

Page 158 #6. ‘If Fermat was a French mathematician, then he was famous.’ Our domain of discourse (\mathcal{D}), predicates (R, M, F), and individual constant (i.e., the proper name of the individual person Fermat) (f) are:

$M_ : _$ is a mathematician $R_ : _$ is French
 $F_ : _$ is famous f : Fermat
 \mathcal{D} : people

In “Loglish,” we have ‘If Rf and Mf , then Ff ’. In LMPL, this becomes: ‘ $(Rf \& Mf) \rightarrow Ff$ ’.

Page 158 #16. ‘If no wealthy economist exists then no famous mathematician exists.’ Our domain of discourse (\mathcal{D}) and predicates (W, E, F, M) are:

$W_ : _$ is wealthy $E_ : _$ is an economist
 $F_ : _$ is famous $M_ : _$ is a mathematician
 \mathcal{D} : people

In “Loglish,” we have ‘If there does not exist an x such that both Wx and Ex , then there does not exist an x such that both Fx and Mx ’. In LMPL, this becomes the following: ‘ $\sim(\exists x)(Wx \& Ex) \rightarrow \sim(\exists x)(Fx \& Mx)$ ’.

Page 165 #5. ‘If it rains, only the killjoys will be happy.’ Our domain of discourse (\mathcal{D}), predicates (K, H), and atomic sentence letter (R) are as follows:

$K_ : _$ is a killjoy R : ‘It rains.’
 $H_ : _$ is happy \mathcal{D} : people

In “Loglish,” we have ‘If R , then only the K ’s will be H ’. Or, in other words, ‘If R , then all H ’s will be (the) K ’s’. In LMPL, this is: ‘ $R \rightarrow (\forall x)(Hx \rightarrow Kx)$ ’. Here, ‘ $R \rightarrow (\forall x)(Hx \rightarrow Kx)$ ’ is also defensible, since the English sentence says ‘*the* killjoys’.

Page 165 #15. ‘No voter will be satisfied unless some politician who is elected is incorrupt.’ Lexicon:

$E_ : _$ is elected $P_ : _$ is a politician
 $C_ : _$ is corrupt $V_ : _$ is a voter
 $S_ : _$ is satisfied \mathcal{D} : people

This sentence says: ‘ p unless q ’, where p says ‘There does not exist an x such that Vx and Sx ’, and q says ‘There exists an x such that Ex and Px and not Cx ’. In LMPL, p is ‘ $\sim(\exists x)(Vx \& Sx)$ ’, and q is ‘ $(\exists x)[(Px \& Ex) \& \sim Cx]$ ’. Recall, ‘ p unless q ’ is symbolized *either* as ‘ $\sim q \rightarrow p$ ’ (p. 23) *or* as ‘ $p \vee q$ ’ (p. 57). So, both:

$$\sim(\exists x)[(Px \& Ex) \& \sim Cx] \rightarrow \sim(\exists x)(Vx \& Sx)$$

and

$$\sim(\exists x)(Vx \& Sx) \vee (\exists x)[(Px \& Ex) \& \sim Cx]$$

are acceptable.

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The existential claim ‘ $(\exists x)(Ix \rightarrow Hx)$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} , because its instance ‘ $Ia \rightarrow Ha$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} , since $\alpha \notin \text{Ext}(I)$.

Page 179 #9. The universal claim ‘ $(\forall x)(\exists y)[Fx \rightarrow (Hx \vee Jy)]$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} , since all three of its instances are true on \mathcal{I} : (i) the existential claim ‘ $(\exists y)[Fa \rightarrow (Ha \vee Jy)]$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} because its instance ‘ $Fa \rightarrow (Ha \vee Ja)$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} , since $\alpha \in \text{Ext}(H)$. (ii) ‘ $(\exists y)[Fb \rightarrow (Hb \vee Jy)]$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} because its instance ‘ $Fb \rightarrow (Hb \vee Ja)$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} , since $\beta \in \text{Ext}(H)$. Finally, (iii) ‘ $(\exists y)[Fc \rightarrow (Hc \vee Jy)]$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} because its instance ‘ $Fc \rightarrow (Hc \vee Ja)$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} , since $\alpha \in \text{Ext}(J)$.

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‘ $(\forall x)(\forall y)[(Fx \leftrightarrow Gy) \leftrightarrow (\exists w)(\exists z)(Hw \& Jz)]$ ’ is false on \mathcal{I} , since its instance (i) ‘ $(\forall y)[(Fa \leftrightarrow Gy) \leftrightarrow (\exists w)(\exists z)(Hw \& Jz)]$ ’ is false on \mathcal{I} . Instance (i) is false on \mathcal{I} , because its instance (i.1) ‘ $(Fa \leftrightarrow Ga) \leftrightarrow (\exists w)(\exists z)(Hw \& Jz)$ ’ is false on \mathcal{I} . The biconditional (i.1) is false, because its left-side ‘ $Fa \leftrightarrow Ga$ ’ is false [since $\alpha \in \text{Ext}(F)$ but $\alpha \notin \text{Ext}(G)$], but its right-side (i.1r) ‘ $(\exists w)(\exists z)(Hw \& Jz)$ ’ is true. (i.1r) is true on \mathcal{I} , because its instance (i.1r.1) ‘ $(\exists z)(Ha \& Jz)$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} . Finally, (i.1r.1) is true on \mathcal{I} , because its instance (i.1r.1.1) ‘ $Ha \& Ja$ ’ is true on \mathcal{I} [since both $\alpha \in \text{Ext}(H)$ and $\alpha \in \text{Ext}(J)$].

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Interpretation \mathcal{I}_1 establishes that:

$$(\exists x)(Fx \leftrightarrow Gx) \neq (\exists x)(Fx \vee Gx)$$

$$(\mathcal{I}_1) \quad \frac{\quad}{\alpha} \left| \begin{array}{cc} F & G \\ - & - \end{array} \right. \quad [\mathcal{D} = \{\alpha\}, \text{Ext}(F) = \emptyset = \text{Ext}(G)]$$

On \mathcal{I}_1 , the premise ‘ $(\exists x)(Fx \leftrightarrow Gx)$ ’ is true, because its instance ‘ $Fa \leftrightarrow Ga$ ’ is true, since $\alpha \notin \text{Ext}(F)$ and $\alpha \notin \text{Ext}(G)$. But, on \mathcal{I}_1 , the conclusion ‘ $(\exists x)(Fx \vee Gx)$ ’ is *false*, because its instance ‘ $Fa \vee Ga$ ’ is false, since $\alpha \notin \text{Ext}(F)$ and $\alpha \notin \text{Ext}(G)$.

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Interpretation \mathcal{I}_2 establishes that:

$$(\forall x)Fx \rightarrow (\exists x)Gx \neq (\forall x)(Fx \rightarrow Gx)$$

$$(\mathcal{I}_2) \quad \frac{\quad}{\beta} \left| \begin{array}{cc} F & G \\ \alpha & + \quad - \\ \beta & - \quad - \end{array} \right. \quad [\mathcal{D} = \{\alpha, \beta\}, \text{Ext}(F) = \{\alpha\}, \text{Ext}(G) = \emptyset]$$

On \mathcal{I}_2 , the premise ‘ $(\forall x)Fx \rightarrow (\exists x)Gx$ ’ is true, because its antecedent ‘ $(\forall x)Fx$ ’ is false, since instance ‘ Fb ’ of the antecedent is false [$\beta \notin \text{Ext}(F)$]. But, on \mathcal{I}_2 , the conclusion ‘ $(\forall x)(Fx \rightarrow Gx)$ ’ is *false*, because its instance ‘ $Fa \rightarrow Ga$ ’ is false, since $\alpha \in \text{Ext}(F)$ but $\alpha \notin \text{Ext}(G)$.

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Interpretation \mathcal{I}_2 also establishes that:

$$(\exists x)[Fx \rightarrow (\forall y)Gy] \neq (\exists x)Fx \rightarrow (\forall y)Gy$$

On \mathcal{I}_2 , the premise ‘ $(\exists x)[Fx \rightarrow (\forall y)Gy]$ ’ is true, because its instance ‘ $Fb \rightarrow (\forall y)Gy$ ’ is true, since $\beta \notin \text{Ext}(F)$. But, on \mathcal{I}_2 , the conclusion ‘ $(\exists x)Fx \rightarrow (\forall y)Gy$ ’ is *false*, because its antecedent ‘ $(\exists x)Fx$ ’ is true [$\alpha \in \text{Ext}(F)$]; but its consequent ‘ $(\forall y)Gy$ ’ is false [in fact, *neither* $\alpha \in \text{Ext}(G)$ *nor* $\beta \in \text{Ext}(G)$].