

Dealing with Disagreement from the First Person Perspective

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- *"Ik zal handhaven"*
- *"I shall stand fast"*
- *"Je maintiendrai"*

Characterizing the target class of situations

- Peerhood
 - Jeffrey's Probabilistic Account
 - Same false positive rate
 - Same false negative rate
 - Conditional independence

Disagreements

- A and B have all the same items of evidence (regarding p), and
- are equally reliable witnesses (regarding p, spelled out by Jeffrey, next slide),
- yet have different doxastic attitudes to p.

Peerage

- $A(p) = \text{“A asserts that } p\text{”}$ $B(p)$ likewise
- Equal “true positive”
 - $\Pr(A(p)/p) = \Pr(B(p)/p) = r$
- Equal “true negative”
 - $\Pr(A(\sim p)/\sim p) = \Pr(B(\sim p)/\sim p) = t$
- Conditional Independence
 - $\Pr(A(p)\&B(p)/p) = r^2$ & $\Pr(A(p)\&B(p)/\sim p) = t^2$
- Jeffrey: When $r = t$ “equally reliable independent witnesses [who] contradict each other... cancel” (1992, 110).

Caveat on “Reasonable”

- NOT “Reasonable-as-in-virtuous”
 - Open-minded, diligent, reflective, etc.
- NOT “Reasonable-as-in-blameless.” (Well, maybe not.)
- Reasonable as in “fits the evidence.”

Basicity

- No need for complicated examples.
- All disagreements come down to basic disagreements.
 - Premises
 - Rules of inference
- Complicated cases confuse.
- Stick with dean on quad (or like).

Twins

- *Two meters*
- *One meter, two kids.*
- *Being reasonable = objective/ impartial/rational/*
- *Now imagine being one of them.*

[Fundamental thesis]

- IT IS *IRRATIONAL* TO PRIVILEGE YOUR OWN POSITION ***JUST BECAUSE IT'S YOUR POSITION!!*** I mean, really, people c'mon! Don't tell me how "obvious" it is to you! That doesn't make you special! Get over yourself!!

[Rationality]

- *Rationality requires being OBJECTIVE.*
- *Plausible: objective = 3rd person perspective*

[Twins Again]

- The relevant members of the intersection of Ted's and Todd's evidence set.
- E1: It seems obvious to Ted that the light is red.
- E2: It seems obvious to Todd that the light is green.
- So suppose that S is aware of this evidence (it is S's only evidence regarding p). What should S's attitude be (modulo peerage)?

[GOTCHA!!]

- S = Ted
- Gotcha!
- Gotcha!
- Gotcha!



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Probability Kinematics

- *YES, Ted, Todd, and Trent share the same items of evidence.*
- *YES, the conditional probability of p and of $\sim p$ are the same.*
- *YET...*
- *The probability of a hypothesis on total evidence is NOT just a function of the conditional probabilities.*
- *As Jeffrey showed us, it's also a matter of how "tethered" we are to our evidence, which can be uncertain and come in degrees.*

Note to self: LaTeX-ize this.

- Theorem of total probability
 - $\Pr(H) = \sum_i \Pr(H/E_i) \times \Pr(E_i)$

The Real Relevance of the First Person Perspective

- *You still have the exact same evidential profile above, but Todd's **sources** differ for [It seems obvious to Ted that the light is red] and [It seems obvious to Todd that the light is green].*
- *[It seems obvious to Ted that the light is red] comes via TESTIMONY.*
- *[It seems obvious to Todd that the light is green] comes via INTROSPECTION.*
- *$J(\text{Intro}) > J(\text{Test})$*

[Twins Again, Again (You are Todd)]

- $Pr(\text{Red/Seems red to Ted}) \times Pr(\text{Seems red to Ted})$
vs.
- $Pr(\text{Green/Seems green to Todd [me]}) \times Pr(\text{Seems green to Todd[me]})$
- *The first multiplicanda of each pair have the same value in virtue of PEERHOOD.*
- *The second multiplicanda are conjunctively the relevant evidence shared by the two.*
- *BUT because of the difference in the SOURCE of evidence, the values of the second pair are asymmetric.*
- *Thus the posterior probabilities are such that Todd is reasonable to stand fast.*

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[Objection: Same evidence?]

- Feldman and Conee: “Ultimate Evidence” consists in *experiences themselves*.
- Contra Williamson re functional roles.
- Me: Evidence is propositional but it *becomes* ours via the experiences (of varying character) which “tether” us to it by varying degrees.

[Objection: Modes]

- Shouldn't evidence somehow include modes of presentation?
- For if not, many things are justified by our evidence of which we have no notion.
- Reply: This is already the case. Many members of the closure of our evidence under entailment are beyond our ken. Think logic student.

[Objection: New Evidence]

- Doesn't this very instance of disagreement give me a reason to downgrade my interlocutor's track-record?
- Seriously?
- No. (Bootstrapping never works.)
- A judgment at t is based on pre- t track-record.