

## (GENERAL PURPOSE) AUTOMATED REASONING IN MODAL LOGICS

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philosophy.wisc.edu/fitelson**Overview of Presentation**

- Brief Background on AR (first-order syntax, OTTER notation, clauses)
- Propositional Modal Logics
  - Axiomatic Approaches
    - \* AR in Hilbert-style systems
    - \* Proofs & Models
  - Semantical Approaches
    - \* AR involving Kripke translations
    - \* Proofs & Models
  - Application of Axiomatic Methods to Interpretability Logics
- Other, “special purpose” approaches
- Challenge problems and Open Questions
- References

**Brief Background on AR I**

- Basic Notation (OTTER syntax in parens):

Predicates	$A, B, C$ ( $A, B, C$ )	Constants	$a, b, c$ ( $a, b, c$ )
Variables	$x, y, z$ ( $x, y, z$ )	Functions	$f, g, h$ ( $f, g, h$ )
Quantifiers	$\forall, \exists$ ( $na$ )	Connectives	$\wedge, \rightarrow, \vee, \neg, =$ ( $na, na,  , -, =$ )

- Formulas vs Clauses (quantifier elimination and CNF)

Formula	Clause (OTTER — $Q$ -free, and CNF)
$(\forall x)(Px \rightarrow Gx)$	$\neg P(x) \mid G(x)$ .
$(\exists x)(Px \wedge Gx)$	$P(a) \mid G(a)$ . (two clauses, new “a”)
$(\forall x)(\exists y)(Rxy \vee x \neq y)$	$R(x, f(x)) \mid \neg(x = f(x))$ . (new “f”)
$(\forall x)(\forall y)(\exists z)(Rxyz \wedge Rz yx)$	$R(x, y, f(x, y)) \mid R(f(x, y), x, y)$ . (new “f”)

- See chapters 1 and 10 of Kalman’s recent book [11], and McCune’s OTTER user manual [13] for details on OTTER’s clause notation and syntax.

**Brief Background on AR II**

- OTTER implements many rules of inference and strategies (see [11]). For our purposes (for now), it will suffice to discuss just one of these.
  - *Hyperresolution* [11, chapter 2] is a generalization of disjunctive syllogism in classical logic. Here are some examples:
 
$$\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{ccc} \neg P \mid M. & \neg P(x) \mid M(x). & \neg L(x, f(b)) \mid L(x, f(a)). \\ P. & P(s). & L(y, f(y)). \\ \hline \therefore M. & \therefore M(s). & \therefore L(b, f(a)). \end{array} \\ \\ \begin{array}{ccc} \neg P(x) \mid P(L(x)). & \neg P(i(x, y)) \mid \neg P(x) \mid P(y). & \\ P(i(x, x)). & P(i(i(i(x, y), i(y, z)), i(x, z))). & \\ \hline \therefore P(L(i(x, x))). & P(i(i(i(x, y), x), y)). & \\ \therefore P(i(x, x)). & & \end{array} \end{array}$$
  - In  $\mathcal{N}_1 \mid \dots \mid \mathcal{N}_n, \mathcal{S}, \therefore \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{N}_1 \mid \dots \mid \mathcal{N}_n$  is the *nucleus*,  $\mathcal{S}$  (may be a set) is the *satellite*, and  $\mathcal{R}$  (may be non-literal) is the *hyperresolvent*.

### Proving Theorems in Hilbert-Style Sentential Logics I

- As our last example shows, hyperresolution is the perfect rule for reasoning about sentential logical calculi (in Hilbert-Style).
- For instance, classical sentential logic can be axiomatized using only hyperresolution, and the following four clauses (see [17], and [11, ch. 8]):  

$$\text{MP. } \neg P(i(x, y)) \mid \neg P(x) \mid P(y).$$

$$\text{L}_1. P(i(i(x, y), i(i(y, z), i(x, z))))).$$

$$\text{L}_2. P(i(x, i(n(x), y))).$$

$$\text{L}_3. P(i(i(n(x), x), x)).$$
- In recent years, we (at Argonne) have used OTTER to prove lots of new results in a wide variety of sentential logics (see [6], [5], [8], [4], [7]).
- Even simple logical calculi can involve *very* difficult proofs (see [20] for a nice survey of challenging problems, and powerful strategies for attacking them). We can prove all the theorems in [15, Appendix I] using OTTER.

### Proving Theorems in Hilbert-Style Sentential Logics II

- Here's a simple but non-trivial OTTER proof of  $P(i(n(n(x)), x))$  in  $\text{L}$ :  

$$1 \text{ [MP]} \neg P(i(x, y)) \mid \neg P(x) \mid P(y).$$

$$2 \text{ [L}_1\text{]} P(i(i(x, y), i(i(y, z), i(x, z))))).$$

$$3 \text{ [L}_2\text{]} P(i(x, i(n(x), y))).$$

$$4 \text{ [L}_3\text{]} P(i(i(n(x), x), x)).$$

$$5 \text{ [2, 2, 1]} P(i(i(i(i(x, y), i(z, y)), u), i(i(z, x), u))).$$

$$6 \text{ [3, 2, 1]} P(i(i(i(n(x), y), z), i(x, z))).$$

$$7 \text{ [4, 2, 1]} P(i(i(x, y), i(i(n(x), x), y))).$$

$$8 \text{ [5, 5, 1]} P(i(i(x, i(y, z)), i(i(u, y), i(x, i(u, z))))).$$

$$9 \text{ [6, 5, 1]} P(i(i(x, n(y)), i(y, i(x, z)))).$$

$$10 \text{ [7, 6, 1]} P(i(x, i(i(n(n(x)), n(x)), y))).$$

$$11 \text{ [7, 5, 1]} P(i(i(x, y), i(i(n(i(y, z)), i(y, z)), i(x, z)))).$$

$$12 \text{ [7, 4, 1]} P(i(i(n(i(n(x), x)), i(n(x), x)), x)).$$

$$13 \text{ [9, 6, 1]} P(i(x, i(y, i(n(x), z)))).$$

- $$14 \text{ [10, 8, 1]} P(i(i(x, i(n(n(y)), n(y))), i(y, i(x, z)))).$$
- $$15 \text{ [11, 8, 1]} P(i(i(x, i(n(i(y, z)), i(y, z))), i(i(u, y), i(x, i(u, z)))).$$
- $$16 \text{ [13, 2, 1]} P(i(i(i(x, i(n(y), z)), u), i(y, u))).$$
- $$26 \text{ [13, 12, 1]} P(i(x, i(n(i(i(n(y), y)), i(n(y), y)), y), z)).$$
- $$17 \text{ [16, 14, 1]} P(i(n(x), i(x, i(y, z)))).$$
- $$18 \text{ [26, 15, 1]} P(i(i(x, i(n(i(n(y), y)), i(n(y), y))), i(z, i(x, y)))).$$
- $$19 \text{ [17, 11, 1]} P(i(i(n(i(i(x, i(y, z)), u)), i(i(x, i(y, z)), u)), i(n(x), u))).$$
- $$20 \text{ [18, 18, 1]} P(i(x, i(i(n(y), i(n(i(n(y), y)), i(n(y), y))), y))).$$
- $$21 \text{ [20, 19, 1]} P(i(n(n(x)), x)).$$

- This is a shorter proof than the one Łukasiewicz reports in [17]. To give you a feel for a *hard* problem in this area, try to prove that the following *single* axiom [14] is sufficient (with MP) to derive  $\text{L}_1$ – $\text{L}_3$ .

$$P(i(i(i(i(i(x, y), i(n(z), n(u))), z), v), i(i(v, x), i(u, x)))).$$

The shortest known proof of this theorem is 41 steps long, and was found (from scratch) by Larry Wos using OTTER [6]. Wos's OTTER proof is simpler (in various ways) than the proof reported by Meredith in [14].

### Proofs in Hilbert-Style Sentential Modal Logics I

- Sentential modal logics are just simple extensions of classical sentential logic. The new connectives “ $\square$ ” (we'll use “L” in OTTER) and “ $\diamond$ ” (we'll use “M” in OTTER) are added to the stock of classical connectives.
- All “normal” modal logics add the following rule of inference and the following axiom to classical sentential logic (OTTER notation):  

$$\text{RN. } \neg P(x) \mid P(L(x)).$$

$$\text{K. } P(i(L(i(x, y)), i(L(x), L(y)))).$$
- OTTER performs best with minimal sets of connectives. So, I will use only  $\{i, n, L\}$  [ $M(x) = n(L(n(x)))$ ] to characterize sentential modal logics.
- Other systems of interest add some or all of the following axioms:  

$$\text{D. } P(i(L(x), n(L(n(x)))).$$

$$\text{4. } P(i(L(x), L(L(x)))).$$

$$\text{T. } P(i(L(x), x)).$$

$$\text{5. } P(i(n(L(n(x))), L(n(L(n(x))))).$$

$$\text{G. } P(i(L(n(L(n(x))), n(L(n(L(x))))).$$

$$\text{B. } P(i(x, L(n(L(n(x))))).$$

## Proofs in Hilbert-Style Sentential Modal Logics II

- |  |              |
|--|--------------|
| 1. $\vdash p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow (p \& q))$   | PL Tautology |
| 2. $\vdash \Box(p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow (p \& q)))$   | 1, RN        |
| 3. $\vdash \Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$  | K axiom      |
| 4. $\vdash \Box(p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow (p \& q))) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box(q \rightarrow (p \& q)))$ | 3, Subst.    |
| 5. $\vdash \Box p \rightarrow \Box(p \rightarrow (p \& q))$  | 2, 4, MP     |
| 6. $\vdash \Box(q \rightarrow (p \& q)) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box(p \& q))$                                 | 3, Subst.    |
| 7. $\vdash \Box p \rightarrow (\Box q \rightarrow \Box(p \& q))$   | 5, 6, "PL"   |
| 8. $\vdash (\Box p \& \Box q) \rightarrow \Box(p \& q)$  | 7, "PL"      |

- This **K** "proof" [2, page 35] is missing many steps, and it contains the connective "&", which we are not using in our OTTER representation. **Exercise** (hard!): represent " $\vdash (\Box p \& \Box q) \rightarrow \Box(p \& q)$ " in our OTTER notation, and try to find a *proof* of it in our system **K** above (44 steps?).
- Note:** almost all of the complexity is in the *non-modal PL reasoning*.

## Finding Matrix Models for Sentential Modal Logics: S5 & G

i	0	1	2	3	x	0	1	2	*3	x	0	1	2	*3
0	3	3	3	3	L(x)	0	0	0	3	-x	3	2	1	0
1	2	3	2	3										
2	1	1	3	3										
*3	0	1	2	3										

2-element S5 Kripke model in which G fails:

$\Box \Diamond p$   
 $\Box \Diamond \neg p$

- McKinsey's axiom G cannot be expressed [2] as a (first order) constraint on the accessibility relation  $R$  in Kripke frames ( $\therefore$  using Kripke translations to find such models automatically will not work, see below).
- I found the logical matrices above using John Slaney's special purpose matrix finder for implicational logics MAGIC [16], and verified them with Bill McCune's general first order model finder MACE [12] (a companion to OTTER, which takes OTTER input). I found the Kripke model by hand.

## Automated Reasoning with Kripke Translations

- Many (but not all: e.g., G and Löb) interesting modal formulae correspond to first-order conditions on relations  $R$  in Kripke frames:

D. $\Box p \rightarrow \Diamond p$	$R$ is serial. $[(\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy]$
T. $\Box p \rightarrow p$	$R$ is reflexive. $[(\forall x)Rxx]$
B. $p \rightarrow \Box \Diamond p$	$R$ is symmetric. $[(\forall x)(\forall y)(Rxy \rightarrow Ryx)]$
4. $\Box p \rightarrow \Box \Box p$	$R$ is transitive. $[(\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)((Rxy \& Ryz) \rightarrow Rxz)]$
5. $\Diamond p \rightarrow \Box \Diamond p$	$R$ is euclidean. $[(\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)((Rxy \& Rxz) \rightarrow Ryz)]$

- These correspondences can allow us to (automatically) find proofs and countermodels more easily than with "pure" axiomatic techniques.
- Exercises:** (1) Prove that all serial, symmetric, euclidean  $R$ s are reflexive and transitive. (2) Prove that some serial, euclidean  $R$ s are not transitive. Then, prove the *syntactic analogues* of (1) and (2), i.e., (1') prove **KDB5**  $\vdash$  T, and **KDB5**  $\vdash$  4; and, (2') show **KD5**  $\not\vdash$  4 — using logical *matrices*. (1') and (2') are much harder.

## Application of Axiomatic Methods to Interpretability Logics I

- Interpretability logics (see [18] and [10]) are propositional modal logics with an additional, binary modal operator " $\triangleright$ " ("I" in Otter).
- The basic system **IL** is **K4** + the following axioms (OTTER notation):
  - Löb.  $P(i(L(i(L(x), x)), L(x)))$ .
  - J<sub>1</sub>.  $P(i(L(i(x, y)), I(x, y)))$ .
  - J<sub>2</sub>.  $P(i(n(i(I(x, y), n(I(y, z))))), I(x, z))$ .
  - J<sub>3</sub>.  $P(i(n(i(I(x, y), n(I(z, y))))), I(i(n(x), z), y))$ .
  - J<sub>4</sub>.  $P(i(I(x, y), I(n(L(n(x))), n(L(n(y))))))$ .
  - J<sub>5</sub>.  $P(I(n(L(n(x))), x))$ .
- Other formulas of interest in this context include:
  - P.  $P(i(I(x, y), L(I(x, y))))$ .
  - M.  $P(i(I(x, y), I(n(i(x, n(L(z))))), n(i(y, n(L(z))))))$ .
  - W.  $P(i(I(x, y), I(x, n(i(y, n(L(n(x))))))))$ .
  - P<sub>0</sub>.  $P(i(I(x, n(L(n(y))))), L(I(x, y)))$ .
  - M<sub>0</sub>.  $P(i(I(x, y), I(n(i(n(L(n(x))), n(L(z))))), n(i(y, n(L(z))))))$ .

### Application of Axiomatic Methods to Interpretability Logics II

- The Kripke semantics for interpretability logics is much less tractable (from a first order perspective) than it was for “normal” modal logics.
- So, we are pressured to use *axiomatic* methods of (automated) proof and model finding. Here, OTTER, MaGIC, and MACE can be very useful.
- The following can be shown pretty easily, using OTTER and MaGIC.
  - (i)  $\mathbf{IL} \vdash \mathbf{I}(i(n(x), n(L(n(x))))), x)$     (ii)  $\mathbf{IL} \not\vdash P$
  - (iii)  $\mathbf{IL} \not\vdash M$     (iv)  $\mathbf{IL} \not\vdash W$
- Difficult problems (not yet solved with automated reasoning): (vii) Axiom 4 is dependent in  $\mathbf{IL}$  (known), (viii) Some pair of  $\{W, P_0, M_0\}$  implies the third, in  $\mathbf{IL}$  (OPEN), (ix)  $\mathbf{IL} \not\vdash P_0$  (known), (x)  $\mathbf{IL} \not\vdash M_0$  (known).
  - (C)  $i(\mathbf{I}(x, n(L(n(y))))), L(\mathbf{I}(x, n(L(n(y))))))$ .
- (xi)  $\mathbf{ILP} \vdash C$ , and (xii)  $\mathbf{ILM} \vdash C$  (known). See [18] for more problems.

### Some Other Approaches & Some More Challenge Problems

- Automated theorem proving (and model finding) for modal logics have been studied extensively in the last few decades ([9], [1], [19]).
- Typically, the focus has been on *special-purpose* provers and finders. Such systems essentially “hard code” the structures of particular logics.
- While this may lead to faster programs, it sacrifices *generality*. We’d like to see more work done on making *general purpose* techniques effective.
- Two more (known)  $\not\vdash$  problems. Find logical matrices which establish that (a)  $\mathbf{KTB} \not\vdash 5$  or (b)  $\mathbf{KTB} \not\vdash 4$  (there are 3-element kripke models).
- More (known)  $\vdash$  problems in  $\mathbf{IL+}$ . Show any of the following: (c)  $\mathbf{ILM} \vdash W$ , (d)  $\mathbf{ILP} \vdash W$ , (e)  $\mathbf{ILM} \vdash P_0$ , (f)  $\mathbf{ILP} \vdash P_0$ , (g)  $\mathbf{ILM} \vdash M_0$ , (h)  $\mathbf{ILP} \vdash M_0$ .
- One more reference. See [3] for a general survey of propositional logics.
- See <http://philosophy.wisc.edu/fitelson/modal.htm> for files, etc.

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