

# The Humean Thesis on Belief (and Its Equivalents)

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What should a joint theory of rational belief and rational degrees of belief look like? While the former concept will contribute principles of doxastic logic, the latter will contribute principles of subjective probability theory, but how can we make sense of their interaction? And how can we avoid the Lottery paradox and related paradoxes in any such theory? I will present three different approaches of how to answer these questions: the first one is an explication of what I call the Humean thesis of belief; the second one is a combination of doxastic logic with the right-to-left direction of what is called the Lockean thesis on belief in the literature; the third one puts together AGM belief revision and the left-to-right direction of the Lockean thesis (formulated for conditional belief). As it happens, all of them will ultimately justify one and the same joint theory of belief and degrees of belief according to which belief corresponds to stably high degree of belief. (Actually, there is a fourth “accuracy” approach from which once again the same theory of belief follows, but we will not have time to deal with this.)