

Announcements and Such

- *Bob Marley*: “Guava Jelly”, “Screw Face”, and “Trenchtown Rock” from *Songs of Freedom*
- I’m already receiving music requests (thanks!)
- Paper topics for first essay will be posted next week
- **Reception Friday for Φ Majors (3-5 in 301 Moses)**
- Today: Memory (I of I)
 - First, a PS on perception (Jessica Handcock)
 - How many “F”s do you count in the following?

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 FINISHED FILES ARE THE RE-
 SULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTIF-
 IC STUDY COMBINED WITH THE
 EXPERIENCE OF YEARS
 ++++

Memory and Perception I

Perception	Memory
Agent <i>S</i>	Agent <i>S</i>
Object <i>o</i>	Event <i>e</i>
<i>S</i> 's perceptual experience <i>P</i> of <i>o</i>	<i>S</i> 's memorial experience <i>M</i> of <i>e</i>
Causal relation linking <i>o</i> and <i>P</i>	Causal relation linking <i>e</i> and <i>M</i>

Memory and Perception II

Perception	Memory
<i>S</i> sees <i>o</i>	<i>S</i> remembers <i>e</i> (also, <i>S</i> remembers <i>o</i>)
<i>S</i> sees <i>o</i> as <i>F</i>	<i>S</i> remembers <i>e</i> as <i>F</i> (also, <i>S</i> remembers <i>o</i> as <i>F</i>)
<i>S</i> sees <i>o</i> to be <i>F</i>	<i>S</i> remembers <i>e</i> to be <i>F</i> (also, <i>S</i> remembers <i>o</i> to be <i>F</i>)
<i>S</i> sees that <i>o</i> is <i>F</i>	<i>S</i> remembers that <i>e</i> is <i>F</i> (also, <i>S</i> remembers that <i>p</i>)

Memory and the Past I

- *Memories* can be thought of as *stored* or *retained* experiences and/or beliefs
- They must be *retained* in such a way that they can be “called-up” (“accessibility”)
- Not all retained beliefs about the past are *memory beliefs* (need right *causation*)
 - I *retain* beliefs about The Alamo (from HS), but I don’t *remember* The Alamo
- *Remembering* is *factive*. *S* cannot remember *e* if it didn’t happen.
- But, memories can be erroneous. I may remember the planting of the oak tree, but remember it *as* a maple-planting.

Memory and the Past II

- Even *true* retained beliefs about the past do not necessarily count as *remembering*
- As a child, Mary dreamt that mother dated Elvis Presley. She never told anyone about this dream, but she actually *believed* what she dreamt. There was no *justification* for her belief — it was based *merely* on her fantasy. Mary *retained* this fanciful belief into adulthood, and one day her mother told her about her *actual* romance with Elvis.
- All along, Mary *retained* the *true belief* that her mother dated Elvis. But, Mary did *not remember* this — *remembering* must be *grounded* in a particular way.

The Causal Basis of Memory Beliefs I

- We can block the Mary case by requiring that memory beliefs be *caused* by (relevant) past events. But, we need *more*:
 - Unbeknownst to John, someone poisons his soup. He eats the soup and gets ill. John (a doctor) correctly *infers* from his illness that (*p*) his soup was poisoned.
- John's belief that *p* (which is *justified and true!*) is *caused* (albeit, *indirectly*) by the poisoning. But, it's *not a memorial belief*.
- John's *memory* has played no role in *supporting the content* of his belief.
- Analogy: not all JTBs that are *caused* by *perceptible objects* are *perceptual* beliefs.

The Causal Basis of Memory Beliefs II

- Moreover not all memorial beliefs are *caused* by events in the familiar way.
- We can remember *mathematical* truths, but these beliefs are not *caused* (in the usual sense) by *mathematical objects*.
- Indeed, this is one of the epistemological challenges that mathematical realists (*e.g.*, Platonists about numbers) face.
- Memorial beliefs are *traceable to a learning* event. But, they are sometimes (*e.g.*, mathematics) not *about any* event.
- Also, we can remember propositions about the future (no backward causation!). I can remember that the sun will explode.

What a Theory of Memory Must Do

- Any *theory* of memory must tell a story about the three *modes* of memory:
 - **Remembering** events, things, propositions
 - **Recalling** events, things, propositions
 - Memory as the **capacity in virtue of which** things are remembered or recalled
- A theory of memory must also have a story about *errors* involving memory
- We will see naive (direct), representational, and phenomenalist theories of memory
- We will focus on cases in which memorial beliefs are formed (they need not be), and (at least) remembering *of* (an event) occurs

Naive Direct Realist Theory of Memory I

- **Naive, direct realism:** *remembering* of an event is a matter of our memory (*directly*) “presenting us” with the event *as it was*
- There is *no intermediate representation* (no “memory-data”) presented to us in memory
- There must be an *unbroken causal chain* linking the event and the remembering
 - Last year, I pruned my tree. You watched. You remember my pruning of the tree, but I have forgotten the event altogether.
 - This *breaks my* memorial causal chain
- I may learn *by your testimony that* I pruned the tree, but I *don't* remember *pruning it*

Naive Direct Realist Theory of Memory II

- Let's say I *retain* my belief *that* I pruned the tree (that is, I retain my *testimonial* belief)
- *Then*, I have a *memory belief that* I pruned the tree. But, I don't remember *pruning it*.
- So, remembering *that* an event *e occurred* does not imply remembering *of e*
- Naive direct realism about memory faces similar problems as in perception
- Memorial beliefs can be *erroneous*. I may remember *e*, but *falsely* remember *e as F*. This might be called *memorial illusion*.
- Also, I may have an experience *intrinsically indistinguishable from* remembering *e*, even if *e* didn't happen (*memorial hallucination*).

Representative Theory of Memory I

- **Representative theory of remembering:** our memories present us with *mental representations* (“memory-data”) of events
- *Events* (with our memory-systems) cause *memory-data*, which cause *remembering*
- On this view, one might think of memory-data as “residue” of sense-data (generally, of memory as “residue” of perception).
- Memory-data are presumably (normally) distinguishable from sense-data
- Memories can be vivid, but we shall assume that SD are more vivid, or in some other way (normally) distinguishable from MD
- Next: comparing MD & SD in some detail...

Representative Theory of Memory II

- The treatment of illusion and hallucination is similar for MD-theory as for SD-theory
- *Memorial illusion:* *S* is directly acquainted with an MD of *e* (*i.e.*, *e did* happen and *cause S's MD*, which *S* experienced), but it *misrepresents e as* being *F*, when it isn't
- *Memorial hallucination:* *S* has an experience *intrinsically indistinguishable from* that of a direct acquaintance with an MD of *e*, but (in fact) *e* never happened
- Audi speaks of “memory *images*” or “*images*”. I prefer the term “memory-data”.
- The representative theory of memory (MD-theory) has similar problems to SD-theory

Representative Theory of Memory III

- Does *remembering e* require *recalling* it — calling up a “mental image” of the event?
- It seems not. It seems that we can reel-off from memory many details of past events without calling-up any “images” of them
 - The use “*image*” might make MD implausible
- Does *misremembering* an event *e as F* require acquaintance with an MD that *is F*?
- It seems not. I may misremember a meeting we had as being in New York, without calling-up any “images” of New York.
- When I retrospectively imagine a past event, must there be something I “see” (like sense-data and perception)? Again, it seems not.

Representative Theory of Memory IV

- Things seem *even worse* for MD than for SD.
- In the case of *seeing*, we *do* seem to have access to “images” (or something like ‘em)
- But, with remembering, this is much less clear. Some people do seem to have “visual memories”, but not everyone.
- It is true that I cannot *recall* the color of my old car without having something like an image of the car which depicts color
- But, it seems that I can *remember* the color of my old car, without such an image
- So, the MD-theory seems even *less* compelling than the SD-theory did

Adverbial Theory of Memory I

- **The Adverbial Conception of Memory:** Roughly, *remembering* is *experiencing in a memorial way*. More precisely, we have:
 - *Actively (occurently) remembering e* is *realizing* a memorial capacity concerning *e*, where this capacity is linked to *e* by an unbroken causal chain. This may involve:
 - *Mental imaging* processes concerning *e*
 - *Formations of memorial beliefs* about *e*
 - *Considering* such propositions, with a sense of *already* believing them
 - *Passively (dispositionally) remembering e* is having this capacity in an *unrealized* state

Adverbial Theory of Memory II

- I have the *capacity* to remember something, if it is *possible* for me to do so (under suitable “reminding” conditions)
- If this capacity is *realized*, then I actively/occurently remember something
 - Analogy: salt has a *disposition* to dissolve. To *realize* this disposition, it must *actually* be placed in a *solvent* (water).
 - Dispositions are *counterfactual* properties. If the salt *were* placed in water, it *would* dissolve. Dispositional memory is similar.
- Almost all of our memories (at any given time) are *dispositional* and not occurent.
- This is much different than *perception!*

Adverbial Theory of Memory III

- One might complain that the adverbial theory requires too little “imaging”
- It doesn’t even require imaging for *occurrent* remembering of *concrete, perceived* events (vs dispositional or abstract propositional remembering)
- When we *self-consciously evoke* or **recall** the memory of some past event *e* we perceived ourselves, we often (if not always) engage in *some* amount of “imaging” of *e*
- But, all this shows is that the *recalling* of an imageable event does require imaging.
- But, remembering (generally) does not. Recalling is a *special kind* of remembering.

Remembering, Recalling, and Recognition

- If we can’t bring ourselves to *recall/image* an event or an object, we may come to *believe* that we can’t remember it. But...
 - Suppose I can neither *recall* nor *image* Susan. But, upon seeing her again, I *recognize* her and I remember our last meeting. Don’t I *remember her*?
- It is harder to draw this distinction w/past *events*, since those cannot *brought back*.
- But, *e.g.*, I may see a picture or a film of a past event which “jogs” my memory and causes me to *recognize* that event, even though I was unable to recall/image it.
- Audi: this favors the Adverbial theory. (?)

The Epistemological Role of Memory I

- Memory is a source of beliefs in the way the a storehouse is a source of things that have been put there — *not* like *perception* is.
- Memory is a mental capacity that *preserves* beliefs and enables us to *call them up*.
- Memory also enables us to *draw on* our beliefs to supply *premises* in reasoning.
- Audi: Remembering is *knowledge-entailing*. If *S remembers* that *p*, then *S knows* that *p*. This differs from Audi’s *seeing that p*, and is a controversial claim (more on this below)
- Memory can also provide *justification*. Audi: *memorial* justification and knowledge behave differently than *perceptual* J&K.

The Epistemological Role of Memory II

- Just as with perception, there are relations between memory, justification, and knowledge. But, Audi thinks they differ.
- It seems clear that one can remember that *p* without being *justified* in believing that *p*.
- *S* may (in fact) remember that *p*, but reasonably think they have lots of other evidence that *undermines* this claim.
- In such a case, it seems wrong to say that *S* is *justified* in believing *p*. But, normally, remembering does imply justification.
- This yields epistemic principles for the relation between memory and justification analogous to those for perception.

The Epistemological Role of Memory III

• General Memorial Justification Principle

- Normally, clear and confident memory beliefs with any subject matter are *prima facie* justified (and, if they do not conflict with other beliefs, *etc.*, they are justified).
- The *degree* of justification may be small, particularly if there is no corroboration (and, the support provided is *defeasible*).
- Audi: *S remembers that $p \Rightarrow S$ knows that p , but S remembers that $p \not\Rightarrow S$ is justified in believing that p . So, Audi thinks that knowledge does not imply justification!*
- Why? Knowledge can be *preserved* by memory, *even if* justification is *defeated*.

Knowledge as a Preservative vs Generative Source I

- Memory has a *preservative* capacity with respect to belief, knowledge & justification.
- You cannot remember something unless you previously believed (or knew) it.
- This previous believing/knowing will (typically) not be grounded in memory.
- Typically, the original belief will be the result of perception or some other *primary* source of belief/knowledge.
- So, memory does not *generate* belief or knowledge. But, by *using* what you have in memory, you can acquire beliefs and knowledge through inference, *etc.*
- Memory is *connected with* knowledge...

Knowledge as a Preservative vs Generative Source II

• Memorial knowledge principle

- Normally, a true memory belief, supported by a vivid, steady experience of recall that is in turn corroborated by other memory experiences, represents knowledge
- But, what makes this principle work is that the belief was *originally* formed in such a way that it would ordinarily constitute knowledge
- In this sense, memory is not a *basic* source of *belief/knowledge*. But, it *can be* (according to Audi/Huemer) a basic source of *justification*.
- Memory can *provide* justification for a belief (as opposed to *merely preserving* a previous justification it originally had) *via* the *way* in which the proposition or event occurs to one.