Dear 125ers, Hope you all had a Happy Thanksgiving! This email contains a couple of announcements, and the final exam questions. A copy of this message is archived on the website (see the homepage, and/or the lecture notes page for links). (1) The GSI union has called for a strike this week. It is unclear right now how this will impact the course. As of now, we are working under the assumption that no disruption of our schedule will ensue. But, this may change (to be updated at the beginning of class Tuesday). (2) My (Branden's) office hours for this week will be a bit different than what I had announced last week in lecture. They will be: M (2-4), W (2-4), and F (2:30-4:30). Note that I will NOT have hours on Tuesday (that's the change, which is due to a lecture I must attend after class Tuesday). This change is already reflected on the course homepage. (3) Final exam questions below (you might want to print this out) ... Philosophy 125 Fall 2003 Final Exam Questions 12/01/03 Below, you will find four questions from each of the four units we covered this semester. This amounts to sixteen questions in total. Of these sixteen, exactly eight will appear on the final exam -- two from each of the four units. On the final exam, you will be asked to answer exactly one question from each of the four units (a total of four questions). The final exam will be held (provided that we are not forced to change plans, because of a GSI strike -- stay tuned!) in our normal classroom, 159 Mulford @ 12:30-3:30 pm on Thursday, December 11, 2003. UNIT #1: Universals 1.1 In response to the Russellian paradox, Loux claims that (page 36) "To avoid the paradox, we have no option but to deny that there is a universal associated with the general term 'does not exemplify itself'". Do you agree? Can you think of an alternative way to avoid the paradox? (Hint: is the only assumption at work here that the property 'does not exemplify itself' exists? Or, are there other assumptions required to generate the paradox?). Your answer should in your own words, (a) describe the Russellian Paradox, and (b) discuss and critically evaluate Loux's claim (above) about the paradox (which may involve providing an alternative way out of the paradox). 1.2 Explain how Carnap's metalinguistic nominalism handles cases of abstract reference. Then, describe the two main problems faced by Carnap's (naive) metalinguistic approach and explain how Sellars' more sophisticated metalinguistic nominalism avoids these two problems (use illustrative examples wherever possible). Finally, briefly discuss what you think is the most serious problem faced by Sellars' theory (as applied to the problem of abstract reference), and explain how he might cope with it. 1.3 Loux argues that austere nominalism cannot adequately cope with the phenomena of abstract reference without introducing explanatory primitives which he calls `ceteris paribus clauses'. In particular, Loux claims that the austere nominalist is forced to appeal to `ceteris paribus clauses' to account for the (necessary) truth of the abstract claim "Courage is a virtue". Reconstruct Loux's argument for this claim. Then, briefly discuss your take on his argument (focusing ONLY on the "Courage is a virtue" example). Do you think this example leads to a compelling argument for `ceteris paribus clauses' as explanatory primitives in the austere nominalist's theory? If not, do you think there are any OTHER examples that DO put pressure on the austere nominalist to use `ceteris paribus clauses'? Or, do you think that the austere nominalist might be able to avoid them altogether? Explain. 1.4 Here is an excerpt from an argument presented by Loux, which is supposed to expose a serious problem for a set-theoretic, trope-theoretic account of universals and abstract reference: "Given that sets have their members necessarily, the trope theorist is committed to the claim that the set that is courage could not have had a different membership. ... On the trope theorist's account, however, concrete objects, persons, are courageous just in case they have a trope that is a member of the set that is identical with courage. But if that set could not have had more or fewer members than it does, we have the result that there could not have been more or fewer courageous individuals than there, in fact, are." Reconstruct Loux's argument (this also requires you to briefly explain what the set-theoretic, trope-theoretic account of universals and abstract reference is). Then, critically evaluate the argument, by describing what you take to be the most serious objection to it. In the end, do you think this is a good argument? Does it really expose a serious problem for the set-theoretic trope theory of abstract reference? Or, can this trope theorist avoid this objection. UNIT #2: Particulars (both concrete and abstract particulars) 2.1 Describe Black's two-sphere example, and explain how this is supposed to constitute a counterexample to the Identity of Indiscernibles (II). Your discussion should (aside from carefully describing (II) and Black's argument against it): (a) describe at least one plausible response (the best one you know) to Black's argument (on behalf of a defender of II), (b) try to explain the distinction between "pure" and "impure" properties, (c) render a judgment on the overall strength of Black's argument -- that is, take a position on whether the argument succeeds in refuting (II), and support this position. 2.2 Explain Quine's metalinguistic nominalism regarding propositions. Then, describe the two main problems faced by Quine's (naive) metalinguistic approach to propositions, and explain how Sellars' and Prior's more sophisticated metalinguistic nominalisms (about propositions) avoid these two problems (use examples where possible). Finally, briefly discuss what you think is the most serious problem faced by these theories of Prior and Sellars. Which do you prefer: Sellars' approach to nominalizing propositions or Prior's, and why? 2.3 Briefly describe the slingshot argument (either Davidson's or Godel's). Your discussion should make clear (a) what the key assumptions of this argument are, (b) how the conclusion of the argument can be avoided (by a defender of facts who thinks there is more than one of them), and (c) what you think the ultimate moral of the slingshot argument is -- that is, what lesson(s) should we, ultimately, take away from the argument. 2.4 Compare and contrast TWO of the following three theories of concrete particulars: (a) bundle theory (your favorite variety thereof), (b) substratum theory, and (c) Aristotelian substance theory (that is, Loux's rendition thereof). Your discussion should address the following five key questions concerning theories of concrete particulars: (i) what proportion of a concrete particular's properties are necessary (de re)? (ii) Is the Identity of Indiscernibles (II) true? (iii) Are concrete particulars complexes or simples? (iv) What are the constituents of concrete particulars? (v) What diversifies particulars (i.e., what individuates them)? Which of these theories of concrete particulars do you prefer, and why? UNIT #3: Modality 3.1 (a) Demonstrate -- using illustrative examples -- that the modal operators (e.g., "necessarily" and "possibly") are intensional, and that, as a result, (de dicto) modal sentences are opaque. Then, (b) explain how possible world semantics (PWS) provides an extensional semantics (i.e., extensional translations) for modal claims (here, you can ignore the subtleties arising from the `accessibility relation' which appears in the sophisticated rendition of PWS). Specifically, take one of the (de dicto) examples you used in part (a), and translate it using (PWS). Then, show that this translation does not involve any intensional operators, and that the translation is no longer opaque (at least, not in the same way that the original modal claim was opaque). 3.2 Describe the fundamental problem of de re contingencies. To fix ideas (and to make the question more precise), (a) explain why a naive possible world semantics (PWS) translation of "Socrates contingently has five fingers on his right hand" is inconsistent with the indiscernibility of identicals (not to be confused with the identity of indiscernibles!). Then, (b) describe your favorite way to restore the consistency of (PWS) and the indiscernibility of identicals (i.e, your favorite account of de re contingency). Finally, (c) defend your favorite account of de re contingency against what you take to be the most serious objection to it (preferably, an objection we discussed in class). [Note: It may help here to contrast your account of de re contingency with what you take to be its most formidable opposing view.] 3.3 (a) Explain how Lewis uses possible worlds and sets (and set theory) to nominalize (or reduce) properties and propositions (use examples to illustrate). Then, (b) use Lewis' technique to provide a "nominalistic explanation" of the distinctness of the properties "having a kidney" and "having a heart". Next, (c) describe what you think is the strongest objection to Lewis' modal-reductionistic nominalism (for properties or propositions), and explain how you think Lewis should respond to this objection. Finally, (d) do you think Lewis' account of propositions and properties is superior to either austere nominalism or metalinguistic nominalism about either propositions or properties? Why or why not (here, it may help to enumerate a few `pros and cons' of Lewisian vs other nominalisms like austere and metalinguistic)? 3.4 On the Possibilist account of modality (e.g., Lewis), there exist possible objects that do not inhabit the actual world in any way. On the Actualist view (e.g., Plantinga/Stalnaker), there are no such objects; all possible objects are parts of the actual world. Compare and contrast these two accounts of "actuality". What difference, if any, is there between the actual world and the plethora of possible worlds, on both views? Which view do you think is better on this score, and why? Nonetheless, are there any notable weaknesses of the view you favor (i.e., anything you still feel a bit uncomfortable about)? Explain. UNIT #4: Causation 4.1 Discuss the "causal differences argument" for fine-graining of the causal relata. To fix ideas, you may focus on Lewis' rendition of the argument, which claims that John's saying "hello" must differ from John's saying "hello" loudly, since only the former causes Fred to greet John in return, and only the latter is caused by John's state of tension. First, (a) reconstruct the argument. Then, (b) discuss the following two lines of response considered by Schaffer: (i) that the argument conflates causation and explanation (Davidson's reply), (ii) that the argument, if pushed to its logical conclusion, forces us to take an extremely fine-grained view of the causal relata (e.g., Achinstein's reply says the argument pushes all the way to Dretske's ultra fine-grained view). Finally, (c) do you think either response is adequate? Explain. And, do you think this is a good argument for fine-graining the causal relata (as Kim and Lewis do)? Explain. 4.2 Discuss EITHER (a) the preemption argument OR (b) the fizzling argument against thinking of causation as involving the cause raising the probability of the effect. This involves (i) reconstructing one of the arguments (here, you can use your favorite example of preemption or fizzling to flesh out the argument you choose to discuss), (ii) discussing two possible replies -- the ones you think strongest -- that could be made on behalf of "probability-raising" theorists, and (iii) giving your own view (with support) as to whether preemption and/or fizzling really are serious problems for the probability raising conceptions of causation (or whether the probability-raising idea ultimately survives these challenges somehow). 4.3 Discuss EITHER (a) the disconnection argument OR (b) the misconnection argument against thinking of causation as involving some sort of process that connects cause and effect. This involves (i) reconstructing one of the arguments (here, you can use your favorite example of disconnection or misconnection to flesh out the argument you choose to discuss), (ii) discussing two possible replies -- the ones you think strongest -- that could be made on behalf of "process" theorists, and (iii) giving your own view (with support) as to whether disconnection and/or misconnection really are serious problems for the process conceptions of causation (or whether the process idea ultimately survives these challenges somehow). 4.4 Discuss the issue of the transitivity of the causal relation. Specifically, (i) explain why the following causal chain from (c) to (d) to (e) seems to exhibit intransitivity: Tom puts potassium salt in the fireplace (c), Dick then tosses a match in the fireplace, which results in a purple fire blazing in the fireplace (d), which then spreads and immolates Harry (e). Second, (ii) explain how fine-graining the intermediate event (d) in the above causal chain can help to restore its transitivity. Then, (iii) explain why the following causal chain from (c*) to (d*) to (e*) seems to exhibit intransitivity: The boulder begins to roll down the hill towards the hiker's head (c*), which causes the hiker to duck (d*), which in turn causes the hiker to survive (e*). Finally, (iv) discuss this example, with an eye toward trying to restore transitivity. Will fine-graining (d*) help in this case? Is there any way to restore transitivity in this case? Do you think causation is or is not transitive? Explain.