Dear 125ers,

This email contains the second set of paper topics and study questions.
A copy of this email is posted on our website (see the course home
page). You are to write on ONE of the (FOUR) paper topics below, and you
are to answer ALL of the (THREE) study questions below.  Both are due at
the final exam on Thursday 12/11/03 at 12:30pm (in our usual classroom).

PAPER TOPICS: Choose ONE of the FOUR topics below

(1) Compare and contrast Lewis' realist, non-actualist Counterpart
Theory of de re modality and Plantinga's realist, actualist account of
de re modality.  In particular, compare and contrast the ways in which
each of these accounts reconciles the indiscernibility of identicals
with the naive possible world semantics rendition of "Socrates
contingently has five fingers on his right hand".  Your discussion
should cover what you take to be the most important ways in which Lewis
and Plantinga disagree about modality generally and de re modality in
particular, as well as those objections the each account that you think
are most important and worrisome.  In the end, which account of de re
modality do you think is more plausible, and why?

(2) Pick your favorite account of concrete particulars (e.g., some
version of bundle theory, or substratum theory, or the Aristotelian
theory of particulars, etc.), and explain the conception of concrete
particulars that it endorses.  Your discussion should (at least) include
an explanation of where your favorite theory comes down on: (i) the
identity of indiscernibles, (ii) whether particulars have any attributes
necessarily, (iii) whether particulars are complexes or simples.  Also,
you should describe what you take to be the most compelling objection to
your favorite theory, and explain how you think the objection can (or
should) be answered.  [If you're really ambitious, you might also want
to consider what consequences your favorite theory of particulars has
for DE RE modal claims about particulars (e.g., as in question (1)).]

(3) Describe the realist account of propositions, its motivation, and at
least one of its applications (preferably, the application of
proposition-realism that you think is most important or compelling).
Then, describe your favorite version of nominalism about propositions
(e.g., Quine's, or Sellars', or Prior's).  Can your favorite
nominalistic theory of propositions do the work that the realist theory
is supposed to do (in the central application you discussed above)?
What's the strongest objection against your favorite nominalistic theory
of propositions, and how is it best handled?

(4) What is the slingshot argument, and how do the Russellian theory of
descriptions and facts provide a way to avoid its conclusion?  More
precisely: briefly outline the slingshot argument (your favorite version
of it), and explain what it's key assumptions are. Then, briefly
describe Russell's theory of descriptions and facts and show how this
Russellian combination can provide us with a way to avoid the
undesirable conclusion of the slingshot argument.


STUDY QUESTIONS:  Answer ALL of the THREE questions below

(1) Describe the similarities and differences between Kim and Davidson's
respective theories of events.  Specifically, what does  each theory say
about: (i) the logical structure of events (e.g., the relationship
between "the bolt gave way suddenly" and "the bolt gave way"), and (ii)
the role that events play in causal claims (e.g., what do they say about
"the bolt's giving way suddenly, and not the bolt's giving way, caused
the collapse")?

(2) What is an intensional operator, and what is an opaque statement?
Explain why modal operators are intensional (use examples).  Also,
explain why the operator "I believe that" is intensional (use examples).
Do you think the operator "that" is intensional (Loux discusses this on
pp.146-147)?  Explain.

(3) Consider the following anonymous objection to Lewisian nominalism
about properties and propositions: "On Lewis' view, properties and
propositions are just sets.  But, sets have their members necessarily.
So, on Lewis' view, it follows that nobody could have had any properties
other than those they actually have (hence, his account of DE RE
modality is absurd).  And, it also follows from Lewis' nominalism that
no propositions could have been true, other than those that are actually
true (hence his theory of DE DICTO modality is absurd)."  Do you think
this is a good objection?  Or does it rest on a misunderstanding of
Lewis' account?  Explain.