

Page 158 #6. ‘If Fermat was a French mathematician, then he was famous.’ Our domain of discourse (\mathcal{D}), predicates (R , M , F), and individual constant (i.e., the proper name of the individual person Fermat) (f) are:

| | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| $M_ : _$ is a mathematician | $R_ : _$ is French |
| $F_ : _$ is famous | f : Fermat |
| \mathcal{D} : people | |

In “Loglish,” we have ‘If Rf and Mf , then Ff ’. In LMPL, this becomes: ‘ $(Rf \ \& \ Mf) \rightarrow Ff$ ’.

Page 158 #16. ‘If no wealthy economist exists then no famous mathematician exists.’ Our domain of discourse (\mathcal{D}) and predicates (W , E , F , M) are:

| | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| $W_ : _$ is wealthy | $E_ : _$ is an economist |
| $F_ : _$ is famous | $M_ : _$ is a mathematician |
| \mathcal{D} : people | |

In “Loglish,” we have ‘If there does not exist an x such that both Wx and Ex , then there does not exist an x such that both Fx and Mx ’. In LMPL, this becomes the following: ‘ $\sim(\exists x)(Wx \ \& \ Ex) \rightarrow \sim(\exists x)(Fx \ \& \ Mx)$ ’.

Page 165 #5. ‘If it rains, only the killjoys will be happy.’ Our domain of discourse (\mathcal{D}), predicates (K , H), and atomic sentence letter (R) are as follows:

| | |
|-------------------------|------------------------|
| $K_ : _$ is a killjoy | R : ‘It rains.’ |
| $H_ : _$ is happy | \mathcal{D} : people |

In “Loglish,” we have ‘If R , then only the K ’s will be H ’. Or, in other words, ‘If R , then all H ’s will be (the) K ’s’. In LMPL, this is: ‘ $R \rightarrow (\forall x)(Hx \rightarrow Kx)$ ’. Here, ‘ $R \rightarrow (\forall x)(Hx \rightarrow Kx)$ ’ is also defensible, since the English sentence says ‘**the** killjoys’.

Page 165 #15. ‘No voter will be satisfied unless some politician who is elected is incorrupt.’ Lexicon:

| | |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| $E_ : _$ is elected | $P_ : _$ is a politician |
| $C_ : _$ is corrupt | $V_ : _$ is a voter |
| $S_ : _$ is satisfied | \mathcal{D} : people |

This sentence says: ‘ p unless q ’, where p says ‘There does not exist an x such that Vx and Sx ’, and q says ‘There exists an x such that Ex and Px and not Cx ’. In LMPL, p is ‘ $\sim(\exists x)(Vx \ \& \ Sx)$ ’, and q is ‘ $(\exists x)[(Px \ \& \ Ex) \ \& \ \sim Cx]$ ’. Recall, ‘ p unless q ’ is symbolized *either* as ‘ $\sim q \rightarrow p$ ’ (p . 23) *or* as ‘ $p \vee q$ ’ (p . 57). So, both:

‘ $\sim(\exists x)[(Px \ \& \ Ex) \ \& \ \sim Cx] \rightarrow \sim(\exists x)(Vx \ \& \ Sx)$ ’

and

‘ $\sim(\exists x)(Vx \ \& \ Sx) \vee (\exists x)[(Px \ \& \ Ex) \ \& \ \sim Cx]$ ’

are acceptable.

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The existential claim ‘ $(\exists x)(Ix \rightarrow Hx)$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} , because its instance ‘ $Ia \rightarrow Ha$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} , since $\alpha \notin \text{Ext}(I)$.

Page 179 #9. The universal claim ‘ $(\forall x)(\exists y)[Fx \rightarrow (Hx \vee Jy)]$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} , since all three of its instances are true on \mathcal{I} : (i) the existential claim ‘ $(\exists y)[Fa \rightarrow (Ha \vee Jy)]$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} because its instance ‘ $Fa \rightarrow (Ha \vee Ja)$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} , since $\alpha \in \text{Ext}(H)$. (ii) ‘ $(\exists y)[Fb \rightarrow (Hb \vee Jy)]$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} because its instance ‘ $Fb \rightarrow (Hb \vee Ja)$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} , since $\beta \in \text{Ext}(H)$. Finally, (iii) ‘ $(\exists y)[Fc \rightarrow (Hc \vee Jy)]$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} because its instance ‘ $Fc \rightarrow (Hc \vee Ja)$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} , since $\alpha \in \text{Ext}(J)$.

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‘ $(\exists x)(Ix \rightarrow (\forall y)(Jy \rightarrow Iy))$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} , since its instance (i) ‘ $Ia \rightarrow (\forall y)(Jy \rightarrow Iy)$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} . Instance (i) is true on \mathcal{I} , because its antecedent ‘ Ia ’ is false on \mathcal{I} . ‘ Ia ’ is false on \mathcal{I} , since $\alpha \notin \text{Ext}(I)$.

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‘ $(\forall x)(\forall y)[(Fx \leftrightarrow Gy) \leftrightarrow (\exists w)(\exists z)(Hw \ \& \ Jz)]$ ’ is false on \mathcal{I} , since its instance (i) ‘ $(\forall y)[(Fa \leftrightarrow Gy) \leftrightarrow (\exists w)(\exists z)(Hw \ \& \ Jz)]$ ’ is false on \mathcal{I} . Instance (i) is false on \mathcal{I} , because its instance (i.1) ‘ $(Fa \leftrightarrow Ga) \leftrightarrow (\exists w)(\exists z)(Hw \ \& \ Jz)$ ’ is false on \mathcal{I} . The biconditional (i.1) is false, because its left-side ‘ $Fa \leftrightarrow Ga$ ’ is false [since $\alpha \in \text{Ext}(F)$ but $\alpha \notin \text{Ext}(G)$], but its right-side (i.1r) ‘ $(\exists w)(\exists z)(Hw \ \& \ Jz)$ ’ is true. (i.1r) is true on \mathcal{I} , because its instance (i.1r.1) ‘ $(\exists z)(Ha \ \& \ Jz)$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} . Finally, (i.1r.1) is true on \mathcal{I} , because its instance (i.1r.1.1) ‘ $Ha \ \& \ Ja$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} [since both $\alpha \in \text{Ext}(H)$ and $\alpha \in \text{Ext}(J)$].