

Bayesianism & Explanationism

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There are two main kinds of epistemic requirements. First, let's examine these in the case of full (all-or-nothing) belief.

- **Correctness Requirements** (for full belief)
 - If p is false, then believing that p is incorrect.
 - Correctness requirements are *factive* — they involve relations between one's attitudes and *the facts* [27, 22, 28].
- **Rational Requirements** (for full belief)
 - If one believes both p and $\neg p$, then one's beliefs are *structurally* irrational (*viz.*, *incoherent*).
 - If one's total evidence K counter-supports p , then believing that p is *substantively* irrational.
 - Rational requirements are *non-factive* — they involve **either** (a) relations (of coherence) among one's attitudes (*structural* rationality) **or** (b) relations between one's total evidence K and one's attitudes (*substantive* rationality) [29].

This distinction also applies to Bayesian epistemology...

Let us suppose that our agent is equipped with a *confidence ordering* \geq over propositions. So that $p \geq q$ iff S is *at least as confident* in the truth of p as in the truth of q .

And, $p > q$ iff S is *strictly more confident* in p than in q .

- **Correctness Requirements** (for comparative confidence)
 - If p is false and q is true, then $p > q$ is incorrect.
 - Heuristically, correctness requirements involve *agreement with the attitudes of an omniscient agent* [14, 12, 18].
- **Rational Requirements** (for comparative confidence)
 - Intransitive \geq relations are *structurally* irrational. *E.g.*, the combination of attitudes $\{p > q, q > r, r > p\}$ is *incoherent*.
 - If one's total evidence K supports p strictly more strongly than K supports q , then $q \geq p$ is *substantively* irrational.

Bayesians also like to talk about *numerical degrees of confidence* (credences). Indeed, this will be our main focus today...

Let us suppose that our agent has (at each time t) *degrees of confidence* (*credences*) represented by a function $cr_t(\cdot)$.

The function $cr_t(\cdot | E)$ will reflect the agent's degrees of confidence (at t) — *on the indicative supposition that E is true*.

Finally, suppose our agent learns (exactly) E (with certainty) between t_0 and t_1 . So, her transition from $cr_{t_0}(\cdot)$ to $cr_{t_1}(\cdot)$ reflects the upshot of learning (precisely) the content E .

Structural Bayesianism involves a Trinity of Requirements [23].

1. **Synchronic (Non-Suppositional) Probabilism.** At each time t , the agent's (non-suppositional) credence function $cr_t(\cdot)$ should obey the (Kolmogorov) probability axioms.
2. **Synchronic (Suppositional) Ratio Formula.** At each time t , the agent's (suppositional) credence function $cr_t(\cdot | E)$ should obey the ratio formula $cr_t(\cdot | E) = \frac{cr_t(\cdot \& E)}{cr_t(E)}$.
3. **Diachronic Conditionalization.** $cr_{t_1}(\cdot)$ should equal $\frac{cr_{t_0}(\cdot \& E)}{cr_{t_0}(E)}$.

The Fourth Pillar of Structural Bayesianism *follows from* (1)–(3).

4. **Learning & Supposing.** $cr_{t_1}(\cdot)$ should equal $cr_{t_0}(\cdot | E)$.

de Finetti [3] gave Dutch Book Arguments for both (1) and (2).

Accuracy-dominance arguments for (1) are now popular [18]. One can also give an accuracy-dominance argument for (2) [10].

Lewis and others have aimed to adapt de Finetti’s argument for (2) into a “diachronic Dutch Book” argument for (3) [19].

Like de Finetti, I view (1) and (2) as the *fundamental* Bayesian principles governing the (structural) rationality of credences.

I have always been more skeptical about the existence and nature of “diachronic coherence requirements.” Indeed, there seem to be *many* reasons to worry about (3) & (4) [11, 30, 24].

I will focus, primarily, on the synchronic requirements (1) & (2), and how they (allegedly) interact with Explanationism.

There are also *substantive* Bayesian requirements. In general, these are of the following generic form: If one’s total evidence at time t (K_t) is such and so, then $cr_t(\cdot)$ should be thus and such.

Let $\{H_1, \dots, H_n\}$ be some partition of alternative hypotheses (putative explanations of E) entertained by an agent (at time t).

Substantive Bayesianism (some example requirements)

- **The Principle of Indifference** [7]. If K_t does not favor any H_i over any H_j , then $cr_t(H_i)$ should equal $cr_t(H_j)$, $\forall i, j$.
- **The Principal Principle** [17]. If K_t entails that the objective chance of H_i is c (and K_t doesn’t contain/imply any inadmissible evidence), then $cr_t(H_i)$ should equal c .
- **The Requirement of Total Evidence** [15, 1, 28]. $cr_t(H_i)$ should be equal to the evidential probability $Pr(H_i | K_t)$.

Next up: Explanationism. I will follow Douven’s [5] recent discussion of (the various explications of) Explanationism.

As Douven [5] explains, there have been various historical views regarding the proper formulation of Explanationism.

Rather than rehearsing Douven’s list of historical explications in detail, I will remain at a higher level of abstraction.

☞ The basic idea behind Explanationism is that some “epistemic credit” should accrue to a hypothesis H in virtue of its being the best explanation of E (among the available alternatives $\{H_k\}$).

The question in which I am interested is: What is the best way to accommodate this basic Explanationist idea — of “credit” accruing to E ’s best explanation — *within a Bayesian framework?*

van Fraassen [25] and Douven [5] maintain that a Bayesian should incorporate Explanationism *by revising some of the basic requirements of Structural Bayesianism: (1)–(3)*.

I will focus on Douven’s proposal, since it is more precise, and it can be couched in purely synchronic terms [as a revision of (2)].

Douven recommends that Bayesians *revise the Ratio Formula* (2) in such a way that the following alternative to Bayes’s Theorem is adopted (for hypotheses $H_i \in \{H_1, \dots, H_n\}$ and evidence E).

$$\text{EXPL. } cr_t(H_i | E) = \frac{cr_t(H_i) \cdot cr_t(E | H_i) + c(H_i, E)}{\sum_{k=1}^n [cr_t(H_k) \cdot cr_t(E | H_k) + c(H_k, E)]},$$

where $c(H, E) \in [0, 1)$ is H ’s “ E -abductive credit score.” And, $c(H, E) > 0$ iff H best explains E (o.w. $c(H, E) = 0$).¹

Note that *if there is no best explanation* of E among the $\{H_k\}$, then **EXPL** reduces to Bayes’s Theorem (since all of the credit scores $c(H_k, E)$ will be equal to zero in such a case).

Because **EXPL** leads to violations of Structural Bayesianism [*viz.*, (2)], Douven discusses various ways a defender of **EXPL** might respond to de Finetti’s [3] Dutch Book argument for (2).

¹This definition can’t be quite right, since sometimes $c(H, E)$ will need to be ≥ 1 in order to emulate some Bayesian abductive updates. See Extras.

☞ There is a more elegant way to capture the idea of “abductive credit,” which avoids the probabilistic incoherencies of [5, 25].

Note that there is something odd about thinking of **EXPL** as a *structural* requirement in the first place. **EXPL** has this form:

EXPL. $cr_t(H_i | E)$ should receive a boost — over and above the value prescribed by Bayes’s Theorem — just in case $(\mathbb{A}_i) H_i$ is the best explanation of E (among the $\{H_k\}$).

Read literally, then, **EXPL** relates $cr_t(H_i | E)$ to *the fact* that H_i best explains E , which makes **EXPL** a *correctness* requirement.

In order for **EXPL** to be a *structural* requirement, it would have to be stated *as a relation among the agent’s credences*. To wit:

EXPL₁. $cr_t(H_i | E)$ should receive a boost — over & above its Bayes’s Thm value — iff *the agent is certain at t that* \mathbb{A}_i .²

²We also have to be careful to allow this “boost” to occur *only once* — presumably, when \mathbb{A}_i is *first learned*. Otherwise, H_i will be “over-boosted.”

Even **EXPL₁** is arguably not a (pure) structural requirement, since it only constrains agents who *entertain* \mathbb{A}_i , for some H_i and E .

Pure structural requirements (*e.g.*, probabilism) do not presuppose anything about the *contents* of an agent’s attitudes.³

☞ If **EXPL** is going to be a (non-vacuous) *rational* requirement, then it must presuppose that the agent *entertains* \mathbb{A}_i , for some H_i and E . And, in that case, I think a preferable explication exists.

Evidential Relevance of Abduction (ERA). Let \mathbb{A}_j assert that H_j is the best (or perhaps the *only* [4, 8]) explanation of E (among the available $\{H_k\}$). Then, it is — in *some* cases — *rationally required* that an agent’s credence function at t_0 be such that

$$cr_{t_0}(H_j | E \ \& \ \mathbb{A}_j) > cr_{t_0}(H_j | E \ \& \ \neg \mathbb{A}_j).$$

³One could also interpret **EXPL** as a relation between S ’s *total evidence* at t [K_t] and their credences at t [$cr_t(\cdot)$]. But, as with **EXPL₁**, we would have to be careful to state such a requirement so as to allow *only one* “boost” to occur, per hypothesis — presumably, when K_t comes to entail \mathbb{A}_j *for the first time*.

I’m not the first one to propose something like **ERA**. Climenhaga, Hartmann *et. al.*, Lange, and Weisberg have all argued convincingly for similar principles [2, 16, 26, 4, 13, 8].

Roche & Sober [20] agree that **ERA** is the right *formulation* of Explanationism; but, they argue that **ERA** is *false* — *viz.*, that \mathbb{A}_j is *never* relevant to H_j (on the supposition of the evidence E).

I think Climenhaga [2] and Lange [16] do a pretty good job of responding to Roche & Sober’s skeptical argument [20].

The main thing I would add to Climenhaga’s and Lange’s trenchant responses Roche & Sober is the following point.

☞ In order to refute R&S’s skepticism, all that is required is a *single example* in which \mathbb{A}_j is relevant to H_j (given E).

I will close by discussing just such an example (involving Newton, Einstein, and the motion of Mercury), which is a well-known instance of The Problem of Old Evidence [6].

Let $E \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{what was (collectively) known about the precession of the perihelion of Mercury in } t_1 = 1914$.⁴

Let $H_1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{Newton’s theory of planetary motion}$, and $H_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{Einstein’s theory of general relativity}$. This yields the following 3-element partition of hypotheses: $\{H_1, H_2, H_3 = \neg H_1 \ \& \ \neg H_2\}$.

If **ERA** applies in this case, then our agent should be such that

$$cr_{t_0}(H_2 | E \ \& \ \mathbb{A}_2) > cr_{t_0}(H_2 | E \ \& \ \neg \mathbb{A}_2).$$

Thus, after E was learned (between t_0 and t_1), we should have

$$cr_{t_1}(H_2 | \mathbb{A}_2) > cr_{t_1}(H_2 | \neg \mathbb{A}_2).$$

So, when \mathbb{A}_2 was subsequently learned in $t_2 = 1915$, it — and *not* E , which was *old evidence* at t_2 — provided a boost to H_2 [13, 8].

⁴Of course, E had been known for many years prior to 1914. It is widely agreed that t_0 would have been no later than 1882, when Newcomb calculated the Newtonian discrepancy in Mercury’s precession precisely.

How would EXPL₁ handle this Old Evidence Problem?

Let us suppose that our agent became certain of A₂ in t₂ = 1915.

Then, according to EXPL₁, H₂ receives a “positive credit score” [c(H₂, E) > 0] and a boost in credence (at t₂) — over and above what Bayes’s Thm would recommend. Hence, EXPL₁ yields

$$cr_{t_2}(H_2 | E) > cr_{t_2}(H_2).$$

In this sense, according to EXPL₁, E confirms H₂ in 1915.

☞ I see (at least) two problems with this application of EXPL₁.

- It is *misleading* to say that E is what confirms H₂ in 1915. It is A₂ — by ensuring c(H₂, E) > 0 — that is doing the work.
- In addition to the machinery of probability theory [modulo (2)], Douven also needs a “theory of credit scores.” In this sense, the (Bayesian) ERA approach is *more parsimonious*. [See Extras for a detailed formal example, which brings this out.]

The simplest formal example of Douven v. Bayes involves a 2-element partition {H₁ = H, H₂ = ¬H}, evidence E, and an abductive claim A asserting that H explains E better than ¬H.

Our Bayesian agent will begin with a prior cr_{t₀}(·) over the algebra generated by the three atoms H, E, A. Between t₀ and t₁, they will learn E, and between t₁ and t₂ they will learn A.

I will assume cr_{t₀}(·) satisfies the following six (6) constraints.

- cr_{t₀}(·) is regular.
- E (initially) confirms H [cr_{t₀}(H | E) > cr_{t₀}(H | ¬E)].
- ERA applies [cr_{t₀}(H | E & A) > cr_{t₀}(H | E & ¬A)].
- E is (a priori) irrelevant to A. [cr_{t₀}(A | E) = cr_{t₀}(A | ¬E)].
- A is (a priori) irrelevant to H. [cr_{t₀}(H | A) = cr_{t₀}(H | ¬A)].
- cr_{t₀}(H) = cr_{t₀}(E) = cr_{t₀}(A) = 1/2.

There are many priors that satisfy (i)–(vi). I will choose a relatively simple one for illustrative purposes.

A	E	H	cr _{t₀} (·)	cr _{t₁} (·) = cr _{t₀} (· E)	cr _{t₂} (·) = cr _{t₀} (· E & A)
T	T	T	7/32	7/16	7/8
T	T	F	1/32	1/16	1/8
T	F	T	1/32	0	0
T	F	F	7/32	0	0
F	T	T	3/32	3/16	0
F	T	F	5/32	5/16	0
F	F	T	5/32	0	0
F	F	F	3/32	0	0

Our Bayesian agent is such that cr_{t₂}(H) = cr_{t₀}(H | E & A) = 7/8.

Douven’s rule for computing cr_{t₂}(H | E) will yield the Bayesian answer of 7/8 here *only if* H’s credit score is c(H, E) = 1 ∉ [0, 1).

In fact, we’ll need to allow c(H, E) ∈ [0, ∞). See my PrSAT [9] notebook fitelson.org/douven.pdf (.nb) for technical details.

☞ I would argue that this is how the values of c(H, E) should be “reverse engineered.” But, then, why *not* just go *fully Bayesian*?

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