

## Announcements and Such

- Today's Music: *Procol Harum*: "Simple Sister" and "A Whiter Shade of Pale" from *Classics Volume 17*
- We now have a *course discography*, and I will be taking song requests (by email — 10 minute limit).
- Sections will meet next week @ 301 Moses
  - Look for email on your section assignment
  - Talk to GSIs about section times/changes
- Final course roster will be set next week.
- Branden's office hours are cancelled today
- Today's Lecture: Perception I (of III)
- First: Two "leftovers" from last time.

## Two Senses of "Reasonable" Belief

- Epistemology is about a *special (epistemic) kind* of "reasonableness"
- Example: I offer a \$1M to those who believe some insignificant falsehood ( $p$ )
- In one sense, it would be "reasonable" for you to (be such that you) believe  $p$ .
- This is *not* the sense of "reasonable" that *epistemology* is concerned with
- We need a connection to the *truth* of  $p$
- This is made more subtle by non-standard conceptions of *truth*.
- We'll return to that wrinkle later...

## Perception vs Introspection (Follow-up)

- Example #1:  $S$  sees a (straight) pencil in water, and (falsely) believes it's bent
- $S$  does *not* see a bent pencil (later, we'll say she sees a straight pencil *as* bent)
- Does  $S$  see *something* that they (falsely) believe is a bent pencil? (Yes.)
- Example #2: By introspection ("seeing in her mind's eye"),  $S$  comes to believe she's imagining a green field.
- Assume  $S$  is mistaken (if it's possible).
- Is  $S$  imagining *something* that  $S$  (falsely) believes is a green field? (Less clear.)
- We'll return to these questions soon...

## Perception I.1

- There are various kinds of sensory perception (seeing, hearing, *etc.*)
- We will focus on *seeing*, but the distinctions we'll make are general.
- We're interested in cases of *perceptual belief* — beliefs *grounded in* perception (*not merely* beliefs *about* perceptibles)
- Paradigm case: I see a green field, and (on this basis) I believe two things:
  - that *there is* a green field before me
  - that *I am seeing* a green field
- First: elements & kinds of perception

## Perception I.2

- There are four *elements* of perception:
  - The **perceiver**  $S$ 
    - Me (in our paradigm case)
  - The **object**  $o$  perceived by  $S$ 
    - The field before me
  - The **sensory experience**  $e$  had by  $S$ 
    - My visual experience (shapes, *etc.*)
  - The **relation** between  $S$  and  $o$ 
    - The causal relation by which  $o$  produces  $e$  in  $S$

## Perception I.3

- Three modes of perception (seeing)
  - **Perceiving of:**  $S$  (simply) perceives the  $F(o)$ 
    - I see the field
  - **Perceiving to be:**  $S$  perceives the  $F(o)$  to be  $G$ 
    - I see the field to be *rectangular*
  - **Perceiving that:**  $S$  perceives that the  $F(o)$  is  $G$ 
    - I see that the field is rectangular
- These three modes of perception are distinct.
- However, there are crucial conceptual relations between these three modes of perception...

## Perception I.4

- Seeing that and seeing to be are different than simple seeing
- $S$ 's (*simply*) seeing  $o$  doesn't require  $S$  to have *any beliefs about*  $o$  at all
- But, seeing that and seeing to be *do*...
- If  $S$  sees  $o$  (which we describe as "the  $F$ ") to be  $G$ , then  $S$  believes that  $o$  is  $G$
- I'll assume  $o$  is  $S$ 's name for "the thing they are currently perceiving"
  - If I see the field to be rectangular, then I believe that it's rectangular.
- *Seeing that* requires *even more* in the way of belief/cognition from  $S$ ...

## Perception I.5

- If I see that the field is rectangular, then I must believe *two* things — that...
  - ...the thing I'm seeing is *rectangular*
  - ...the thing I'm seeing is *a field*.
- But, I can see the field to be rectangular *without* believing it to be *a field*.
- Cuter Example: Lois Lane sees Clark Kent to be flying. But, she does *not* believe that Clark Kent can fly.
- In *all* cases of perception we must have *simple* perception (*i.e.*, *perceiving of*)

## Perception I.6

if \ then	<i>S must believe o to be G</i>	<i>S must believe that o is F</i>
<i>S sees the F (o)</i>	No	No
<i>S sees the F (o) to be G</i>	Yes	No
<i>S sees that the F (o) is G</i>	Yes	Yes

## Perception I.7

if \ then	<i>S must see the F</i>	<i>S must see the F to be G</i>	<i>S must see that the F is G</i>
<i>S sees the F</i>	Yes	No	No
<i>S sees the F to be G</i>	Yes	Yes	No
<i>S sees that the F is G</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes

## Perception I.8

- *Seeing that* and *seeing to be* both require *S* to grasp certain concepts
- I can't see the field *to be* rectangular unless I grasp *rectangularity*
- And, I can't see *that* the field is rectangular without grasping *both rectangularity* and the *field* concept
- Example: If I've just awoken from a 50-year coma, I can't see the silver box on my desk *to be* a DVD player.
- Nor can I see *that* the DVD player is silver. But, I *can see* the DVD player.

## Perception I.9

- *Seeing that* involves *more* cognition/ conceptualization than *seeing to be*.
  - *Seeing that* is *propositional* seeing.
  - *Seeing to be* is *objectual* seeing.
- We *see that propositions* are true; but we see *objects to be* certain ways.
- Thus, I can see an object *to be* a certain way, without seeing *that* any *particular* proposition (about that object) is true.
- That is, I may not have beliefs about what *o* (the object of my perception) *is*
- In this sense, objectual perception is less definite than propositional.

## Perception I.10

- *Objectual* perception can allow us to “bootstrap” *propositional* beliefs/knowledge about unfamiliar things
  - Example: I see the flare in the distance *to be* certain ways (*e.g.*, to have a fading glow with a certain trajectory, *etc.*)
  - Using these objectual perceptions, I come to believe that it *is* a flare.
- Then, I can have *propositional* beliefs, *e.g.*, that *the flare* in the distance is red (not just *objectual* beliefs regarding *o*)
- In this sense, objectual perception is *more basic* than propositional

## Perception I.11

- *Seeing that* and *seeing to be* are *veridical experiences* (*i.e.*, *factive*)
- If I see *that* the field is green (or see it *to be* green), then it *is* (*in fact*) green.
- When my senses lead me astray, I am *not* perceiving *that* or perceiving *to be*
- Example: I see the (straight) stick in the water, but I do *not* see the stick *to be* bent (nor do I see *that* it is bent)
- I may see it *as* bent (more below)
- *S*'s (simple) perceiving *of o* often leads to *S* having *some* true belief about *o*.
- But, this is not always the case...

## Perception I.12

- I may see a bird in the distance without forming any particular belief about it
- Later, if asked, I may be able to form a belief about it by *recalling* my seeing it
- Perceptual experience provides “raw material” (a “ready basis”) for beliefs
- Even if I don't form a true *propositional* belief (on the basis of a perceptual experience), I may form a true *objectual* one
  - I see the bird fleetingly and I form the (false) belief that it is a blowing leaf
  - I may (on the same perceptual basis) also (truly) believe the bird *to be* dark

## Perception I.13

- The Perceptual Hierarchy
  - Simple Perception is *basic*
  - Objectual perception depends on simple
  - Propositional depends on objectual
- Simple perception gives us *access to (a vast amount of) perceptual information*
- This perceptual information need not be propositional/conceptualized (*imagistic*)
- But, it can serve to ground objectual and propositional (perception and) belief
- *Many* beliefs are *situationally* perceptually justified (*e.g.*, <1M people are in this rm.)

## Perception I.14


- When I observe the (straight) stick in the water, I may see it *as* bent, but I do not see it *to be* bent (nor *that it is* bent)
- So, seeing *as*  $\not\Rightarrow$  seeing *that* (or *to be*)
- We see things *by* seeing their properties/aspects — *aspectual* perception.
- But, seeing *by*  $\not\Rightarrow$  seeing *as*.
  - I see the van Gogh painting *by* its distinctive brush strokes
  - But, I may not see it *as* having these distinctive brush strokes (because my experience is dominated by the whole)

## Perception I.15

- Putting things together so far:
  - *S* simply perceives *o* (say, *S* sees *o*)
  - This may not produce *any* belief about *o*
  - But, *S* does see *o*, and *S* does see *o* by seeing some property *F* that *o* has
  - However, *S* need not see *o* as an *F*
  - And, even if *S* does see *o* as an *F*, this “seeing as” can fail to *epistemically ground* *S*'s belief that *o* is *F* (why?)
  - If things are good, then *S* not only sees *o* as an *F*, but also sees *o* to be an *F*
  - And, *S* may even see *that o* is an *F*

## Perception I.16

- Finally, an *epistemic principle*!
- **The Visual Justification Principle**
  - If *S* sees that *o* is *F*, then *S* is *prima facie* justified in believing that *o* is *F* on the basis of their visual experience.
  - And, if *S*'s visual grounding for their belief that *o* is *F* is *undefeated*, then *S* is *justified* in believing that *o* is *F*.
- Examples of *defeat*:
  - *S* has been hallucinating all manner of things in their present context
  - *S* receives strong evidence that *o* is *not F*



## Perception I.18

- An interesting case to ponder
  - I look in the direction of a nearby tree which has a (nearly perfect) chameleon sitting on a branch
  - We are in normal circumstances, and I have a very high quality visual experience of the tree, *etc.*
  - I don't recognize the presence of a chameleon (even if asked, and even if allowed to stare, study, recollect, *etc.*)
  - Do I see the chameleon?
  - Which properties do I see it *by*?
  - I clearly don't see it *as* anything, *etc.*