Dear 125ers, This email is to announce the first sets of (graded) study questions and paper topics. There are three (3) graded study questions in this first set (you are to answer ALL of these -- in about one page, single spaced, each -- these will be grade mainly for effort and comprehension, and no comments will be given on them), which are as follows: (1) On p. 23, Loux distinguishes between a one-place universal and a many-place universal. What is the difference? Is this a substantial metaphysical difference? Briefly discuss the differences and similarities between one and many-place universals, and any important ramifications they might have for metaphysical realism. (2) Quine says: In debating over what there is, there are still reasons for operating on a semantical plane. One reason is to escape from the predicament noted at the beginning of this essay: the predicament of my not being able to admit that there are things which McX countenances and I do not. So long as I adhere to my ontology, as opposed to McX's, I cannot allow my bound variables to refer to entities which belong to McX's ontology and not to mine. I can, however, consistently describe our disagreement by characterizing the statements which McX affirms. Provided merely that my ontology countenances linguistic forms, or at least concrete inscriptions and utterances, I can talk about McX's sentences. Try to explain in your own words what Quine has in mind here. Specifically, explain how the nominalist should interpret or understand a realist when they say "There are universals (for instance, Courage)." (3) Explain how Russell's theory of descriptions (described by both Quine and Russell) paraphrases the claim ``The present king of France is bald.'' On Russell's account, does this claim come out true or false? Do you think this is the right answer? Answer these same questions for the claim ``Courage is a virtue''? There are five (5) paper topics in this first set (you are to CHOOSE ONE of them to write on -- in 5 pages, double-spaced -- the paper will be graded in much more detail than the study questions, with comments), which are as follows: (1) Describe Austere Nominalism (the strongest rendition of it you can muster), giving one argument for it (the best one you can think of). Critically evaluate this argument. If you ultimately find it persuasive, then defend it against potential objections (the best ones you can think of); if you don't, criticize it. Your answer should contain some discussion of the issues of simplicity and explanatory primitives, discussed by Loux in connection with Austere Nominalism. (2) What is the relation of exemplification? How must it be restricted for Metaphysical Realism to have a chance, and why? Is this view defensible, in your view? Defend your view. (3) Describe Bradley's regress. Do you agree with Loux when he suggests that Bradley's regress is really no more troublesome for the realist than the Parmenidean regress(es)? Why or why not? What, ultimately, do you think realists should conclude from Bradley's regress (i.e., how should they respond to it), and why? (4) Develop and analyze one of the arguments (the one you think is strongest) adduced by Loux in support of Metaphysical Realism in chapter 1. (That is, select either an instance of the Attribute Agreement Argument, the Predication Argument or the Abstract Reference Argument, depending on which one you think is strongest.) Is this argument compelling, in your opinion? Explain why or why not. (5) How does Sellars' metalinguistic nominalism represent an improvement over Carnap's. What problems are there with Sellars' improvements, according to Loux? Do you agree with him? Why or why not? Both the study questions, and the paper are due four weeks hence (on 10/16/03). These assignments are also announced on the course website (where a copy of this email was posted on 9/18/03). See: http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~fitelson/125/. Good luck! Best, Branden