How Many Beliefs to Ascribe?
Not too many  Sensible people don’t believe all the logical consequences of their beliefs. They
don’t believe blatant inconsistencies. Nor they believe all mathematical truths (not even all
provable ones).
Not too few  Sensible people don’t fail to believe the obvious logical consequences of their beliefs.

A Sorites Argument
Suppose we have a set $\Gamma$ of propositions, each of which Rachael believes. And suppose we have a
proposition $\phi$ which can be deduced from $\Gamma$ in 1,000 steps, which Rachael does not believe.

Faith  Rachael believes every proposition that can be deduced from $\Gamma$ in 0 steps.
Charity  If Rachael believes every proposition that can be deduced from $\Gamma$ in $n$ steps, then Rachael
believes every proposition that can be deduced from $\Gamma$ in $n + 1$ steps.
Honesty  Rachael does not believe $\phi$.

Our options:
Reject Faith  Join the Churchlands, or the Quineans.
Reject Honesty  The classical solution.
Revise Our Logic  Pretty serious—we’ll have to give up on either modus ponens or cut.
Reject Charity  Mark’s solution. He keeps Charity alive in spirit by not permitting any $n$ to deter-
minately witness its falsity.

Mark models beliefs using worlds that are epistemically possible, but alethically impossible. There
are two different kinds of alethic impossibility, and we need both.
The Glutty Kind  The world represents that $P$, and also represents that $\neg P$.
The Gappy Kind  The world neither represents that $P$, nor represents that $\neg P$.

Mark’s proposal allows for various possible sharpenings of “obvious consequence”, each associ-
ated with a model structure. An individual determinately believes $P$ iff the individual believes $P$
according to all admissible model structures.

- Each model structure has a set of possible worlds, a set of sufficiently consistent impossible
  worlds, an accessibility relation among worlds for each agent, and a valuation function.
- An agent knows a proposition at world $w$ (according to a model structure) if it’s true at all
  (possible or impossible) worlds epistemically accessible (to the agent) from $w$.
- The models are arranged in a sequence (according to how seriously we take the twin norms of
  ”not too many beliefs” and ”not too few beliefs”). At each step, we throw out more impossible
  worlds for being too inconsistent, and we add impossible worlds that are more decisive than the
  worlds in the previous model.