. On "non-inferential," see 2002, 341 and 2003, 60, 62.


In his earliest discussions, he uses “evidence” to mean “empirical evidence” (see 2000, 147). In later discussions, he counts earned a priori warrants as evidence too (2004, 174-5). But nowhere does he count unearned warrants as evidence. Hence, Wright will count beliefs whose warrant is non-inferential, in my sense, but still mediate because it depends on antecedent *unearned* warrant to believe other things, as non-inferential and “groundless” (2000, 152-3, 156-7; and 2003, 66-67). In his view, that includes our most basic perceptual beliefs. In this table:

<b>what I call immediate warrants</b>	<b>what I call mediate but non-inferential warrants</b> non-inferential warrants that depend on antecedent <i>unearned</i> warrants to believe other things	<b>what I call inferential warrants</b>
	non-inferential warrants that depend on “information” (that is, antecedent <i>earned</i> warrants to believe other things)	


the darkest grey cells represent Wright’s information-dependent warrants; the other cells his non-inferential warrants.

In Wright’s vocabulary, our perceptual warrants have a Humean or “I-II-III” structure when they’re “inferentially” supported by “defeasible evidence” (see 2002, 336 and 341; 2003, 60; 2004, 172). They have only a Cartesian structure if they’re “acquired not on the basis of evidence, but directly” (2003, 60, 62; 2004, 168). This bears on what sorts of skeptical argument, and what sorts of transmission-failure, our perceptual beliefs are vulnerable to.

As I said, Wright outlines two templates for transmission-failure. The first is the information-dependent template. This is instantiated when some premise in a piece of reasoning is warranted in part by information, that is, antecedent earned warrants, that includes the reasoning’s conclusion. That’s clearly an example of our BW Model of transmission-failure:



But the BW Model also applies to cases where your reasoning depends on antecedent *unearned* warrants that include the reasoning’s conclusion:



premise A

×

conclusion B

An important question is whether this is all that Wright's second template, his *disjunctive* template, manages to cover.<sup>27</sup> If so, then Wright's two transmission-failure templates are just subspecies of our BW Model.

However, Wright clearly seems to want his *disjunctive* template to cover cases where the relevant warrants are alleged to be genuinely immediate. So perhaps the *disjunctive* template only *overlaps with* our BW Model, and includes more besides.

It's not easy to determine which of these two possibilities obtains. My considered view is that the former is correct: that the only models of transmission-failure Wright successfully presents us with are BW Models. When he's trying to apply his *disjunctive* model to cases where your warrant for the relevant premises is *alleged to be* genuinely immediate, he's most charitably interpreted as arguing that the warrant in question *can't* really be immediate, but can at best be of the sort represented by the light grey cell in our table. (I'm not sure whether this captures Wright's own understanding of what he's doing.)

I'll briefly present some evidence in support of this interpretation. But as I said, the question is tricky. [I'll reserve some of the harder evidence until later.]

To begin, Wright at some points (in 2003, in note 9 and pp. 67-8) says that transmission-failure *presupposes* Closure. That is, in order for us to have a case where you have warrant for A that fails to transmit to B, it must be that Closure is not violated: you must also have some warrant to believe B. Why? Wright seems to be thinking that if your warrant for A didn't already *require* that warrant for B, you wouldn't be in the kind of position that blocked warrant-transmission. In other words, transmission-failure must be due to B's being among the background warrants that warrant you in believing A. This is just our BW Model.

Let's next consider Wright's expositions of his *disjunctive* template. Wright is supposing that he has some warrant W his possession of which is compatible with either A or C being the case. He believes A on the basis of that warrant, and reasons from A to B. B is such that its falsity implies C is true; to simplify we can just set B equal to not-C. Wright focuses on the question: what should make it reasonable for him to believe A on the basis of W, rather than the more tentative belief  $A \vee C$ ? Here is a sample of what he says:

[T]he more tentative claim would indeed be appropriate unless I am somehow *additionally* entitled to discount alternative C... [I]n order for me to be entitled to discount C, and so move past the disjunction to A, I have to be entitled to *discount the negation of B*, and therefore entitled to accept B; for by hypothesis, if not-B were true, so would C be. So it would seem that I must have an appreciable


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<sup>27</sup> For Wright's exposition of the "disjunctive" template, see his 2000, 153-6; 2002, 342-4; and 2003, 60-63.

entitlement to affirm B *already*, independent of the recognition of its entailment by A, if I am to claim to be warranted in accepting A in the first place... So my warrant [for A] does not transmit [to B]. (2003, 62-3, Wright's italics; compare his 2000, 155 and 2002, 343)<sup>28</sup>

Notice what he says: for the subject to reasonably believe A on the basis of W, he needs to be antecedently "entitled to discount" not-B, and "entitled to accept" and "affirm" B. Elsewhere Wright talks of having "antecedent reason to think" that B holds (2000, 156; see also 2003, 66 and 2002, 346). In other words, the subject's warrant for A must require him to have an antecedent warrant to believe or doxastically accept B. Presumably, then, the warrant for A is not immediate. But it can still be non-inferential in his sense: it can be a warrant from the light grey cell in our table.

That's the most straightforward construal of Wright's disjunctive template, and if it's correct, then this template will be just a subspecies of our BW Model. It won't apply in cases where your warrant for A genuinely *is* immediate:



However, there are reasons to hesitate: notice in the second-to-last sentence of the quoted passage, Wright doesn't say that he needs an antecedent warrant to believe B, if he is *to be* warranted in accepting A. He says he needs it in order to *claim to be* warranted in accepting A. Is this difference significant? Should we take Wright to be talking not about what it takes to be warranted in believing A, but rather about what it

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<sup>28</sup> An aside: Wright says in a note that this argument relies on a closure step: if you need antecedent warrant to believe not-C (because your warrant for A draws support from that antecedent warrant), and you appreciate that not-B implies C, then you *will also have* some warrant to believe B. However, I think that's not enough for Wright's purposes. The fact that you must in this situation have *some* warrant to believe B does not entail that this warrant has to be antecedent to A, nor that your warrant for A will constitutively depend on it too. So we wouldn't yet have reason to deny that warrant could be transmitting from A to B. Wright is on better footing if he assumes that that your antecedent warrant for not-C not merely *implies you have* some warrant for B, but more strongly, that it *will transmit* to B. Then it will follow, in the situation he describes, that you have *a* warrant for B which is antecedent to A. I think even more will be needed to clinch his case: having *a* not-C-derived, antecedent-to-A warrant for B is compatible with *also* having an A-derived warrant for B. So Wright ultimately needs to show that the warrant you have for A *includes* the not-C-derived, antecedent-to-A warrant for B. That would make it clear why your warrant for A should be blocked from transmitting to B. This will be easiest when B equals not-C. When B is merely implied by not-C, more work will be needed.

takes to have some *higher-order warrant*, to the effect *that one is* warranted in believing A?

If the claiming warrant talk was supposed to mean that, Wright didn't do much to highlight it. He mostly writes as though being in a position to claim a warrant were just a matter of *having* a warrant—or perhaps, having an *earned* warrant. For example, he says:

Whenever I get in a position to claim justification for a proposition, I do so courtesy of specific presuppositions...for which I will have no specific, earned evidence... Again: whenever cognitive achievement takes place, it does so in a context of *specific* presuppositions which are not themselves an expression of any cognitive achievement to date. (2004, 189)

He speaks here as though getting in a position to claim justification were the same thing as “cognitive achievement tak[ing] place.” Yet he uses “cognitive achievement” to cover getting evidence for first-order claims like P, or coming to know P (see e.g., 2004, 175). It's not said to require *higher-order* warrants.

Wright elaborates on how he understands the notion of claiming warrant in his forthcoming (ms pp. 7-9). There he confirms that it should not be understood as *just equivalent to* believing, or acquiring warrant to believe, that one has a warrant. Instead, the main role of the notion is to express a kind of *internalist* warrant. It's unclear to me whether he wants being in a position to claim warrant to at least always *include* having a higher-order warrant.

There are other higher-order threads in Wright's discussion. Consider these corresponding sentences from his different expositions of the disjunctive template:

[W]hat, in the circumstances, can justify me in accepting A? Why not just reserve judgment and stay with the more tentative disjunction, “A or C”? (2000, 155)

[W]hat, in the circumstances, can justify me in accepting A? Should I not just reserve judgment and stay with the more tentative disjunction, either (I have warrant for) A or C? (2003, 62; my underlining)

[W]hat, in the circumstances, can justify me in taking it that I have a warrant for A? Why not just reserve judgment and stay with the more tentative disjunction, Either (I have a warrant for) A, or C? (2002, 343; my underlining)

Wright doesn't say anything to highlight these changes; and neither does he say anything to *motivate* focusing on higher-order questions in this context. Moreover, his dialectical settings demand that we *shouldn't* be focusing on higher-order questions. Wright's expositions begin with questions about whether you've acquired warrant to believe that *certain animals are not disguised mules*, or that *the wall you see is not white but lit by tricky red lighting*. He says that you may warrantably be taking it for granted that the italicized claims are true, but it would be “absurd to pretend that you had gained a reason for thinking so.” He then says his disjunctive template is suggested by, or is a generalization of, what's going on in such examples. Up to that point, everything was formulated in terms of what *first-order* warrants we possess.

So I don't think there's enough in the texts to support reading much into Wright's higher-order-ish talk. But we'll revisit this issue in the next section.

We've been discussing how to interpret Wright's notion of non-inferential warrant, and his disjunctive transmission-failure template. There are also some other, more minor, interpretative issues to sort out.

One of these is that, in his 2004, Wright hesitates to speak of being entitled *to believe* anything. What's driving him is a concern whether the notion of "belief" can be used in a way that permits one to rationally believe things on mere "entitlements," that is, unearned warrants (2004, 175-7). When the only warrants one has are unearned, perhaps we should instead speak of *trusting* that things are as those warrants testify. If so, then Wright's account of perception should be revised to say: our perceptual warrants require us to have antecedent entitlements to trust that our senses are reliable, that we're not brains in vats, and so on.

This talk of entitlements to trust might evoke the notion of "taking for granted" that we discussed on p. \_\_\_\_, above. But that's not what Wright means. His notion of *trusting* that P is still a species of "accepting," which is a general kind of action-guiding attitude. *Trusting* is like belief in that it's a form of acceptance that excludes doubt and withholding judgment (2004, 192-4). At one place Wright characterizes entitlement as a "norm of doxastic acceptance" (2004, note 1). So I think we can group belief and trust together as two species of doxastic acceptance. The sense in which a *dogmatist* says you "take it for granted" that you're not a brain in a vat, and so on, is instead just being vulnerable to that as a defeater. It's no kind of doxastic attitude towards the hypothesis that you're not a brain in a vat.

If Wright's notion of *trusting* is still a form of doxastic acceptance, then I don't think the contrast between it and belief bears much on the issues we're discussing. If there are differences between different kinds of doxastic acceptance, they're not differences I care about. I'm interested in the general question of what we have warrant to doxastically accept in any form.

Another interpretive issue concerns the fact that Wright seems to understand entitlements as warrants that don't "bear on the likely truth" of what they support (2004, 177, 182). This is puzzling. Most epistemologists would agree that there are norms of doxastic acceptance that don't bear on the likely truth of one's belief, but they'd deny that these are properly regarded as *epistemic warrants*. (That doesn't mean they have no relevance to epistemology.) For instance, Pascalian considerations might mandate believing or at least doxastically accepting that God exists, but they wouldn't do anything to make that hypothesis epistemically more probable, and so they shouldn't be counted as *epistemic warrants* that God exists. I've been assuming that Wright does intend his entitlements to be a kind of epistemic warrant. But I'm not entirely sure that's correct. I'd find the indispensability considerations he adduces in his 2004 more convincing if they *weren't* supposed to constitute epistemic warrants (see also 2000, 157; 2003, 66-7, 68). Perhaps this is a sign that Wright and I are operating with fundamentally different understandings of what an epistemic warrant needs to be. Well, I'll hope there's enough overlap in our understanding that I haven't seriously misrepresented him.

Summarizing: based on the evidence we've reviewed so far, Wright's two transmission-failure templates seem to be subspecies of our BW Model. As we've noted many times, that model can't apply when your warrant for the relevant premises is genuinely immediate.



## VII

Could there be other models of transmission-failure, which apply even when your warrant for the premises is immediate?

Our Background Warrant Model says:

W  
 B... ↗  
 A  
 ✕  
 B

If B is among the background you need antecedent warrant for, *to be warranted by W to believe A*, then your W-based warrant for A can't transmit to B.

Some of Wright's higher-order-ish talk suggests a different, **Higher Order Background Warrant (HOBW) Model:**

⋮		W
B... ↗		↓
W warrants	⇒	A
believing A		✕
		B

If B is among the background you need antecedent warrant for, *to be warranted in believing you are warranted by W to believe A*, then your W-based warrant for A can't transmit to B.

The suggestions are strongest in Wright's 2002 exposition of his *disjunctive* template. Later in that same paper he also writes:

[A] warrant, W, for a belief, A, cannot transmit to any of its consequences, B, if—in context—one would need an entitlement (earned or standing) to B in order to defend the claim that conditions for the acquisition of W were satisfied. (2002, 345)

In other words, transmission fails when you need an antecedent warrant for B to defend the higher-order claim that you have acquired (or are at least in a position to acquire) warrant W to believe A.

What could motivate such a restriction on warrant-transmission? After the work of Alston and Audi,<sup>29</sup> there's now broad agreement among epistemologists that higher-

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<sup>29</sup> See the essays in Alston 1989, especially Essay 6 ??; and Audi 1993, especially Chs. 4 and 11. ??

order epistemic statuses may be harder to achieve, and may need to draw on more resources, than their first-order counterparts. So why should facts about what's needed to achieve the higher-order warrant that *you are warranted by W to believe A* bear on what the first-order warrant for A is itself able to transmit to?

Even if we were to *grant* the HOBW model, it's not clear to me that Moorean reasoning as understood by dogmatists would instantiate it. Some dogmatists, like myself, are internalists about warrant. They should say: look, it's not a requirement for W to warrant you in believing you have hands that your senses really *be* reliable, or that you really *fail* to be a brain in a vat. So why should it be a requirement for *you to warrantedly believe that W* so warrants you, that you have antecedent warrants to believe those things? It ought to be enough that you merely *lack* warrants to believe their negations. More needs to be done to persuade us internalist dogmatists that antecedent warrant for Moore-3 is *even needed for the higher-order claim* that your experiences warrant you in believing Moore-2.

What may make the HOBW model attractive is the hovering thought that dogmatism can at best be an answer to first-order skepticism; that it's going to let second-order skeptics have run of the house.<sup>30</sup> This thought goes: even if a lack of perception-independent warrant to believe we're not brains in vats doesn't preclude us from *having* perceptual warrants, it *will* preclude us from *warrantedly believing* we have them. Dogmatists can at best give us "animal warrants" to believe we have hands; not warrants that survive reflective scrutiny.<sup>31</sup>

But I see no reason to concede that. Why can't our immediate perceptual warrants be available to us for settling higher-order questions, too?

What *is* true is that it's easier to give an accounting of our first-order perceptual warrants than it is to give an accounting of our higher-order warrants. Our first-order warrants are constituted by everyday experiences. Our higher-order warrants are constituted by philosophical discussions, of which the present discussion is just one part. But if dogmatism is correct, shouldn't it be possible for us (eventually) to be warranted in believing it is? (These philosophical discussions ought to lead somewhere!) Why can't our immediate perceptual warrants be part of our (more dearly won) warrant to believe dogmatism?

I suppressed the HOBW model of transmission-failure until now for expository convenience. It was useful for us to get clear on the prospects of the BW model first. But as I've just argued, I don't think the HOBW model necessarily changes our dialectical position.

What I think will be more promising to consider are some other models, which try to motivate obstacles to Moorean transmission *without* making claims about what higher-order warrants we're in a position to have. These other models may, on some views, end up *entailing* the HOBW model. But since they don't *rest on* any contested claims about what higher-order epistemic positions we're in, they may be dialectically more useful.

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<sup>30</sup> See Wright 1985, 444; 1991, 89; and his forthcoming ms p. 13.

<sup>31</sup> For this notion, see Sosa and Cohen BK.

In the framework we're working with, warrants are constituted by factors that count in favor of believing something. Let's call these **warrant-making factors** (on analogy with the notion of "truth-makers"). Warrant-making factors may include things like: having antecedent warrant to believe such-and-such premises. They may include things like: having such-and-such experiences. On reliabilist theories, they will include things like: having reliable vision. And so on.

This enables us to formulate one new model of transmission-failure.

**Warrant-Making Factor (WMF) Model:** If B is among the factors that *make* W be a warrant for A, then your W-based warrant for A can't transmit to the claim that B obtains.<sup>32</sup>

This is different than the BW and HOBW Models, because it does not require that B be your having warrant to believe anything. B may instead be a fact like: your vision is reliable, or: you have such-and-such experiences. For example, the WMF Model would count this reasoning as transmission-failing:

[Visual experiences as of hands]



I see two hands.



I have visual experiences.

In the Gettier literature, one sees the term "defeat" used in such a way that defeating facts merely have to *obtain*, in order to neutralize an epistemic status you'd otherwise possess. I use the term differently. I only use "defeat" to describe a kind of *warrant* or evidence subjects get. When warrant-makers give you prima facie warrant to believe P, that warrant is vulnerable to being outweighed or undermined by other **defeating evidence**. Let's focus on the undermining kind of defeat. This is exemplified in the following sort of case: you seem to see Tom at the library. Then you learn that Tom is one of a set of identical triplets. Intuitively, this new information doesn't tell you that Tom *wasn't* at the library. At least, not directly. It might on balance be reasonable for you to reduce your confidence that Tom was there. But what the new information more directly testifies to is that *you weren't in a position to visually tell* that Tom was at the library.

When a hypothesis U is such that *evidence for it* would undermine a warrant W, I call U an undermining hypothesis for W. On the other hand, hypotheses H that *aren't* undermining, and which entail the falsity of some Us that *are* undermining hypotheses for W, I call **anti-underminers** for W.

This enables us to formulate another new model of transmission-failure:

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<sup>32</sup> Compare Wright's repeated insistence that warrant cannot transmit to the "external preconditions for the effectiveness of your [belief-forming] method" (2000, 154; 2002, 342; 2003, 61, 70).

**Anti-Underminer (AU) Model:** If B is an anti-underminer for W, then your W-based warrant for A can't transmit to B.

We should demand that any proposal for transmission-failure not be ad hoc. But things can be said to motivate these two new models. As we saw on p. \_\_\_\_, above, it can be natural even for a dogmatist to describe you as "taking for granted" that your senses are reliable, and so on. And it can be natural to worry whether arguments can be effective whose conclusions are already "taken for granted," or "presupposed," in that way.<sup>33</sup>

Though these proposals can be motivated, I do not think they can be correct. I have counter-examples.

Consider:

Turing-1. Being able to grasp entailments is sufficient for being able to rationally follow an argument.

Turing-2. Turing machines are able to grasp entailments.

Turing-3. So Turing machines are able to rationally follow arguments.

Never mind how we might establish Turing-2. Just assess whether this argument seems to be objectionably question-begging. Most of my consultants judge it is not.

And yet, if you learned that *you hadn't properly followed* the argument, that would undermine how confident you ought to be in its conclusion (at least, on the basis of so reasoning). If you learned that *you weren't capable* of following the argument, all the more so. Now it's certainly epistemically possible that you are a Turing machine, so if you acquired reason to believe (let us suppose, falsely) that Turing machines aren't able to rationally follow arguments, it should to some degree have that undermining effect. What that means is that the conclusion of this argument is one kind of anti-underminer for the warrant the argument gives you. (It's an anti-underminer for the warrant you get by *reasoning through* or following the argument, not your warrant for any of the premises.) So the AU Model would count this argument as transmission-failing. Yet intuitively, it seems like such reasoning should be okay.

If in fact *you are* a Turing machine, then the conclusion of the argument may be not just an anti-underminer, but a warrant-making factor as well. In that case, the WMF Model would also count the argument as transmission-failing. But again, it seems like it ought not to be so counted.

Consider a different case. You're looking in a zoo pen, and your mad scientist friend proudly announces that any animals in the pen have been turned invisible. You inform him he's wrong: you see rats in the corner, so there are some visible animals in the pen after all. Your reasoning might be represented like this:

Rat-1. [Visible experiences as of rats]

Rat-2. I see rats in the corner.

Rat-3. So there are some visible animals in the pen.

Assess whether this argument seems objectionably question-begging. Most of my consultants judge it is not.

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<sup>33</sup>

Alston on presupposition.

And yet, to the extent that you have reason to believe any animals in the pen *are* invisible, your visual warrant to believe Rat-2 is undermined. So Rat-3 is an anti-underminer for the warrant Rat-1 gives you to believe Rat-2. So the AU Model would count this argument as transmission-failing, too. Yet intuitively, it seems like such reasoning should be okay.

The natural move at this point will be to try to refine the transmission-failure models to avoid these counter-examples. For example, we might try to replace the AU Model with:

If B is an anti-underminer for W *whose non-obtaining would give you the same experiences you actually have* then your W-based warrant for A can't transmit to B.

This would no longer count the Rat argument as transmission-failing, since if the pen *did* only contain invisible animals, we wouldn't expect to have experiences of rats. It would only impugn arguments like this:

Rat-1. [Visible experiences as of rats]

Rat-2. I see rats in the corner.

Rat-3\*. So it's not the case that: there are no visible animals in the pen and I am merely hallucinating rats.

and that seems close enough to Moorean reasoning that we have no independent intuition it should be okay.

Perhaps some such refinement can work. But I'm pessimistic, for three reasons.

In the first place, the refinement I articulated wouldn't help with the Turing example.

In the second place, what may make such refinements attractive are the probabilistic considerations that I deferred for later discussion. Those probabilistic considerations make it difficult to see how something can warrant you in believing Q, when not-Q's truth would entail that you have the same warrant. I acknowledge the force of those considerations; and I have responses to them; but they require extended discussion. Our question here is whether the notion of transmission-failure gives us any further diagnostic tool, or whether it's just piggy-backing on the probabilistic considerations. I suspect that efforts to refine the AU Model in the way I described will lead to our just piggy-backing.

As I said in section IV, I doubt that the probabilistic considerations really do reflect our deepest-rooted intuitive resistance to Moorean reasoning, anyway, for we feel that same resistance to arguments where the probabilistic considerations are not applicable.

My third doubt about the strategy of refining the AU Model is that it raises serious motivational difficulties.

It was possible to motivate the AU and WMF Models in the first place because they reflected notions of "taking for granted" or "presupposing" that we already had some intuitive grasp of: it can seem natural to doubt whether arguments can establish their own "presuppositions." That can seem like a covert form of question-begging.

This motivation wouldn't have been available if we didn't have some folk understanding of anti-underminers or warrant-making factors *as* "presuppositions," and had just used some technical notion instead. It *doesn't* seem natural to doubt whether arguments can establish their own XYZZYs. The refined AU Model strikes me as going down that path. I don't think we have any intuitive notion of "presupposing" such that the relation specified in the original AU Model and the relation specified in the refined model count as *different kinds of presupposing*. No, the sense in which one can naturally be counted as "presupposing" B in the refined model is *the same* as in the original model; it's just that in the refined model, B meets extra conditions besides. Yet our counter-examples show that it's *a mistake* to count "presupposing" your conclusion in that sense as any form of begging a question. The proponent of the refined model needs to scratch up some further motivating story. I'm not sure there is any (non-probabilistic) such story.

Perhaps all that will be said for a refined story is that it extensionally captures the kinds of arguments, like Moore's, that one doesn't like.

I understand and respect the view that, when B is the kind of conclusion we're considering, the subject's warrant W for A *can't* be immediate, but instead requires her to have antecedent warrant to believe B. As a dogmatist, I don't *agree* with that view. But I recognize it as a viable theoretical option. In that case, Moorean reasoning would fail because it exemplifies the simple BW Model.

If on the other hand we evaluate Moorean reasoning from the dogmatist's perspective, it seems to me more promising to diagnose our intuitive resistance to the reasoning as the product of illusion. I don't see much money in the project of coming up with (non-probabilistic) models of transmission-failure that impugn Moorean reasoning even when our perceptual warrant *is* immediate.

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